injunctive relief claim in California

2024In so arguing, he relies on cases establishing that “[w]hen it is clear . . . from a provision that the proposed written contract would become operative only when signed by the parties . . . [and/or] from any other evidence presented by the parties that both parties contemplated that acceptance of the contract’s terms would be signified by signing it, the failure to sign the agreement means no binding contract was created.” (Banner, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 358 , italics omitted; see Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co. v. Hock Investment Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 83, 91

2024(See MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618 , 622– 623.) I.

2024(See Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1265 .) 15 By its own terms, the exception is indeed one-sided in favor of Motive, as it permits injunctive relief only for breaches by Helfet of certain provisions protecting only Motive.

2024(See Sanchez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 398, 403 .) They argue, however, that the court erred in concluding (1) that the injunctive relief exception was substantively unconscionable, and (2) that the fee-shifting provision, which they acknowledge is substantively unconscionable, could not be severed from the agreement.

2024(See Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 176 ; Cruise, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398–399; see also Lara, supra, 896 F.Supp.2d at p. 844 .) The language of the agreement repeatedly refers to a mutual agreement to arbitrate all disputes (except those falling within the injunctive relief exception, a provision discussed further below) and includes several declarations of the company’s commitment to arbitration, to 7 wit: “The company is committed to using binding arbitration to resolve all legal disputes.” “The company and [Helfet] hereby mutually agree that any dispute or controversy . . .

2024(See Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 176 ; Cruise, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398–399; see also Lara, supra, 896 F.Supp.2d at p. 844 .) The language of the agreement repeatedly refers to a mutual agreement to arbitrate all disputes (except those falling within the injunctive relief exception, a provision discussed further below) and includes several declarations of the company’s commitment to arbitration, to 7 wit: “The company is committed to using binding arbitration to resolve all legal disputes.” “The company and [Helfet] hereby mutually agree that any dispute or controversy . . .

2024(See Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 176 ; Cruise, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398–399; see also Lara, supra, 896 F.Supp.2d at p. 844 .) The language of the agreement repeatedly refers to a mutual agreement to arbitrate all disputes (except those falling within the injunctive relief exception, a provision discussed further below) and includes several declarations of the company’s commitment to arbitration, to 7 wit: “The company is committed to using binding arbitration to resolve all legal disputes.” “The company and [Helfet] hereby mutually agree that any dispute or controversy . . .

2023(See Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 267, 306-307 .) In our view, the ultimate fact that a defendant must establish to be entitled to the defense is that the challenged activity was conducted “in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards.” (§ 3482.5, subd. (a)(1).) The subsequent phrase “as established and followed by similar agricultural operations in the same locality” (ibid.) does not require the defendant to establish an additional ultimate fact but instead limits the evidence that is relevant to establish the proper and accepted customs and standards.4 T

2023(Rancho Viejo v. Tres Amigos Viejos (Rancho Viejo) (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 550, 562 [rejecting “appellant’s attempt to exclude . . . conduct from the reach of the statute by distinguishing between trespass and nuisance theories”]; W&W El Camino Real, LLC v. Fowler (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 263, 276 (El Camino Real) [concluding that a verdict finding defendant negligent was inconsistent with a finding that section 3482.5, subd. (a)(1), applied because the statute’s requirement that a defendant act “ ‘in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards’ ” is the same as finding tha

2015As for the injunctive-relief claim, we agree with West Bay that it cannot stand on its own. “[A] request for injunctive relief is not a cause of action” (Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 984 ), and the Douglases do not argue otherwise.

2014Finally, given the resolution of all the other claims in defendants’ favor, the cause of action for alter ego provided no possible remedy because the claim “is a procedural device,” not “a claim for substantive relief.” (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 418-419 .) We conclude that the trial court clearly intended to dispose of all of Wilson’s causes of action in defendants’ favor.

2014At least one court has concluded that, to establish that an injunctive relief claim falls within Cruz, the plaintiff must make a factual showing the relief sought would “more than incidentally benefit the public.” (Nelsen, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136 .) Because Fry’s has not argued that Ramos failed to show an injunction in this case would have more than an incidental benefit to the public, we need not address that issue. 28 E.

2013(See Trompeter, supra, 2012 WL 1980894, p. *6 .) Financial argues that even if the injunctive relief exception to the finality rule is not mutual, it is merely a "slight departure" from the bilateral nature of the contract.

2013(See Trompeter, supra, 2012 WL 1980894, p. *6 .) Financial argues that even if the injunctive relief exception to the finality rule is not mutual, it is merely a "slight departure" from the bilateral nature of the contract.

2001They note that several cases state that the criteria for determining whether the probable-cause presumption applies "may be articulated in the following question: Did a trier of fact after a fair adversary hearing reach a determination on the merits against the defendant in the prior proceeding?" ( Coivles v. Carter, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 358 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 269 ; accord, Roberts, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 375, 383 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 ; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 787 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 (hereafter Lucchesi ).) They contend that, under that standard, the order fol

2001They note that several cases state that the criteria for determining whether the probable-cause presumption applies "may be articulated in the following question: Did a trier of fact after a fair adversary hearing reach a determination on the merits against the defendant in the prior proceeding?" ( Coivles v. Carter, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 358 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 269 ; accord, Roberts, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 375, 383 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 ; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 787 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 (hereafter Lucchesi ).) They contend that, under that standard, the order fol

2001They note that several cases state that the criteria for determining whether the probable-cause presumption applies "may be articulated in the following question: Did a trier of fact after a fair adversary hearing reach a determination on the merits against the defendant in the prior proceeding?" ( Coivles v. Carter, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 358 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 269 ; accord, Roberts, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 375, 383 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 ; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 787 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 (hereafter Lucchesi ).) They contend that, under that standard, the order fol

2001They note that several cases state that the criteria for determining whether the probable-cause presumption applies "may be articulated in the following question: Did a trier of fact after a fair adversary hearing reach a determination on the merits against the defendant in the prior proceeding?" ( Coivles v. Carter, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 358 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 269 ; accord, Roberts, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 375, 383 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 ; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 787 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 (hereafter Lucchesi ).) They contend that, under that standard, the order fol

2001The requirement of a fair adversary hearing is simply another way of saying that the presumption of probable cause may be rebutted only upon a showing that the judgment in the underlying action was procured "`by *493 fraud, perjury or subornation of perjury, or other unfair conduct on the part of the defendant( Carpenter v. Sibley, supra, 153 Cal. at p. 218 , 94 P. 879 .) Here, there is no assertion of any fraud or other wrongful conduct by Defendants during the trial.

2001The requirement of a fair adversary hearing is simply another way of saying that the presumption of probable cause may be rebutted only upon a showing that the judgment in the underlying action was procured "`by *493 fraud, perjury or subornation of perjury, or other unfair conduct on the part of the defendant( Carpenter v. Sibley, supra, 153 Cal. at p. 218 , 94 P. 879 .) Here, there is no assertion of any fraud or other wrongful conduct by Defendants during the trial.

1987The trial court upheld the privilege and dismissed the injunctive relief claim, stating that disclosure of the materials would “unquestionably damage our national security.” (Id., at p. 194.) *580 In Salisbury v. United States, supra, 690 F.2d 966 , a New York Times editor learned through Freedom of Information Act requests that the CIA and FBI maintained records on him that had been provided by the National Security Agency (NSA).

1960Appellants cite Mathews Paint Co. v. Seaside Paint etc. Co., supra, 148 Cal.App.2d 168 , as authority for their position.