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13 California opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Angelica Textile Services Inc. v. Parkgreen2 sentences2023KV relies on Angelica Textile, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 495 , which explains CUTSA “does not displace noncontract claims that, although related to a trade secret misappropriation, are independent and based on facts distinct from the facts that support the misappropriation claim.” (Id. at p. 506.) “ ‘[T]he determination of whether a claim is based on trade secret misappropriation is largely factual.’ (Angelica Textile, 220 Cal.App.4th at 6 “The terms ‘displacement,’ ‘preemption,’ and ‘supersession’ have all been used to describe CUTSA’s effect.” (Erhart v. BofI Holding, Inc. (S.D. 2023KV relies on Angelica Textile, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 495 , which explains CUTSA “does not displace noncontract claims that, although related to a trade secret misappropriation, are independent and based on facts distinct from the facts that support the misappropriation claim.” (Id. at p. 506.) “ ‘[T]he determination of whether a claim is based on trade secret misappropriation is largely factual.’ (Angelica Textile, 220 Cal.App.4th at 6 “The terms ‘displacement,’ ‘preemption,’ and ‘supersession’ have all been used to describe CUTSA’s effect.” (Erhart v. BofI Holding, Inc. (S.D. | 1 | 3 |
Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp.green2 sentences2013Code, § 3426.7, subd. (b)(1).) Moreover, UTSA does not displace noncontract claims that, although related to a trade secret misappropriation, are independent and based on facts distinct from the facts that support the misappropriation claim. ( Silvaco, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 241-242; Amron Int'l Diving Supply, Inc. v. Hydrolinx Diving Commun., Inc. (S.D.Cal., Oct. 21, 2011, No. 11-CV-1890-H) 2011 U.S. Dist. 2013Code, § 3426.7, subd. (b)(1).) Moreover, UTSA does not displace noncontract claims that, although related to a trade secret misappropriation, are independent and based on facts distinct from the facts that support the misappropriation claim. ( Silvaco, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 241-242; Amron Int'l Diving Supply, Inc. v. Hydrolinx Diving Commun., Inc. (S.D.Cal., Oct. 21, 2011, No. 11-CV-1890-H) 2011 U.S. Dist. | 1 | 3 |
San Diegans for Open Gov't v. San Diego State Univ. Research Found.green1 sentence2021Nor is it significant in determining whether an element of the misappropriation claim is conduct in furtherance of constitutionally protected speech that the creative efforts in this case did not result in a public airing of the Penn-Bruckheimer pilot: “[C]onduct can assist and help to advance the exercise of the right of free speech, even if that assistance did not result in a completed exercise of free speech at the time the lawsuit is filed.” (Ojjeh v. Brown, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1042; see San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State University Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bankgreen2 sentences2014(Loranger v. Jones (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 847, 858, fn. 9 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 ].) In any event, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding the process described in the Canon patent is distinguishable from Altavion’s DST. 28 As the trial court pointed out, Altavion’s expert testified that KMSL’s patents could prevent Altavion from proceeding with sale or licensing of Altavion’s own DST. 29 Section 3288 provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the 2014(Loranger v. Jones (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 847, 858, fn. 9 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 ].) In any event, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding the process described in the Canon patent is distinguishable from Altavion’s DST. 28 As the trial court pointed out, Altavion’s expert testified that KMSL’s patents could prevent Altavion from proceeding with sale or licensing of Altavion’s own DST. 29 Section 3288 provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the | 1 | 1 |
In Re Pago Pago Aircrash of January 30, 1974green1 sentence2014However, that section relates to interest on “liquidated” damages claims, while “section 3288 permits discretionary prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims.” (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 102 ; see Newby v. Vroman (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 283, 286-287 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] [characterizing as “inapposite” cases decided under § 3287 “which hold that prejudgment interest is only appropriate if a plaintiff’s damages are either known or knowable”]; Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 572 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ] [in contrast to § 3287, § 3288 “allows inter | 1 | 1 |
Loranger v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2014(Loranger v. Jones (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 847, 858, fn. 9 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 ].) In any event, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding the process described in the Canon patent is distinguishable from Altavion’s DST. 28 As the trial court pointed out, Altavion’s expert testified that KMSL’s patents could prevent Altavion from proceeding with sale or licensing of Altavion’s own DST. 29 Section 3288 provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the 2014(Loranger v. Jones (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 847, 858, fn. 9 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 ].) In any event, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding the process described in the Canon patent is distinguishable from Altavion’s DST. 28 As the trial court pointed out, Altavion’s expert testified that KMSL’s patents could prevent Altavion from proceeding with sale or licensing of Altavion’s own DST. 29 Section 3288 provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the | 1 | 1 |
