flagrant violation (Utah) · Go Syfert
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flagrant violation in Utah

14 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Autoliv ASP, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servicesgreen
utahctapp · 2001 · cited in 3 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2007–2012
2 sentences

2012The alternative way to establish knowledge is to prove that "the conduct involved is a flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior." See Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2001 UT App 198, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah Admin.

2012The alternative way to establish knowledge is to prove that “the conduct involved is a flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior.” See Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2001 UT App 198, ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah Admin.

33
Texas v. McCulloughgreen
scotus · 1986 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Thus, the Court held that "(due process of law ... requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial." Id. at 725 . °19 The Court has subsequently made clear, however, that a presumption of vindictiveness does "not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial." Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986).

2013Thus, the Court held that "(due process of law ... requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial." Id. at 725 . °19 The Court has subsequently made clear, however, that a presumption of vindictiveness does "not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial." Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986).

22
Bhatia v. Department of Employment Securitygreen
utahctapp · 1992 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2001–2007
2 sentences

2007See, eg., Au-toliv ASP, 2001 UT App 198 at 1 27, 29 P.3d 7 (concluding that emailing sexually explicit jokes, pictures, and videos in the workplace "constitutes a flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior"); Bhatia v. Department of Employment Sec., 834 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (concluding that "angrily walking off the job in the middle of a busy shift at a crucial time for the employer's business, leaving others to assume ... responsibilities, and us[ing] vulgarity within the hearing of customers" constituted a violation of a universal standard of behavior).

2001P. R994-405-208(1)(e) (2000). 1 21 Utah's appellate courts have only onee determined whether the conduct of an employee constituted "a flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior." In Bhatia v. Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 574 (Utah Ct.App.1992), we upheld the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission's conclusion that an employee's "behavior in angrily walking off the job in the middle of a busy shift at a crucial time for the employer's business, leaving others to assume his responsibilities, and his use of vulgarity within the hearing of customers was 'a flagran

22
Spackman Ex Rel. Spackman v. Board of Educationgreen
utah · 2000 · cited in 3 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2011–2019
2 sentences

2019As we have already noted, the Spackman test consists of three elements: (1) that the constitutional violation the plaintiff suffered was a flagrant violation; (2) that existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries; and (3) that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s rights or redress his or her injuries.78 ¶46 Because Mr. Kuchcinski has identified the County, and not a specific County employee, as the alleged violator of his due process rights, he can satisfy the first, or flagrant violation, prong of this test only by proving th

2011In addition, even if we were to conclude that a flagrant violation of the Jensens' procedural due process rights occurred, monetary damages nonetheless would be an inappropriate remedy because the Jensens have failed to establish the third Spackman element, "that equitable relief .. was and is wholly inadequate to [protect the plaintiff's rights or] redress [their] injuries.'' Spackman, 2000 UT 87, ¶ 25 , 16 P.3d 533 .

13
Jensen Ex Rel. Jensen v. Cunninghamgreen
utah · 2011 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See, e.g., Jensen, 2011 UT 17 , ¶ 52 (describing how this court has “incorporated and expanded upon” the “defense of absolute immunity from section 1983 civil rights actions” in determining when a municipal officer is immune from suit under Spackman); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496 , 497–98 (Utah 1998) (relying on Section 1983 jurisprudence to determine whether a court-appointed psychologist qualifies for judicial immunity).

11
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen
scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019The court justified its reading by stating that the language in Spackman referring to human frailties “would be rendered meaningless if a constitutional offender was not _____________________________________________________________ 26 2000 UT 87, ¶ 23 . 27 Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 28 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 639–40 (1987)). 29Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 , 739–40 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spackman, 2000 UT 87 ). 10 Cite as: 2019 UT 21 Opinion of the Court specifically named.” A

2019The court justified its reading by stating that the language in Spackman referring to human frailties “would be rendered meaningless if a constitutional offender was not _____________________________________________________________ 26 2000 UT 87, ¶ 23 . 27 Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 28 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 639–40 (1987)). 29Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 , 739–40 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spackman, 2000 UT 87 ). 10 Cite as: 2019 UT 21 Opinion of the Court specifically named.” A

11
Nelson v. Department of Employment Securitygreen
utahctapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001However, our review of the record persuades us that the claimants' conduct violated a universal standard of behavior and any other determination would be unreasonable. 120 Autoliv need not establish "knowledge" with a clear explanation or written policy and consistent enforcement of that policy if Guzman and King's conduct was "a flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior." Nelson, 801 P.2d at 162 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Utah Code Admin.

11
Tanglewood Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. Henkegreen
texapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995See Tanglewood Homes Ass'n v. Henke, 728 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex.App.1987). 6 .

11
Kehl v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commissiongreen
utah · 1985 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
1 sentence

1989Code R475-5b-2(l)(b) (1988) states that “[t]he employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the employer expected.” The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to mean that “[kjnowledge may not be established *25 unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a pertinent written policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior.” Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129, 1133 (Utah 1985).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Bott v. DeLand green
utah · 1996
2 sentences

2011The "flagrant" requirement "ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary 'human frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering [him or herjself liable for a constitutional violation'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bott, 922 P.2d at 740 ). 167 The defendants contend that a flagrant violation cannot exist absent clear precedent on point that specifically recognizes the claimed right and applies it to analogous facts.

