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13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. McManisgreen2 sentences2025(Oct. 2024) CALCRIM No. 580, p. 331; see People v. McManis (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 608, 614 [“instruction defining misdemeanor within the context of a misdemeanor- manslaughter instruction must be given sua sponte”].) Here, instead of directing the jury to an underlying predicate offense committed with criminal negligence, the version of CALCRIM No. 580 given by the court incorrectly directed the jury to murder which requires either express or implied malice. 2025(Oct. 2024) CALCRIM No. 580, p. 331; see People v. McManis (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 608, 614 [“instruction defining misdemeanor within the context of a misdemeanor- manslaughter instruction must be given sua sponte”].) Here, instead of directing the jury to an underlying predicate offense committed with criminal negligence, the version of CALCRIM No. 580 given by the court incorrectly directed the jury to murder which requires either express or implied malice. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Faillagreen2 sentences2000(People v. Failla [(1966)] 64 Cal.2d 560, 564 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 103 , 414 P.2d 39 ] [citations].) Failure to do so may allow the trier of fact to engage *673 in unguided speculation as to what conduct is sufficient to constitute a misdemeanor inherently dangerous to human life.” (McManis, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 614 .) Interestingly, this court’s decision in People v. Failla, supra, 64 Cal.2d 560 (Failla), upon which the McManis court relied with little substantive analysis, had nothing to do with homicide or manslaughter. 2000(People v. Failla [(1966)] 64 Cal.2d 560, 564 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 103 , 414 P.2d 39 ] [citations].) Failure to do so may allow the trier of fact to engage *673 in unguided speculation as to what conduct is sufficient to constitute a misdemeanor inherently dangerous to human life.” (McManis, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 614 .) Interestingly, this court’s decision in People v. Failla, supra, 64 Cal.2d 560 (Failla), upon which the McManis court relied with little substantive analysis, had nothing to do with homicide or manslaughter. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1986(See People v. Wright (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 6, 11, fn. 5 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 311 ] for a discussion of the need to rewrite the involuntary manslaughter statute.) It should be apparent from the structure of the argument outlined above, unless we find insufficient evidence to convict defendant of a violation of Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(2), that we never reach defendant’s bid for extension of the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine. 1986(See People v. Wright (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 6, 11, fn. 5 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 311 ] for a discussion of the need to rewrite the involuntary manslaughter statute.) It should be apparent from the structure of the argument outlined above, unless we find insufficient evidence to convict defendant of a violation of Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(2), that we never reach defendant’s bid for extension of the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Stuartgreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 174 [ 302 P.2d 5 ] [preparing, compounding, or selling an adulterated or misbranded drug]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [ 248 P.2d 12 ] [brandishing a firearm]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 132, 139-140 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] [carrying a loaded firearm in a public place]; People v. Villalobos (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 111 ] [child endangerment].) Therefore, it cannot be said a violation of section 192 would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of section 245. 2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe | 1 | 2 |
People v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1989Code, § 192, par. 2), we reach the same conclusion as to the first degree felony-murder rule only by piling inference on inference; and the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code (see People v. Phillips (1966) . . . 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ], and cases cited). 1989Code, § 192, par. 2), we reach the same conclusion as to the first degree felony-murder rule only by piling inference on inference; and the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code (see People v. Phillips (1966) . . . 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ], and cases cited). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 174 [ 302 P.2d 5 ] [preparing, compounding, or selling an adulterated or misbranded drug]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [ 248 P.2d 12 ] [brandishing a firearm]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 132, 139-140 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] [carrying a loaded firearm in a public place]; People v. Villalobos (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 111 ] [child endangerment].) Therefore, it cannot be said a violation of section 192 would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of section 245. 2008(See, e.g., People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 174 [ 302 P.2d 5 ] [preparing, compounding, or selling an adulterated or misbranded drug]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [ 248 P.2d 12 ] [brandishing a firearm]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 132, 139-140 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] [carrying a loaded firearm in a public place]; People v. Villalobos (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 111 ] [child endangerment].) Therefore, it cannot be said a violation of section 192 would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of section 245. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2008The misdemeanor manslaughter clause of section 192 applies whenever the victim’s death results from a misdemeanor that is “dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its commission.” (People v. Garcia (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 18, 27 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 ].) While aggravated assault would qualify as a predicate misdemeanor, it is only one of many that may support a conviction under section 192. 