due diligence standard in Alabama

2025The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So. 2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987), "is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described fictitiously." ' "Thus, in order for the relation-back doctrine to apply and justify the substitution of a defendant for a fictitiously named party after the limitations period has run, the plaintiff seeking such substitution must establish: (1) that it stated a cause of action against the defendant in the body of the original complaint, albeit identifying the party only

2012The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala.1987), ‘is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described fictitiously.’ ” Thus, in order for the relation-back doctrine to apply and justify the substitution of a defendant for a fictitiously named party after the limitations period has run, the plaintiff seeking such substitution must establish: (1) that it stated a cause of action against the defendant in the body of the original complaint, albeit identifying the party only as

2012“The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala.1987), ‘is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described ficti tiously.’ ” Ex parte Griffin, 4 So.3d 430, 436 (Ala.2008) (emphasis added). “ ‘Diligence’ is a relative term, and what is due diligence must be determined by the circumstances of each case.” Brown & Flowers v. Central of Georgia Ry., 197 Ala. 71, 75 , 72 So. 366, 367 (1916). “ ‘This Court’s standard of review applicable to a petition for a writ of mandamus is well s

2011The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala.1987), ‘is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described fictitiously.’ ” 4 So.3d at 436 .

2012Further, although a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle by which to seek review of the trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion on a statute-of-limitations ground in the context of fictitious-party practice, the writ will issue “‘only if undisputed evidence show[s] that the plaintiffs had failed to act with due diligence in identifying [the fictitiously named defendants] as the partfies] intended to be sued.’ ” Ex parte Stover, 663 So.2d 948, 952 (Ala.1995) (quoting Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So.2d 592, 595 (Ala.1992) (emphasis added)).

2004See, e.g., Crowl , 848 So.2d at 931 -41 ; Crawford , 678 So.2d at 1060 -61 ; Ex parte Stover , 663 So.2d at 952 ; Ex parte Klemawesch , 549 So.2d 62 , 63-65 (Ala. 1989); Bowen , 517 So.2d at 618 ; and Kinard , 468 So.2d at 134 -36 .

2017Ward’s inaction is what distinguishes his case from the diligence demonstrated by the petitioner in Holland.” (C. 22-23.) In discussing this prong of the Ward III inquiry courts have stated: “ ‘Due diligence ... does not require a prisoner to undertake repeated exercises in futility or to exhaust every imaginable option, but rather to make,reasonable efforts.’ Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 2002). ‘Moreover, the due diligence inquiry is an individualized one that must take into account the conditions of confinement and the reality of the prison system.’ Id. (internal quota

2017Ward’s inaction is what distinguishes his case from the diligence demonstrated by the petitioner in Holland.” (C. 22-23.) In discussing this prong of the Ward III inquiry courts have stated: “ ‘Due diligence ... does not require a prisoner to undertake repeated exercises in futility or to exhaust every imaginable option, but rather to make,reasonable efforts.’ Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 2002). ‘Moreover, the due diligence inquiry is an individualized one that must take into account the conditions of confinement and the reality of the prison system.’ Id. (internal quota

2017Ward’s inaction is what distinguishes his case from the diligence demonstrated by the petitioner in Holland.” (C. 22-23.) In discussing this prong of the Ward III inquiry courts have stated: “ ‘Due diligence ... does not require a prisoner to undertake repeated exercises in futility or to exhaust every imaginable option, but rather to make,reasonable efforts.’ Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 2002). ‘Moreover, the due diligence inquiry is an individualized one that must take into account the conditions of confinement and the reality of the prison system.’ Id. (internal quota

2012“The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala.1987), ‘is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described ficti tiously.’ ” Ex parte Griffin, 4 So.3d 430, 436 (Ala.2008) (emphasis added). “ ‘Diligence’ is a relative term, and what is due diligence must be determined by the circumstances of each case.” Brown & Flowers v. Central of Georgia Ry., 197 Ala. 71, 75 , 72 So. 366, 367 (1916). “ ‘This Court’s standard of review applicable to a petition for a writ of mandamus is well s

2012“The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala.1987), ‘is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described ficti tiously.’ ” Ex parte Griffin, 4 So.3d 430, 436 (Ala.2008) (emphasis added). “ ‘Diligence’ is a relative term, and what is due diligence must be determined by the circumstances of each case.” Brown & Flowers v. Central of Georgia Ry., 197 Ala. 71, 75 , 72 So. 366, 367 (1916). “ ‘This Court’s standard of review applicable to a petition for a writ of mandamus is well s

2012Further, although a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle by which to seek review of the trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion on a statute-of-limitations ground in the context of fictitious-party practice, the writ will issue “‘only if undisputed evidence show[s] that the plaintiffs had failed to act with due diligence in identifying [the fictitiously named defendants] as the partfies] intended to be sued.’ ” Ex parte Stover, 663 So.2d 948, 952 (Ala.1995) (quoting Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So.2d 592, 595 (Ala.1992) (emphasis added)).

2012“The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala.1987), ‘is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described ficti tiously.’ ” Ex parte Griffin, 4 So.3d 430, 436 (Ala.2008) (emphasis added). “ ‘Diligence’ is a relative term, and what is due diligence must be determined by the circumstances of each case.” Brown & Flowers v. Central of Georgia Ry., 197 Ala. 71, 75 , 72 So. 366, 367 (1916). “ ‘This Court’s standard of review applicable to a petition for a writ of mandamus is well s

2011See also McGhee v. Martin, 892 So.2d 398, 410-11 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (noting that Rule 9(h) allows relation back only for the benefit of “ ‘[t]he diligent plaintiff who is truly ignorant of the defendant’s identity at the time of filing the original complaint. ... ’ ” (quoting Kinard v. C.A.

2004See, e.g., Crowl , 848 So.2d at 931 -41 ; Crawford , 678 So.2d at 1060 -61 ; Ex parte Stover , 663 So.2d at 952 ; Ex parte Klemawesch , 549 So.2d 62 , 63-65 (Ala. 1989); Bowen , 517 So.2d at 618 ; and Kinard , 468 So.2d at 134 -36 .