flagrant violation in Florida

2003I believe the campaign actions of Judge Kinsey are quite similar to the behavior relating to the credibility of law enforcement witnesses described and condemned by the Second District Court of Appeal as “a flagrant violation of ... the Code of Judicial Conduct” in Dougherty v. State, 746 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “[T]o allow someone who has committed such misconduct during a campaign to attain office to then serve the term of judgeship obtained by such means clearly sends the wrong message to future candidates; that is, the end justifies the means and, thus, all is fair so long as th

2003I believe the campaign actions of Judge Kinsey are quite similar to the behavior relating to the credibility of law enforcement witnesses described and condemned by the Second District Court of Appeal as "a flagrant violation of... the Code of Judicial Conduct" in Dougherty v. State, 746 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). "[T]o allow someone who has committed such misconduct during a campaign to attain office to then serve the term of judgeship obtained by *100 such means clearly sends the wrong message to future candidates; that is, the end justifies the means and, thus, all is fair so long a

2005The supreme court agreed that the defendant violated the order in limine on numerous occasions and that the above-quoted was the most flagrant violation, which it deemed "highly prejudicial and improper." Id. at 909 .

2005The court explained that it was not just a "traditional empty chair argument," but instead emphasized that there had been "a prior suit against that empty chair." Id.

1997See Frost v. Ward, 622 So.2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Hill v. Feder, 564 So.2d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

1994Having found the motion to constitute a flagrant violation of rule 9.330(a), this court, in Reitzes , entered an order to show cause "why monetary or other sanctions should not be imposed." Id. at 1101 .

1994As the court in Parker observed, "[i]t is the accumulated weight of such motions that has caused this particular motion to tip the balance toward again doing something other than simply denying the motion." 499 So.2d at 848 . [2] Accordingly, and consistent with our action in Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp. v. Reitzes, supra, appellant's motion for rehearing is denied because it is without merit and constitutes a flagrant violation of rule 9.330(a).

1994As the court in Parker observed, "[i]t is the accumulated weight of such motions that has caused this particular motion to tip the balance toward again doing something other than simply denying the motion." 499 So.2d at 848 . [2] Accordingly, and consistent with our action in Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp. v. Reitzes, supra, appellant's motion for rehearing is denied because it is without merit and constitutes a flagrant violation of rule 9.330(a).

1988In Frazier, 467 So.2d at 447 , the Pearce case and its progeny were held to be inapplicable to the situation where, as here, the defendant has rejected a plea offer and elected to go to trial, in contrast to a defendant successfully attacking his original conviction and, after being reindicted by the prosecutor, reconvicted.

1986The petition for rehearing in the present case infracts the rule in all of the above particulars, and the profession is hereby put upon notice that in [the] future the court will adhere strictly to the requirements of the rule in such cases, and will visit infractions thereof by a refusal to consider such applications and with a dismissal thereof. 322 So.2d at 9 .

1982See Santuoso v. McGrath & Associates, Inc., 385 So.2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Ramos v. Sanchez, 375 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

1982Hamilton Electric, Inc., 181 So.2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), was a flagrant violation of discovery rules.

1981Where . . . the original conviction has been set aside because of a constitutional error, the imposition of such a punishment, “penalizing those who choose to exercise” constitutional rights, “would be patently unconstitutional.” Id. at 723-24 , 89 S.Ct. at 2079-80 , quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 , 88 S.Ct. 1209, 1216 , 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968).

1981Where . . . the original conviction has been set aside because of a constitutional error, the imposition of such a punishment, “penalizing those who choose to exercise” constitutional rights, “would be patently unconstitutional.” Id. at 723-24 , 89 S.Ct. at 2079-80 , quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 , 88 S.Ct. 1209, 1216 , 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968).

1979Kay v. Swimmer, 151 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Synthetic Environmental Development Corp. v. Sussman, 275 So.2d 291 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); City of Miami Beach v. Chadderton, 306 So.2d 558 (Fla.3d DCA 1975).

1979Kay v. Swimmer, 151 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Synthetic Environmental Development Corp. v. Sussman, 275 So.2d 291 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); City of Miami Beach v. Chadderton, 306 So.2d 558 (Fla.3d DCA 1975).

1979Kay v. Swimmer, 151 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Synthetic Environmental Development Corp. v. Sussman, 275 So.2d 291 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); City of Miami Beach v. Chadderton, 306 So.2d 558 (Fla.3d DCA 1975).