2008The misdemeanor manslaughter clause of section 192 applies whenever the victim’s death results from a misdemeanor that is “dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its commission.” (People v. Garcia (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 18, 27 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 ].) While aggravated assault would qualify as a predicate misdemeanor, it is only one of many that may support a conviction under section 192. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Southackgreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 174 [ 302 P.2d 5 ] [preparing, compounding, or selling an adulterated or misbranded drug]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [ 248 P.2d 12 ] [brandishing a firearm]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 132, 139-140 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] [carrying a loaded firearm in a public place]; People v. Villalobos (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 111 ] [child endangerment].) Therefore, it cannot be said a violation of section 192 would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of section 245. 2008(See, e.g., People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 174 [ 302 P.2d 5 ] [preparing, compounding, or selling an adulterated or misbranded drug]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [ 248 P.2d 12 ] [brandishing a firearm]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 132, 139-140 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] [carrying a loaded firearm in a public place]; People v. Villalobos (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 111 ] [child endangerment].) Therefore, it cannot be said a violation of section 192 would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of section 245. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Villalobosgreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 174 [ 302 P.2d 5 ] [preparing, compounding, or selling an adulterated or misbranded drug]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [ 248 P.2d 12 ] [brandishing a firearm]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 132, 139-140 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] [carrying a loaded firearm in a public place]; People v. Villalobos (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 111 ] [child endangerment].) Therefore, it cannot be said a violation of section 192 would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of section 245. 2008(See, e.g., People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 174 [ 302 P.2d 5 ] [preparing, compounding, or selling an adulterated or misbranded drug]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [ 248 P.2d 12 ] [brandishing a firearm]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 132, 139-140 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] [carrying a loaded firearm in a public place]; People v. Villalobos (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 111 ] [child endangerment].) Therefore, it cannot be said a violation of section 192 would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of section 245. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Le Grantgreen2 sentences2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe 2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. McManisgreen2 sentences2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe 2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tophiagreen2 sentences2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe 2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morgangreen2 sentences2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe 2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 | 1 | 1 |
Broxton v. Stategreen1 sentence2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe 2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Samarjiangreen2 sentences1992(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 380-383 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Bozigian (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 876 ]; People v. Samarjian (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 13, 23 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 180 ].) There was no basis for a misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction. 9. 1992(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 380-383 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Bozigian (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 876 ]; People v. Samarjian (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 13, 23 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 180 ].) There was no basis for a misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction. 9. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bozigiangreen2 sentences1992(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 380-383 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Bozigian (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 876 ]; People v. Samarjian (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 13, 23 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 180 ].) There was no basis for a misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction. 9. 1992(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 380-383 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Bozigian (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 876 ]; People v. Samarjian (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 13, 23 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 180 ].) There was no basis for a misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction. 9. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Banksgreen2 sentences1992(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 380-383 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Bozigian (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 876 ]; People v. Samarjian (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 13, 23 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 180 ].) There was no basis for a misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction. 9. 1992(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 380-383 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Bozigian (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 876 ]; People v. Samarjian (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 13, 23 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 180 ].) There was no basis for a misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction. 9. