13 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
William Z. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2007Sec., 192 Ariz. 385, ¶ 22 , 965 P.2d 1224, 1228 (App. 1998) (summary denial of motion to intervene is abuse of discretion). 2007Sec., 192 Ariz. 385, ¶ 22 , 965 P.2d 1224, 1228 (App. 1998) (summary denial of motion to intervene is abuse of discretion). | 2 | 2 |
Speer v. Donfeldgreen2 sentences2007See id.; see also Speer v. Donfeld, 193 Ariz. 28, ¶ 9 , 969 P.2d 193, 196 (App.1998) (trial court abuses its discretion if it "base[s] its ruling on an error of law"). 2007See id.; see also Speer v. Donfeld, 193 Ariz. 28, ¶ 9 , 969 P.2d 193, 196 (App.1998) (trial court abuses its discretion if it "base[s] its ruling on an error of law"). | 2 | 2 |
Bechtel v. Rose in and for Maricopa Countygreen2 sentences2007Id. at 72 , 722 P.2d at 240 , quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977) (footnotes omitted in Bechtel ). ¶ 13 In his minute entry denying Allen's motion to intervene, the respondent judge stated: Under the facts of this case, the Court finds that allowing Grace Allen to intervene would be adverse to [T.'s] best interest. 2007Id. at 72 , 722 P.2d at 240 , quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977) (footnotes omitted in Bechtel ). ¶ 13 In his minute entry denying Allen's motion to intervene, the respondent judge stated: Under the facts of this case, the Court finds that allowing Grace Allen to intervene would be adverse to [T.'s] best interest. | 2 | 2 |
Nancy Anne Spangler, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee v. Pasadena City Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2007Id. at 72 , 722 P.2d at 240 , quoting Spangler v. Pasedena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (footnotes omitted in Bechtel). ¶13 In his minute entry denying Allen’s motion to intervene, the respondent judge stated: Under the facts of this case, the Court finds that allowing Grace Allen to intervene would be adverse to [T.’s] best interest. 2007Id. at 72 , 722 P.2d at 240 , quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977) (footnotes omitted in Bechtel ). ¶ 13 In his minute entry denying Allen's motion to intervene, the respondent judge stated: Under the facts of this case, the Court finds that allowing Grace Allen to intervene would be adverse to [T.'s] best interest. | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. Hardygreen2 sentences2003Under the Allen framework, courts weigh three factors to determine if a rule applies retroactively to final cases: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 478 U.S. at 258 , 106 S.Ct. at 2880 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 , 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1341 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984)). ¶ 27 We regard DeStefano as particularly persuasive because the Court applied these same three factors to conclude t 2003Under the Allen framework, courts weigh three factors to determine if a rule applies retroactively to final cases: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 478 U.S. at 258 , 106 S.Ct. at 2880 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 , 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1341 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984)). ¶ 27 We regard DeStefano as particularly persuasive because the Court applied these same three factors to conclude t | 1 | 3 |
Solem v. Stumesgreen2 sentences2003Under the Allen framework, courts weigh three factors to determine if a rule applies retroactively to final cases: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 478 U.S. at 258 , 106 S.Ct. at 2880 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 , 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1341 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984)). ¶ 27 We regard DeStefano as particularly persuasive because the Court applied these same three factors to conclude t 2003Under the Allen framework, courts weigh three factors to determine if a rule applies retroactively to final cases: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 478 U.S. at 258 , 106 S.Ct. at 2880 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 , 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1341 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984)). ¶ 27 We regard DeStefano as particularly persuasive because the Court applied these same three factors to conclude t | 1 | 2 |
State v. Djerfgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583 , 597 ¶ 54 (1998) (stating that because the (F)(6) aggravator is worded in the disjunctive, “a finding of either especial cruelty or heinousness/depravity will suffice to establish this aggravating factor”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Spreitzgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1 , 3 ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002). 2009See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1 , 3 ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Pass v. Stephensgreen2 sentences1998The court cited as analogous a very early decision by this court in which incompetency, for purposes of invalidating a testamentary instrument, required that the grantor be "incapable of understanding in a reasonable degree and knowing the consequences of the instrument he executes." 137 Ariz. at 216 , 669 P.2d at 993 (citing Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 470 , 198 P. 712, 715 (1921)). 1998The court cited as analogous a very early decision by this court in which incompetency, for purposes of invalidating a testamentary instrument, required that the grantor be "incapable of understanding in a reasonable degree and knowing the consequences of the instrument he executes." 137 Ariz. at 216 , 669 P.2d at 993 (citing Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 470 , 198 P. 712, 715 (1921)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jesus M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
