Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
95 California opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2026 88 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vivargreen2 sentences2026(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527 ; Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 959.) “ ‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ ” (Vivar, at p. 527.) If the superior court heard testimony, we “give particular deference 12 to [any] factual findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses.” (Id. at pp. 527-528.) But “[w]here, as here, the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other documents . . . , there is no reason to conclude the trial court has the same special 2026(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) Applying this standard, we “ ‘exercise[ our] independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ ” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527 (Vivar).) B. | 18 | 79 |
People v. George T.green2 sentences2025Trial courts and juries are better situated to resolve questions of fact, while appellate courts are more competent to resolve questions of law. review of the ultimate judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence”].) Where, as here, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, such review is generally described as “independent review.” (See In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 [when an appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings while “exercis[ing] its independent judgment to determine 2025(Ibid.) “[I]ndependent appellate review of a mixed law and fact question is crucial when an excessively deferential appellate affirmance risks error in the final determination of a party’s rights, either as 16 to the entire case, or on a significant issue in the litigation.” (Ibid.) For these reasons, independent review is the appropriate standard here. “[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 .) Independent review is not the same as de novo review “ ‘i | 4 | 9 |
In Re Resendizred2 sentences2025(Id. at p. 527, citing In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.); see also Vivar, at p. 527, fn. 6 [distinguishing substantial evidence review, where factual findings are binding if supported by substantial evidence, from independent review].) 6 B. 2021(See In re Ernesto H. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 298, 306 ; cf. George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 634 [under a de novo standard, “ ‘a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence’ ”].) In reviewing the constitutional claim raised in Resendiz, we explained that factual determinations that are based on “ ‘the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed’ ” are entitled to particular deference, even though courts reviewing such claims generally may “ ‘reach a different conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent examination of the evidence . . . even wh | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mejiagreen2 sentences2023Appellant’s Failure to Meaningfully Understand the Immigration Consequences The first question under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) is whether appellant met his burden to establish “he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319; accord, Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529 .) “[T]he focus of an inquiry in a section 1473.7 motion is on the ‘defendant’s own error in … not knowing that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States.’ ” (People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 2021In assessing the latter element, courts should look to ‘contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.’” (DeJesus, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th 17 at pp. 1133-1134 ; see Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865-866; Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1011-1012; Ruiz, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.) We review the denial of a section 1473.7 motion independently.13 (Vivar, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [2021 Cal. Lexis 2968, at p. *5].) “‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ | 2 | 2 |
Virginia v. Blackgreen2 sentences2014Accordingly, we will defer to the juvenile court’s credibility determinations, but will ‘“‘make an independent examination of the whole record’”’ [citation], including a review of the constitutionally relevant facts ‘“de novo, independently of any previous determinations by the [juvenile court]”’ [citations] to determine whether minor’s poem was a criminal threat entitled to no First Amendment protection.” (Ibid.) “[T]he words actually used must constitute a threat in light of the surrounding circumstances.” (Id. at p. 636.) The First Amendment does not protect “‘[t]rue threats,’ [which] encom 2014Accordingly, we will defer to the juvenile court’s credibility determinations, but will ‘“‘make an independent examination of the whole record’”’ [citation], including a review of the constitutionally relevant facts ‘“de novo, independently of any previous determinations by the [juvenile court]”’ [citations] to determine whether minor’s poem was a criminal threat entitled to no First Amendment protection.” (Ibid.) “[T]he words actually used must constitute a threat in light of the surrounding circumstances.” (Id. at p. 636.) The First Amendment does not protect “‘[t]rue threats,’ [which] encom | 2 | 2 |
Jose Gomez-Fernandez v. William Barrgreen2 sentences2026The Immigration Consequences Under federal law, attempted murder, assault with great bodily injury, and assault with a firearm are all either aggravated felonies or crimes of violence that are aggravated felonies if a defendant is sentenced to at least one year imprisonment. ( 18 U.S.C. § 16 (a) [defining “crime of violence” as an offense “that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another”]; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a)(43)(A) [murder is an aggravated felony], (F) [defining aggravated felony as a crime of violence for which the 2021(People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 527 .) “‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’” (Ibid.) “Where, as here, the facts 6 derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, . . . ‘[t]he trial court and this court are in the same position in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding.” (Id. at 528.) “Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under s | 1 | 2 |