Stein v. Southern California Edison Co.green2 sentences2014However, that section relates to interest on “liquidated” damages claims, while “section 3288 permits discretionary prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims.” (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 102 ; see Newby v. Vroman (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 283, 286-287 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] [characterizing as “inapposite” cases decided under § 3287 “which hold that prejudgment interest is only appropriate if a plaintiff’s damages are either known or knowable”]; Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 572 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ] [in contrast to § 3287, § 3288 “allows inter 2014However, that section relates to interest on “liquidated” damages claims, while “section 3288 permits discretionary prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims.” (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 102 ; see Newby v. Vroman (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 283, 286-287 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] [characterizing as “inapposite” cases decided under § 3287 “which hold that prejudgment interest is only appropriate if a plaintiff’s damages are either known or knowable”]; Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 572 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ] [in contrast to § 3287, § 3288 “allows inter | 1 | 1 |
Newby v. Vromangreen2 sentences2014However, that section relates to interest on “liquidated” damages claims, while “section 3288 permits discretionary prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims.” (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 102 ; see Newby v. Vroman (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 283, 286-287 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] [characterizing as “inapposite” cases decided under § 3287 “which hold that prejudgment interest is only appropriate if a plaintiff’s damages are either known or knowable”]; Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 572 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ] [in contrast to § 3287, § 3288 “allows inter 2014However, that section relates to interest on “liquidated” damages claims, while “section 3288 permits discretionary prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims.” (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 102 ; see Newby v. Vroman (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 283, 286-287 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] [characterizing as “inapposite” cases decided under § 3287 “which hold that prejudgment interest is only appropriate if a plaintiff’s damages are either known or knowable”]; Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 572 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ] [in contrast to § 3287, § 3288 “allows inter | 1 | 1 |
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2013Multimedia, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 954 ; accord, Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 210, 236 (Silvaco), disapproved on other grounds in Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 337 [“We thus reaffirm that CUTSA provides the exclusive civil remedy for conduct falling within its terms, so as to supersede other civil remedies ‘based upon misappropriation of a trade secret’ [Citation] ”].) 27 bottom, trade secret protection is itself but a branch of unfair competition law.’ [Citation.] “California’s statutory unfair competition law permits claims for ‘un | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2005The rule is that a trial court may not grant a defendant’s motion for nonsuit if plaintiff’s evidence would support a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor.” (Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 117-118 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 891 , 649 P.2d 224 ].) “In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. 2005The rule is that a trial court may not grant a defendant’s motion for nonsuit if plaintiff’s evidence would support a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor.” (Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 117-118 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 891 , 649 P.2d 224 ].) “In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Deerpoint Grp., Inc. v. Agrigenix, LLC
green
1 sentence2023Cal. 2020) 612 F.Supp.3d 1062 , 1117, fn. 24.) 7Specifically, the trial court ruled KV’s first four claims were preempted by CUTSA and, as to KV’s fifth claim, ruled it had already granted summary judgment on KV’s fraud claims. 12 p. 505.) CUTSA preempts/supersedes civil, non-contract claims ‘based on the same nucleus of facts as trade secret misappropriation.’ ” (Deerpoint Group, Inc. v. Agrigenix, LLC (E.D.Cal. 2018) 345 F.Supp.3d 1207, 1236 .) “Following the nucleus of facts test, numerous courts have held that CUTSA supersedes other state-law claims where the wrongdoing alleged is the misa | 1 | 2023–2023 |
ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Cal. 2019) 369 F.Supp.3d 983, 989 ; cf. K.C. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Filmon.Com. Inc. v. Doubleverify Inc.