2 sentences2007Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 , 53 P.3d at 207 . 2007Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 , 53 P.3d at 207 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Mitchell v. City of Nogales
green
2 sentences2007ESPINOSA, Judge, dissenting. ¶ 17 I refrain from joining the majority decision because, as the majority acknowledges, our standard of review is abuse of discretion, Mitchell, 83 Ariz. 328, 333 , 320 P.2d 955, 958 , and there is ample justification supporting the respondent judge's decision to deny Allen's motion to intervene in this dependency proceeding. 2007ESPINOSA, Judge, dissenting. ¶ 17 I refrain from joining the majority decision because, as the majority acknowledges, our standard of review is abuse of discretion, Mitchell, 83 Ariz. 328, 333 , 320 P.2d 955, 958 , and there is ample justification supporting the respondent judge's decision to deny Allen's motion to intervene in this dependency proceeding. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
DeStefano v. Woods
green
2 sentences2003DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633-34 , 88 S.Ct. at 2095-96 . 2003DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633-34 , 88 S.Ct. at 2095-96 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Anders v. California
green
1 sentence2021Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense counsel asked this Court to search the record for fundamental error. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Leon
green
1 sentence2021Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense counsel asked this Court to search the record for fundamental error. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Allen v. Superior Court of Maricopa County
green
2 sentences2019Ct. of Maricopa Cty. , 86 Ariz. 205 , 209, 344 P.2d 163 (1959). "[T]he true test for determining whether parties and causes of action are the same for purposes of abatement, by reason of pendency of a prior action, ordinarily is, whether the two actions present a substantial identity as to parties, subject matter, issues involved, and relief demanded." Id. ¶14 In explaining its ruling on the Petitioner's motion for abatement, the Mohave County Superior Court found that "the parties are the same" in the Mohave and Maricopa County actions, but the record is unclear on whether the court found the 2019Ct. of Maricopa Cty. , 86 Ariz. 205 , 209, 344 P.2d 163 (1959). "[T]he true test for determining whether parties and causes of action are the same for purposes of abatement, by reason of pendency of a prior action, ordinarily is, whether the two actions present a substantial identity as to parties, subject matter, issues involved, and relief demanded." Id. ¶14 In explaining its ruling on the Petitioner's motion for abatement, the Mohave County Superior Court found that "the parties are the same" in the Mohave and Maricopa County actions, but the record is unclear on whether the court found the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Allen v. State
green
2 sentences2004Allen, like Zajac, failed to assert his objection until after the referendum had occurred. 14 Ariz. at 465-66 , 130 P. at 1116-17 . 2004Allen, like Zajac, failed to assert his objection until after the referendum had occurred. 14 Ariz. at 465-66 , 130 P. at 1116-17 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Allen v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2000Id. at 368, 375 , 106 S.Ct. 2988 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Nelson v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1998The court cited as analogous a very early decision by this court in which incompetency, for purposes of invalidating a testamentary instrument, required that the grantor be "incapable of understanding in a reasonable degree and knowing the consequences of the instrument he executes." 137 Ariz. at 216 , 669 P.2d at 993 (citing Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 470 , 198 P. 712, 715 (1921)). 1998The court cited as analogous a very early decision by this court in which incompetency, for purposes of invalidating a testamentary instrument, required that the grantor be "incapable of understanding in a reasonable degree and knowing the consequences of the instrument he executes." 137 Ariz. at 216 , 669 P.2d at 993 (citing Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 470 , 198 P. 712, 715 (1921)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Nolde v. Frankie
green
2 sentences1998In Nolde v. Frankie, Division One interpreted Florez in the same manner as the Doe court. 190 Ariz. 422 , 949 P.2d 511 (App.1997). 1998In Nolde v. Frankie, Division One interpreted Florez in the same manner as the Doe court. 190 Ariz. 422 , 949 P.2d 511 (App.1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Florez v. Sargeant
green
2 sentences1996The opinion neglects to describe those details, simply stating that the facts set forth are "not relevant or material to the issue of unsound mind under the Allen test." Op. at 527, 917 P.2d at 256 . 1996The opinion neglects to describe those details, simply stating that the facts set forth are "not relevant or material to the issue of unsound mind under the Allen test." Op. at 527, 917 P.2d at 256 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. McKinney
green
2 sentences1996Op. at 525, 917 P.2d at 254 . 1996Op. at 525, 917 P.2d at 254 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.