Oiye v. Foxgreen2 sentences2022(Id. at p. 1021.) Further, the Jackson court said that, while independent judgment is not the same as de novo review, where the trial court did not take testimony and determine the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court reviews the same record as the trial court, and “[i]n these circumstances, independent review is the equivalent of de novo review . . . .” (Ibid.) In Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036 , the court rejected an attempt to distinguish the independent review standard in Jackson as applicable only where First Amendment rights are involved. 2015(See id. at p. 1020.) The Jackson court held that the appropriate standard of review of an order sealing court records is a de novo “independent review . . . ‘to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’” (Id. at p. 1021; see Overstock.com at p. 491; see also Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1067 [following Jackson over Providian on this point].) Because Copeland challenges only the part of the order denying her request to seal, we do not need to resolve this split of authority. 5 The court may grant a motion to seal (or, as here, redact) records only if the court “expressl | 1 | 2 |
In Re Scottgreen1 sentence2023(See Vivar, supra, at pp. 523-528 .) “ ‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ [Citation.] When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that ‘ “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de novo review . . . .” ’ [Citation.] An appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that are 12. based on the trial court’s own observations. [Citations.] . . . [F]actual determinations that are based on ‘ “the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and obser | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ogunmowogreen1 sentence2023In section 1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts should . . . give particular deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses.” (Vivar, at pp. 527-528; accord, Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319-320; People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 76 [on independent review, “[w]e accord deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if supported by substantial evidence in the record, but exercise our independent judgment in deciding whether the facts demonstrate trial counsel’s deficient performance and resulting prejudice to the defendant”].) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Aultgreen1 sentence2022(In re J.K., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 504, citing In re J.L. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 913, 918 ; accord, D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051; In re Michael V., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 235, fn. 5 ); Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 ; see People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1266 [“[I]ndependent appellate review of a mixed law and fact question is crucial when an excessively deferential appellate affirmance risks error in the final determination of a party’s rights, either as to the entire case, or on a significant issue in the litigation.”].) In this case, bec | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Kristina C.green1 sentence2022(In re J.K., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 504, citing In re J.L. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 913, 918 ; accord, D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051; In re Michael V., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 235, fn. 5 ); Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 ; see People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1266 [“[I]ndependent appellate review of a mixed law and fact question is crucial when an excessively deferential appellate affirmance risks error in the final determination of a party’s rights, either as to the entire case, or on a significant issue in the litigation.”].) In this case, bec | 1 | 1 |
DIAZ-LIZARRAGAgreen1 sentence2021The elements of the crime are “(1) stolen property; (2) knowledge that the property was stolen; and (3) possession of the stolen property.” (People v. King (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 .) The statute lacks “‘multiple, alternative elements’” that “‘create[] several different crimes.’” (Fernandez v. Barr, supra, 969 F.3d at 1086 ; see also United States v. Bahena (C.D.Cal. 2017) 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 142102, *16, *17 [ending inquiry into whether section 496(a) constituted an aggravated felony after concluding it was “both overbroad and indivisible”].) Because appellant’s sole basis for contendin | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lindberggreen1 sentence2021(See Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 316–319; cf. In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 632 [concluding that “a reviewing court should make an independent examination of the record in a [Penal Code] section 422 case when a defendant raises a plausible First Amendment defense to ensure that a speaker’s free speech rights have not been infringed by a trier of fact’s determination that the communication at issue constitutes a criminal threat.”]; id. at p. 634 [“Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review;” “under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent jud | 1 | 1 |
| In re Hernandezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| McCoy v. Hearst Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton
green