green
1 sentence2021The Challenged Conduct Does Not Concern an Issue of Public Interest As the Supreme Court instructed in FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pages 144 to 145, “In protecting ‘any other conduct’ 21 that meets the requirements laid out in its text (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4), italics added), subdivision (e)(4) proves both broader in scope than the other subdivisions, and less firmly anchored to any particular context. [Citations.] This provision consequently suggests that courts should engage in a relatively careful analysis of whether a particular statement falls within the ambit of ‘other conduct’ encompass | 1 | 2021–2021 |
KNB ENTERPRISES v. Matthews
green
1 sentence2014As the KNB court observed, the court in Fleet found the misappropriation claim was preempted “where the only misappropriation alleged was the film’s authorized distribution by the exclusive distributor, CBS.” (KNB, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 364 ; see Fleet , at p. 1914.) Thus, the KNB court explained, “Fleet stands for the solid proposition that performers in a copyrighted film may not use their statutory right of publicity to prevent the exclusive copyright holder from distributing the film.” (KNB, at p. 372.) That rule, however, did not apply in KNB because the plaintiff was not “asserting | 1 | 2014–2014 |
PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler
green
1 sentence2014However, that section relates to interest on “liquidated” damages claims, while “section 3288 permits discretionary prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims.” (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 102 ; see Newby v. Vroman (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 283, 286-287 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] [characterizing as “inapposite” cases decided under § 3287 “which hold that prejudgment interest is only appropriate if a plaintiff’s damages are either known or knowable”]; Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 572 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ] [in contrast to § 3287, § 3288 “allows inter | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2014However, that section relates to interest on “liquidated” damages claims, while “section 3288 permits discretionary prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims.” (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 102 ; see Newby v. Vroman (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 283, 286-287 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] [characterizing as “inapposite” cases decided under § 3287 “which hold that prejudgment interest is only appropriate if a plaintiff’s damages are either known or knowable”]; Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 572 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ] [in contrast to § 3287, § 3288 “allows inter | 1 | 2014–2014 |
K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013Multimedia, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 954 ; accord, Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 210, 236 (Silvaco), disapproved on other grounds in Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 337 [“We thus reaffirm that CUTSA provides the exclusive civil remedy for conduct falling within its terms, so as to supersede other civil remedies ‘based upon misappropriation of a trade secret’ [Citation] ”].) 27 bottom, trade secret protection is itself but a branch of unfair competition law.’ [Citation.] “California’s statutory unfair competition law permits claims for ‘un | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ajaxo Inc. v. E Trade Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010We noted that Ajaxo had based its contract cause of action upon the same facts it used to prove the misappropriation claim; the two causes of action were “inextricably linked.” (Ajaxo I, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 63 .) Further, the only theory of recovery Ajaxo had pursued on its claim for breach of contract was the theory *1302 of unjust enrichment. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009(Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., supra, 370 F.Supp.2d at p. 1035 .) Unfair competition “California recognizes claims for both common law unfair competition and statutory unfair competition.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, Litigation Issues, § 11.49, p. 452, citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ].) “A claim for common law or even statutory unfair competition may be preempted under CC[] §3426.7 if it relies on tire same facts as the misappropriation claim.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, at p. 452, citing AccuI | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Accuimage Diagnostics Corp. v. Terarecon, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009(Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., supra, 370 F.Supp.2d at p. 1035 .) Unfair competition “California recognizes claims for both common law unfair competition and statutory unfair competition.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, Litigation Issues, § 11.49, p. 452, citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ].) “A claim for common law or even statutory unfair competition may be preempted under CC[] §3426.7 if it relies on tire same facts as the misappropriation claim.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, at p. 452, citing AccuI | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Balboa Insurance v. Trans Global Equities
green
1 sentence2009Co. v. Trans Global Equities, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1341 .) “Nevertheless, at bottom, trade secret protection is itself but a branch of unfair competition law.” (Ibid.) California’s statutory unfair competition law permits claims for “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business practices. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Bank of the West v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2009(Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., supra, 370 F.Supp.2d at p. 1035 .) Unfair competition “California recognizes claims for both common law unfair competition and statutory unfair competition.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, Litigation Issues, § 11.49, p. 452, citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ].) “A claim for common law or even statutory unfair competition may be preempted under CC[] §3426.7 if it relies on tire same facts as the misappropriation claim.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, at p. 452, citing AccuI 2009(Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., supra, 370 F.Supp.2d at p. 1035 .) Unfair competition “California recognizes claims for both common law unfair competition and statutory unfair competition.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, Litigation Issues, § 11.49, p. 452, citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ].) “A claim for common law or even statutory unfair competition may be preempted under CC[] §3426.7 if it relies on tire same facts as the misappropriation claim.” (Trade Secrets Practice in Cal., supra, at p. 452, citing AccuI | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States Golf Association v. St. Andrews Systems, Data-Max, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999Andrews, supra, 749 F.2d at pp. 1038-1039 & fn. 17.) Under the California law applicable here, on the other hand, the essential elements of a misappropriation claim simply do not include any such requirement of proof of direct competition between the plaintiff and the defendant. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.