2011The "flagrant" requirement "ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary `human frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering [him or her]self liable for a constitutional violation.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bott, 922 P.2d at 740 ). ¶67 The defendants contend that a flagrant violation cannot exist absent clear precedent on point that specifically recognizes the claimed right and applies it to analogous facts.

32011–2019
Anderson v. Creighton green
scotus · 1987
2 sentences

2019The court justified its reading by stating that the language in Spackman referring to human frailties “would be rendered meaningless if a constitutional offender was not _____________________________________________________________ 26 2000 UT 87, ¶ 23 . 27 Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 28 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 639–40 (1987)). 29Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 , 739–40 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spackman, 2000 UT 87 ). 10 Cite as: 2019 UT 21 Opinion of the Court specifically named.” A

2011The "flagrant" requirement "ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary `human frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering [him or her]self liable for a constitutional violation.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bott, 922 P.2d at 740 ). ¶67 The defendants contend that a flagrant violation cannot exist absent clear precedent on point that specifically recognizes the claimed right and applies it to analogous facts.

22011–2019
State v. DeBooy green
utah · 2000
2 sentences

2011The Jensens' Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Seizures 198 The Jensens' final claim is that their rights under article I, section 14 to be free from unreasonable seizure were violated when Mr. Jensen was arrested in Idaho in August 2008 and when both parents were "booked and released in Utah in September 2003." This court has recognized that while article I, section 14 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution have identical language, "we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this

2011The Jensens' Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Seizures 198 The Jensens' final claim is that their rights under article I, section 14 to be free from unreasonable seizure were violated when Mr. Jensen was arrested in Idaho in August 2008 and when both parents were "booked and released in Utah in September 2003." This court has recognized that while article I, section 14 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution have identical language, "we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this

22011–2011
Dexter v. Bosko green
utah · 2008
1 sentence

2022Further, to be a flagrant violation in satisfaction of the Spackman test, “the conduct at issue [must] be more than negligent to be actionable.” Dexter, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 21 .

12022–2022
Parker v. Dodgion green
utah · 1998
1 sentence

2019See, e.g., Jensen, 2011 UT 17 , ¶ 52 (describing how this court has “incorporated and expanded upon” the “defense of absolute immunity from section 1983 civil rights actions” in determining when a municipal officer is immune from suit under Spackman); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496 , 497–98 (Utah 1998) (relying on Section 1983 jurisprudence to determine whether a court-appointed psychologist qualifies for judicial immunity).

12019–2019
Kuchcinski v. Box Elder County green
utah · 2019
2 sentences

2019The court justified its reading by stating that the language in Spackman referring to human frailties “would be rendered meaningless if a constitutional offender was not _____________________________________________________________ 26 2000 UT 87, ¶ 23 . 27 Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 28 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 639–40 (1987)). 29Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 , 739–40 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spackman, 2000 UT 87 ). 10 Cite as: 2019 UT 21 Opinion of the Court specifically named.” A

2019Although we are not bound by federal caselaw or the reasoning of federal courts, the district court on remand is, of course, free to consider the reasoning in these and other related cases as part of its deliberate indifference analysis. 26 Cite as: 2019 UT 21 Opinion of the Court determination made by the jury.83 ¶47 Finally, the district court must also make determinations regarding the final two prongs of the Spackman test—whether “existing remedies do not redress” Mr. Kuchcinski’s injuries, and whether “equitable relief . . . was and is wholly inadequate to protect [his] rights or redress

12019–2019
Brown v. Illinois green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

2015The court of appeals affirmed under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

2015The court of appeals affirmed under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

12015–2015
North Carolina v. Pearce red
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

2013The Court reasoned that "it would be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every recon-victed defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside." Id. at 728-24 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 .

2013The Court reasoned that "it would be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every recon-victed defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside." Id. at 728-24 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 .

12013–2013
Bruce Barcellona, Cross-Appellants v. Tiffany English Pub, Inc., D/B/A Tgi Friday's, Cross-Appellee green
ca5 · 1979
1 sentence

1997The Fifth Circuit Court expressed concern regarding “the inconsistency between the [district court’s] finding of a flagrant violation [of the FLSA] and yet a later denial of liquidated damages based on nondefiant ignorance.” 597 F.2d at 468 .

11997–1997

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 42u.s.c.1983 (3) UT § Utah Code § 35A-4-405 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 40 (1922–2014) AL 37 (1847–2012) CA 24 (1908–2026) TX 19 (1911–2022) FL 16 (1918–2021) UT 14 (1989–2022) MS 13 (1910–2021) NY 13 (1920–2008) MI 12 (1946–2024) NC 11 (1916–2025) IA 10 (1963–2026) PA 9 (1841–2023) IN 8 (1986–2015) TN 8 (1872–2023) LA 8 (1944–2000) OK 8 (1917–1981) AR 8 (1959–2018) MO 7 (1889–1983) GA 7 (1915–1976) OR 6 (1967–2023) KY 6 (1925–2021) NJ 6 (1976–2023) KS 5 (1888–2026) ID 5 (1943–2021) AZ 5 (1969–2012) WA 5 (1961–2021) VA 4 (1951–2010) OH 4 (1924–2012) MT 4 (1910–1925) NE 4 (1955–2001) HI 4 (1963–2016) MD 3 (1948–2013) WI 3 (1912–2023) MA 3 (1935–2016) MN 3 (1996–2016) WV 3 (1959–1974) CO 3 (1926–1965) WY 2 (1973–2021) RI 2 (1892–1992) ND 2 (1916–1921)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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