2 sentences2008(Id. at pp. 499-500; Harte-Hanks [Communications v. Connaughton (1989)] 491 U.S. [657,] 688 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 562 , 109 S.Ct. 2678 ].) As noted above, under the substantial evidence standard, the question is whether any rational trier of fact could find the legal elements satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 93 P.3d 1007 ].) Relying on Bose, we held in In re George I, that when a plausible 2008(Id. at pp. 499-500; Harte-Hanks [Communications v. Connaughton (1989)] 491 U.S. [657,] 688 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 562 , 109 S.Ct. 2678 ].) As noted above, under the substantial evidence standard, the question is whether any rational trier of fact could find the legal elements satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 93 P.3d 1007 ].) Relying on Bose, we held in In re George I, that when a plausible | 3 | 2004–2008 |
People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)
green
2 sentences2026(People v. DeJesus (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1133 .) “[A]dvising a defendant that a no contest plea may in the abstract have immigration consequences, cannot be taken as placing him on notice that, owing to his particular circumstances, he faces an actual risk of suffering such.” (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 204 .) Defendant’s 9 own subjective error, demonstrated in his declaration, is sufficient to show defendant did not understand the immigration consequences of the plea deal. 2021(See id. at pp. 1266– 1267.) “[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 .) When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that “ ‘[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de novo review . . . .’ ” (People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1021 .) An appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations. | 2 | 2021–2026 |
People v. Dejesus
green
2 sentences2026Next, the defendant must show that his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error. ‘[P]rejudical error . . . means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.’ [Citation.]” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) “We apply independent review to evaluate whether a defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its immigration consequences. [Citation.] ‘“[U]nder independent review, an appellat 2026(People v. DeJesus (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1133 .) “[A]dvising a defendant that a no contest plea may in the abstract have immigration consequences, cannot be taken as placing him on notice that, owing to his particular circumstances, he faces an actual risk of suffering such.” (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 204 .) Defendant’s 9 own subjective error, demonstrated in his declaration, is sufficient to show defendant did not understand the immigration consequences of the plea deal. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Patterson
green
2 sentences2021A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (§ 1473.7, subds. (a) & (a)(1).) Prejudicial error “means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 , ___, [ 2021 WL 1726827 , at *10] (Vivar).) 3. ` A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a section 1473.7 motion is reviewed independently. “ ‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independen 2021(People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998 . 1011, fn. 8.) “In evaluating the court’s [warning], “[t]he defendant can be expected to rely on counsel’s independent evaluation of the charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of the risks and probable outcome of trial.” ’ ” (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 896 .) The court’s warning is a “ ‘generic advisement’ … and … ‘is not designed, nor does it operate, as a substitute for such advice’ of defense counsel regarding the applicable immigration consequences in a given case.” (See In re Hernandez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 530, 545 [conclud | 2 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Gonzalo Vasquez-Gonzalez
green
1 sentence2026The Immigration Consequences Under federal law, attempted murder, assault with great bodily injury, and assault with a firearm are all either aggravated felonies or crimes of violence that are aggravated felonies if a defendant is sentenced to at least one year imprisonment. ( 18 U.S.C. § 16 (a) [defining “crime of violence” as an offense “that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another”]; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a)(43)(A) [murder is an aggravated felony], (F) [defining aggravated felony as a crime of violence for which the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
The People v. Weber
green
1 sentence2026(Weber, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058 .) “ ‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ [Citation.] When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that ‘ “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de novo review,” ’ ” because an “appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527 .) Rather, factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations are enti | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Nesler
green
1 sentence2025(Ibid.) “[I]ndependent appellate review of a mixed law and fact question is crucial when an excessively deferential appellate affirmance risks error in the final determination of a party’s rights, either as 16 to the entire case, or on a significant issue in the litigation.” (Ibid.) For these reasons, independent review is the appropriate standard here. “[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 .) Independent review is not the same as de novo review “ ‘i | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Iqbal v. Ziadeh
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 10 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 .) “‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ [Citation.] When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that ‘“[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de novo review . . . .”’ [Citation.] An appellate court may not simply second- guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations. [Citations.] . . . [F]actual determinations that are based on ‘“the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] hear | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mendoza v. Holder
green
