judicially established rule in California

2017In today’s parlance, we would characterize the rule as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure.” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 430 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 981 P.2d 525 ] (Allen).) After establishing this judicial rule of procedure authorizing challenges to a prior conviction in a subsequent prosecution, Coffey proceeded to “delineate the nature of the contemplated hearing ... for the guidance of courts and counsel who will be called upon to deal with similar matters in the future.” (Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 217 .) The court set forth in detail the mechanics of the he

2017In today’s parlance, we would characterize the rule as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure.” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 430 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 981 P.2d 525 ] (Allen).) After establishing this judicial rule of procedure authorizing challenges to a prior conviction in a subsequent prosecution, Coffey proceeded to “delineate the nature of the contemplated hearing ... for the guidance of courts and counsel who will be called upon to deal with similar matters in the future.” (Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 217 .) The court set forth in detail the mechanics of the he

2012Later, in People v. Allen *516 (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 430 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 981 P.2d 525 ], we described Coffey’s holding this way: “In today’s parlance, we would characterize the rule [in Coffey] as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure.” (Italics added.) In short, “we have prescribed judicial rules of criminal procedure when necessary to effectuate a fundamental constitutional principle or a specific constitutional protection of individual liberty." (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519, fn. 9 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ] [listing cases].) 40 See, e.g.

2012Here counsel may choose to list (1) repetitive claims proffered as background support for a new claim in the petition regarding cumulative Coffey] as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure.‖ (Italics added.) In short, ―we have prescribed judicial rules of criminal procedure when necessary to effectuate a fundamental constitutional principle or a specific constitutional protection of individual liberty.‖ (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519, fn. 9 [listing cases].) 104 prejudice, and (2) some or all claims that are raised solely for the purpose of federal exhaustion.

1999(Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 963 ; see Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 353 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 326 , 801 P.2d 1077 ].) Having determined the absence of any state or federal constitutional entitlement to use the motion to strike procedure (aside from Gideon claims), we also declined to create a judicially established rule of criminal procedure to authorize motions to strike prior felony convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

1999We reached the same conclusion under the California Constitution, reasoning that no previous authority had relied on our state charter to authorize the motion to strike procedure, and that, in any event, the defendant failed to present a "`cogent reason'" for construing the state Constitution differently than its federal counterpart. ( Garcia , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 963 ; see Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336 , 353 .) Having determined the absence of any state or federal constitutional entitlement to use the motion to strike procedure (aside from Gideon claims), we also declined to c

1999We answered that question in the affirmative in Sumstine , supra , 36 Cal.3d 909 .

1997Having concluded that neither the federal nor the state Constitution, nor People v. Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d 909 , entitles petitioner to employ the procedures established in Coffey to challenge a prior conviction on ineffectiveness-of-counsel grounds, we must determine whether, as urged by petitioner and amici curiae, the interest of efficient judicial administration, or some other policy consideration, supports a judicially established rule of procedure permitting a defendant who faces greater punishment for a current offense because of a prior conviction to challenge the validity of that

1999Our decision was not based on an interpretation of either the federal or state Constitution, but on this court's assessment of "efficient judicial administration." (See Garcia , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 963 .) In today's parlance, we would characterize the rule as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure. ( Id . at p. 964.) The question later arose whether the Coffey motion to strike procedure was available to challenge an alleged prior felony conviction on constitutional grounds other than denial of counsel.

1999We reached the same conclusion under the California Constitution, reasoning that no previous authority had relied on our state charter to authorize the motion to strike procedure, and that, in any event, the defendant failed to present a "`cogent reason'" for construing the state Constitution differently than its federal counterpart. ( Garcia , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 963 ; see Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336 , 353 .) Having determined the absence of any state or federal constitutional entitlement to use the motion to strike procedure (aside from Gideon claims), we also declined to c

2012Later, in People v. Allen *516 (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 430 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 981 P.2d 525 ], we described Coffey’s holding this way: “In today’s parlance, we would characterize the rule [in Coffey] as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure.” (Italics added.) In short, “we have prescribed judicial rules of criminal procedure when necessary to effectuate a fundamental constitutional principle or a specific constitutional protection of individual liberty." (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519, fn. 9 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ] [listing cases].) 40 See, e.g.

1999(Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 760 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ]; see also Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 475 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 612 P.2d 948 , 9 A.L.R.4th 758 ].) The Iverson court’s method of reconciling that judicial exception with the limitation on employer liability for assaults committed by coemployees applies as well to our analysis of section 3602, subdivision (b)(1), which codified that judicial exception. 7 At oral argument, Fretland’s counsel argued, for the first time, that his position was supported by Farmers Ins.

1999(Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 760 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ]; see also Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 475 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 612 P.2d 948 , 9 A.L.R.4th 758 ].) The Iverson court’s method of reconciling that judicial exception with the limitation on employer liability for assaults committed by coemployees applies as well to our analysis of section 3602, subdivision (b)(1), which codified that judicial exception. 7 At oral argument, Fretland’s counsel argued, for the first time, that his position was supported by Farmers Ins.

1989(People v. Gineris (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18, 23 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 317 ]; 2 Witkin Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, § 866, p. 832.) We reject Oliver’s claim that the ruling below relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving each and every fact upon which the proof of his blood alcohol level depended.

1982(See McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 222, 230-232 [ 237 P. 42 , 40 A.L.R. 1110 ].) The six-month limitation for bringing a motion to vacate on grounds of intrinsic fraud would seem to be a judicially established rule of procedure.

1982(See McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 222, 230-232 [ 237 P. 42 , 40 A.L.R. 1110 ].) The six-month limitation for bringing a motion to vacate on grounds of intrinsic fraud would seem to be a judicially established rule of procedure.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1980(See, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 242 P.2d 932 ]; People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) The analogy is inapt.

1942(Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal. (2d) 97, 104 [ 114 P. (2d) 1 ]; O livera v. Grace, 19 Cal. (2d) 570, 579 [ 122 P. (2d) 564 ]; and cases cited therein.) It is true that the Haddad case, supra, and others (see Aalwyn v. Cobe, 168 Cal. 165 [ 142 Pac. 79 ]; Consolidated R. & P. Co. v. Scarborough, 216 Cal. 698, 706 [ 16 P. (2d) 268 ]; Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 7 Cal. (2d) 230 [ 60 P. (2d) 276 ]; California Trust Co. v. Gustason, 15 Cal. (2d) 268 [ 101 P. (2d) 74 ]), followed a judicially established rule of procedure which precluded an appellate court from considering wheth

1942(Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal. (2d) 97, 104 [ 114 P. (2d) 1 ]; O livera v. Grace, 19 Cal. (2d) 570, 579 [ 122 P. (2d) 564 ]; and cases cited therein.) It is true that the Haddad case, supra, and others (see Aalwyn v. Cobe, 168 Cal. 165 [ 142 Pac. 79 ]; Consolidated R. & P. Co. v. Scarborough, 216 Cal. 698, 706 [ 16 P. (2d) 268 ]; Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 7 Cal. (2d) 230 [ 60 P. (2d) 276 ]; California Trust Co. v. Gustason, 15 Cal. (2d) 268 [ 101 P. (2d) 74 ]), followed a judicially established rule of procedure which precluded an appellate court from considering wheth