concrete instruction in California

1991(Gregori v. Bank of America, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 306-308; see also People v. Lopez (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 813, 823 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 333 ] [“The appearance of impropriety, however, is a malleable factor having the chameleon-like quality of reflecting the subjective views of the percipient. [Citations.]”].) But the court in Williams actually grounded its decision on a more concrete test: whether there is a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety occurred that threatens the integrity of the trial process.

1991(Gregori v. Bank of America, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 306-308; see also People v. Lopez (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 813, 823 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 333 ] [“The appearance of impropriety, however, is a malleable factor having the chameleon-like quality of reflecting the subjective views of the percipient. [Citations.]”].) But the court in Williams actually grounded its decision on a more concrete test: whether there is a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety occurred that threatens the integrity of the trial process.

2014In deciding whether instructional error occurred, we “assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.” (People v. Mills (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 898, 918 .) In that context, we then “determine whether it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction[s] as [defendant] suggests. [Citation.] In making that determination, we must consider several factors including the language of the instruction[s] in question [citation], the record of the trial [citation], and the arguments of counsel.” (People v. Nem (2003) 1

2013Standard of review In deciding whether instructional error occurred, we “assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.” (People v. Mills (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 898, 918 .) In that context, we then “determine whether it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction[s] as [defendant] suggests. [Citation.] In making that determination, we must consider several factors including the language of the instruction[s] in question [citation], the record of the trial [citation], and the arguments of counsel.” (Peo

2017Certainly jurors are permitted to “ ‘use common experiences and illustrations in reaching their verdicts.’ ” (People v. Cumpian (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 307, 316 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ], quoting U.S. v. Avery (6th Cir. 1983) 111 F.2d 1020 , 1026.) But Juror No. 8’s experiment was conducted precisely to remove the discussion from the realm of the hypothetical by providing a new concrete standard, observable by every juror, as to how an innocent person responds to a fabricated charge of sexual misconduct.

2017Certainly jurors are permitted to “ ‘use common experiences and illustrations in reaching their verdicts.’ ” (People v. Cumpian (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 307, 316 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ], quoting U.S. v. Avery (6th Cir. 1983) 111 F.2d 1020 , 1026.) But Juror No. 8’s experiment was conducted precisely to remove the discussion from the realm of the hypothetical by providing a new concrete standard, observable by every juror, as to how an innocent person responds to a fabricated charge of sexual misconduct.

2016(Ibid.) Rather, “the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Ibid.) A “public official or government body, just like any private litigant, may make an anti-SLAPP motion where appropriate.” (San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 353 (San Ramon).) There is also “support for the argument that the protection accorded by the anti-SLAPP statute extends to statements made by public officials at an official 12 public meeting

2016“Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gomez (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 986, 992 .) “As jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given by the court (People v. Murtishaw (198

2016“Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gomez (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 986, 992 .) “As jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given by the court (People v. Murtishaw (198

2002He is an observer of criminal activity, who by calling the police, acts openly in aid of law enforcement.’ ” (Gardner, at p. 325, quoting People v. Lewis (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ].) From these dicta, petitioner distills a concrete requirement that a victim must consciously consider the eventual need to testify and potentially be subject to malicious prosecution charges, and must personally call the police, or else her statements will be presumed unreliable.

2002He is an observer of criminal activity, who by calling the police, acts openly in aid of law enforcement.’ ” (Gardner, at p. 325, quoting People v. Lewis (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ].) From these dicta, petitioner distills a concrete requirement that a victim must consciously consider the eventual need to testify and potentially be subject to malicious prosecution charges, and must personally call the police, or else her statements will be presumed unreliable.

1986Respondent asserts that even if the omission was error it did not rise to a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. “ ‘In a case where there is a conflict in the instructions and the court erred in the giving of one or more of them, and where it is impossible to determine whether the jury followed the law as correctly or as incorrectly set before them, a new trial will be ordered if by such error the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.”’ (People v. Honeycutt (1946) 29 Cal.2d 52, 61-62 [ 172 P.2d 698 ].) “[T]he case law is clear that whether the giving of a concrete instruction is

1986Respondent asserts that even if the omission was error it did not rise to a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. “ ‘In a case where there is a conflict in the instructions and the court erred in the giving of one or more of them, and where it is impossible to determine whether the jury followed the law as correctly or as incorrectly set before them, a new trial will be ordered if by such error the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.”’ (People v. Honeycutt (1946) 29 Cal.2d 52, 61-62 [ 172 P.2d 698 ].) “[T]he case law is clear that whether the giving of a concrete instruction is

1979As stated in People v. Wingo (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 974, 979 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 448 ], “Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.” (See also People v. Rhodes (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 10, 21 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; P