1 sentence2024A noncitizen who is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of admission to the United States is deportable, provided that a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed for the offense. ( 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i).) In addition, a noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude generally is inadmissible. ( 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I); Mendoza v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3d 1299, 1300 .) Grand theft is a crime involving moral turpitude under federal immigration law. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Morales
green
1 sentence2024(Ibid.) In this part of the discussion, we: A) state the relevant principles of law; 3 “[A] ‘U visa’, [is] a temporary nonimmigrant visa created by Congress to provide legal status for noncitizens who assist in the investigation of serious crimes in which they have been victimized.” (People v. Morales (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 502, 506 .) 5 B) summarize the hearing on the motion; and C) analyze the law as applied to the facts. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Dwayne P. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2022(In re J.K., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 504, citing In re J.L. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 913, 918 ; accord, D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051; In re Michael V., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 235, fn. 5 ); Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 ; see People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1266 [“[I]ndependent appellate review of a mixed law and fact question is crucial when an excessively deferential appellate affirmance risks error in the final determination of a party’s rights, either as to the entire case, or on a significant issue in the litigation.”].) In this case, bec | 1 | 2022–2022 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. K.B.
green
1 sentence2022(In re J.K., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 504, citing In re J.L. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 913, 918 ; accord, D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051; In re Michael V., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 235, fn. 5 ); Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 ; see People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1266 [“[I]ndependent appellate review of a mixed law and fact question is crucial when an excessively deferential appellate affirmance risks error in the final determination of a party’s rights, either as to the entire case, or on a significant issue in the litigation.”].) In this case, bec | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Cuevas green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. King
green
1 sentence2021The elements of the crime are “(1) stolen property; (2) knowledge that the property was stolen; and (3) possession of the stolen property.” (People v. King (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 .) The statute lacks “‘multiple, alternative elements’” that “‘create[] several different crimes.’” (Fernandez v. Barr, supra, 969 F.3d at 1086 ; see also United States v. Bahena (C.D.Cal. 2017) 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 142102, *16, *17 [ending inquiry into whether section 496(a) constituted an aggravated felony after concluding it was “both overbroad and indivisible”].) Because appellant’s sole basis for contendin | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Ernesto H. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Jackson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Castillo-Cruz v. Holder
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 527 .) “‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’” (Ibid.) “Where, as here, the facts 6 derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, . . . ‘[t]he trial court and this court are in the same position in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding.” (Id. at 528.) “Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under s | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
1 sentence2021(See Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 316–319; cf. In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 632 [concluding that “a reviewing court should make an independent examination of the record in a [Penal Code] section 422 case when a defendant raises a plausible First Amendment defense to ensure that a speaker’s free speech rights have not been infringed by a trier of fact’s determination that the communication at issue constitutes a criminal threat.”]; id. at p. 634 [“Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review;” “under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent jud | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Camacho
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998 . 1011, fn. 8.) “In evaluating the court’s [warning], “[t]he defendant can be expected to rely on counsel’s independent evaluation of the charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of the risks and probable outcome of trial.” ’ ” (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 896 .) The court’s warning is a “ ‘generic advisement’ … and … ‘is not designed, nor does it operate, as a substitute for such advice’ of defense counsel regarding the applicable immigration consequences in a given case.” (See In re Hernandez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 530, 545 [conclud | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Juan Hernandez-Gonzalez v. Eric Holder, Jr.
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 527 .) “‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’” (Ibid.) “Where, as here, the facts 6 derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, . . . ‘[t]he trial court and this court are in the same position in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding.” (Id. at 528.) “Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under s | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Palmer v. Gregg green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Young v. Bruere green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.