1969Initially, we observe that the principle is well established in Florida that, “[WJhere the essential requirements of law are not observed in making valuations of property for assessment, and the valuations as made are shown by admissions or proofs to be clearly excessive, unjust, and unequal, appropriate relief may be had in equity, even though the proceedings authorized by law for seeking relief from administrative officers were not utilized, where the case made shows a flagrant violation of or omission to follow the mandatory requirements of the law in valuing property for taxation.” Graham

1969Initially, we observe that the principle is well established in Florida that, “[WJhere the essential requirements of law are not observed in making valuations of property for assessment, and the valuations as made are shown by admissions or proofs to be clearly excessive, unjust, and unequal, appropriate relief may be had in equity, even though the proceedings authorized by law for seeking relief from administrative officers were not utilized, where the case made shows a flagrant violation of or omission to follow the mandatory requirements of the law in valuing property for taxation.” Graham

1956A few of the cases involving charges of similar misconduct wherein this court approved disciplinary action against the offending attorney are: In re Harrell, 156 Fla. 327 , 23 So.2d 92 ; In re Stoller, 154 Fla. 864 , 19 So.2d 312, 313 ; Weinstein v. State, 151 Fla. 287 , 9 So.2d 710 .

1956A few of the cases involving charges of similar misconduct wherein this court approved disciplinary action against the offending attorney are: In re Harrell, 156 Fla. 327 , 23 So.2d 92 ; In re Stoller, 154 Fla. 864 , 19 So.2d 312, 313 ; Weinstein v. State, 151 Fla. 287 , 9 So.2d 710 .

1956A few of the cases involving charges of similar misconduct wherein this court approved disciplinary action against the offending attorney are: In re Harrell, 156 Fla. 327 , 23 So.2d 92 ; In re Stoller, 154 Fla. 864 , 19 So.2d 312, 313 ; Weinstein v. State, 151 Fla. 287 , 9 So.2d 710 .

1956A few of the cases involving charges of similar misconduct wherein this court approved disciplinary action against the offending attorney are: In re Harrell, 156 Fla. 327 , 23 So.2d 92 ; In re Stoller, 154 Fla. 864 , 19 So.2d 312, 313 ; Weinstein v. State, 151 Fla. 287 , 9 So.2d 710 .

1956A few of the cases involving charges of similar misconduct wherein this court approved disciplinary action against the offending attorney are: In re Harrell, 156 Fla. 327 , 23 So.2d 92 ; In re Stoller, 154 Fla. 864 , 19 So.2d 312, 313 ; Weinstein v. State, 151 Fla. 287 , 9 So.2d 710 .

1956A few of the cases involving charges of similar misconduct wherein this court approved disciplinary action against the offending attorney are: In re Harrell, 156 Fla. 327 , 23 So.2d 92 ; In re Stoller, 154 Fla. 864 , 19 So.2d 312, 313 ; Weinstein v. State, 151 Fla. 287 , 9 So.2d 710 .

1939See Smith v. Smith, supra, 90 Fla., text 830, wherein Mr. Chief Justice Brown said: “However, where an allowance for solicitor’s fees pendente lite is prayed in the bill where the wife is the complainant, or in the answer or counterclaim or by petition where the *116 wife is defendant, and the pleadings of the wife make out a prima facie case, either affirmative or defensive, and testimony is taken bearing on such matters, the faculties of the parties, etc., either on special hearing or during the taking of testimony on the main issues, we are not prepared to say that under our statute an orde

1939See Smith v. Smith, supra, 90 Fla., text 830, wherein Mr. Chief Justice Brown said: “However, where an allowance for solicitor’s fees pendente lite is prayed in the bill where the wife is the complainant, or in the answer or counterclaim or by petition where the *116 wife is defendant, and the pleadings of the wife make out a prima facie case, either affirmative or defensive, and testimony is taken bearing on such matters, the faculties of the parties, etc., either on special hearing or during the taking of testimony on the main issues, we are not prepared to say that under our statute an orde

1933City of Stuart 97 Fla. 69 , 120 So. 335 .

1933City of Stuart 97 Fla. 69 , 120 So. 335 .

1918Jones v. Fox, supra; Steele v. State, 33 Fla. 354 , 14 South.