1979As stated in People v. Wingo (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 974, 979 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 448 ], “Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.” (See also People v. Rhodes (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 10, 21 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; P

1979As stated in People v. Wingo (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 974, 979 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 448 ], “Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.” (See also People v. Rhodes (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 10, 21 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; P

1979As stated in People v. Wingo (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 974, 979 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 448 ], “Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.” (See also People v. Rhodes (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 10, 21 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; P

1979While it has been said that where, as in the instant case, the crimes charged require specific intent CALJIC No. 4.20 should not be given (People v. Spencer (1963) 60 Cal.2d 64, 87 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 383 P.2d 134 ]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 796 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ]), the case law is clear that whether the giving of a concrete instruction is confusing or erroneous must be determined from the instructions as a whole.

1979While it has been said that where, as in the instant case, the crimes charged require specific intent CALJIC No. 4.20 should not be given (People v. Spencer (1963) 60 Cal.2d 64, 87 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 383 P.2d 134 ]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 796 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ]), the case law is clear that whether the giving of a concrete instruction is confusing or erroneous must be determined from the instructions as a whole.

1979While it has been said that where, as in the instant case, the crimes charged require specific intent CALJIC No. 4.20 should not be given (People v. Spencer (1963) 60 Cal.2d 64, 87 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 383 P.2d 134 ]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 796 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ]), the case law is clear that whether the giving of a concrete instruction is confusing or erroneous must be determined from the instructions as a whole.

1979While it has been said that where, as in the instant case, the crimes charged require specific intent CALJIC No. 4.20 should not be given (People v. Spencer (1963) 60 Cal.2d 64, 87 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 383 P.2d 134 ]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 796 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ]), the case law is clear that whether the giving of a concrete instruction is confusing or erroneous must be determined from the instructions as a whole.

1979As stated in People v. Wingo (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 974, 979 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 448 ], “Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.” (See also People v. Rhodes (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 10, 21 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; P

1979As stated in People v. Wingo (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 974, 979 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 448 ], “Error cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt from the instructions since the correctness of an instruction is to be determined in its relation to other instructions and in the light of the instructions as a whole. [Citations.] Accordingly, whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be determined from a part of an instruction or one particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.” (See also People v. Rhodes (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 10, 21 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; P

1957It is impracticable to lay down a more concrete test of general validity.” That test has continued to be used and applied, notably in these cases: Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co., supra, 132 Cal.App. 67, 70-71 ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 92, 94 [ 94 P.2d 1019 ]; Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 183, 192 [ 95 P.2d 149 ]; Mills Music, Inc. v. Lampton, 40 Cal.App.2d 354, 360 [ 104 P.2d 893 ].

1957It is impracticable to lay down a more concrete test of general validity.” That test has continued to be used and applied, notably in these cases: Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co., supra, 132 Cal.App. 67, 70-71 ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 92, 94 [ 94 P.2d 1019 ]; Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 183, 192 [ 95 P.2d 149 ]; Mills Music, Inc. v. Lampton, 40 Cal.App.2d 354, 360 [ 104 P.2d 893 ].

1957It is impracticable to lay down a more concrete test of general validity.” That test has continued to be used and applied, notably in these cases: Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co., supra, 132 Cal.App. 67, 70-71 ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 92, 94 [ 94 P.2d 1019 ]; Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 183, 192 [ 95 P.2d 149 ]; Mills Music, Inc. v. Lampton, 40 Cal.App.2d 354, 360 [ 104 P.2d 893 ].

1957It is impracticable to lay down a more concrete test of general validity.” That test has continued to be used and applied, notably in these cases: Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co., supra, 132 Cal.App. 67, 70-71 ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 92, 94 [ 94 P.2d 1019 ]; Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 183, 192 [ 95 P.2d 149 ]; Mills Music, Inc. v. Lampton, 40 Cal.App.2d 354, 360 [ 104 P.2d 893 ].

1957It is impracticable to lay down a more concrete test of general validity.” That test has continued to be used and applied, notably in these cases: Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co., supra, 132 Cal.App. 67, 70-71 ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 92, 94 [ 94 P.2d 1019 ]; Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 183, 192 [ 95 P.2d 149 ]; Mills Music, Inc. v. Lampton, 40 Cal.App.2d 354, 360 [ 104 P.2d 893 ].

1957It is impracticable to lay down a more concrete test of general validity.” That test has continued to be used and applied, notably in these cases: Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co., supra, 132 Cal.App. 67, 70-71 ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 92, 94 [ 94 P.2d 1019 ]; Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 183, 192 [ 95 P.2d 149 ]; Mills Music, Inc. v. Lampton, 40 Cal.App.2d 354, 360 [ 104 P.2d 893 ].