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burroughsgreen2 sentences1986(See People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ]; and People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 157 ].) Defendant argues, by analogy to this “felony manslaughter” doctrine, that the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine should be extended to noninherently dangerous misdemeanors committed without due caution and circumspection, and that he should have been given the benefit of such an extension in the instructions to the jury. 1986(See People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ]; and People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 157 ].) Defendant argues, by analogy to this “felony manslaughter” doctrine, that the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine should be extended to noninherently dangerous misdemeanors committed without due caution and circumspection, and that he should have been given the benefit of such an extension in the instructions to the jury. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Buttsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Satchellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Schadergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kerrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Escarcegagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lilliockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Blair
green
1 sentence2014(See People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 866–867; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 744–745.) Nonetheless, when, as occurred here, a defendant’s trial counsel cites one or more specific statutes as the basis for a misdemeanor manslaughter instruction, and the trial judge concludes that the cited statutes are not a proper basis for the instruction, we do not believe the judge is required to comb the Penal Code in search of an alternative statutory basis for the instruction. 19 Second, “where involuntary manslaughter is predicated on an unlawful act constituting a misdemeanor, it mu | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Morse
green
1 sentence2014In support of this contention, respondent cites People v. Morse (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647 , which held that a wobbler is a felony for all purposes unless and until it is validly reduced to a misdemeanor. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Tufunga
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 944 .) At trial, appellant requested a misdemeanor manslaughter instruction on the theory that the homicide occurred in the course of a violation of former section 12025, subsection (a)(3), which has since been recodified as section 25400, subsection (a)(3).14 Former section 12025, subdivision (a)(3) made it a crime to “[c]ause[] to be carried concealed within any vehicle in which [the defendant] is an occupant any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Appellant’s theory at trial, which he reiterates on appeal, | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2014As to his first contention, appellant quotes People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 for the proposition that “[a]n instruction on involuntary manslaughter is required whenever there is substantial evidence indicating the defendant did not actually form the intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 884.) Appellant has taken this quotation out of context, however. 2014(See People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 866–867; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 744–745.) Nonetheless, when, as occurred here, a defendant’s trial counsel cites one or more specific statutes as the basis for a misdemeanor manslaughter instruction, and the trial judge concludes that the cited statutes are not a proper basis for the instruction, we do not believe the judge is required to comb the Penal Code in search of an alternative statutory basis for the instruction. 19 Second, “where involuntary manslaughter is predicated on an unlawful act constituting a misdemeanor, it mu | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Cox
green
2 sentences2014The court further held that “where involuntary manslaughter is predicated on an unlawful act constituting a misdemeanor, it must still be shown that such misdemeanor was dangerous to human life or safety under the circumstances of its commission.” (People v. Cox, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 675 .) Accordingly, the Court disapproved earlier cases adopting “a misdemeanor-manslaughter rule that automatically establishes the offense of involuntary manslaughter whenever a killing results from the commission of any misdemeanor . . . .” (Ibid.) Thus, People v. Cox is flatly inconsistent with appellant’s 2014(See People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 866–867; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 744–745.) Nonetheless, when, as occurred here, a defendant’s trial counsel cites one or more specific statutes as the basis for a misdemeanor manslaughter instruction, and the trial judge concludes that the cited statutes are not a proper basis for the instruction, we do not believe the judge is required to comb the Penal Code in search of an alternative statutory basis for the instruction. 19 Second, “where involuntary manslaughter is predicated on an unlawful act constituting a misdemeanor, it mu | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Puryear
green
2 sentences2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Horton.
green
2 sentences2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Wells
green
1 sentence2000We recognize, as did the Court of Appeal below, that a line of early California intermediate appellate court decisions, many predating Stuart , held that “where a person, in committing an assault and battery . . . unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime is [involuntary] manslaughter. [Citations.]” (People v. McManis (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 898 [ 266 P.2d 134 ]; see also People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 608 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 911 ]; People v. Tophia (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 39, 47-48 [ 334 P.2d 133 ]; People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [ 172 P.2d 554 ]; Pe | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Boag
green
2 sentences2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 2000As LaFave and Scott point out, early cases relying on the so-called malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction in fashioning an automatic misdemeanor-manslaughter rule for cases in which the predicate unlawful act *676 resulting in a killing was malum in se (i.e., a misdemeanor committed with general criminal intent) were indeed widespread. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Crimes Against the Person, § 7.13(d), p. 296 (LaFave & Scott); see, e.g., Broxton v. State (1936) 27 Ala.App. 298 [ 171 So. 390 ]; State v. Boag (1936) 154 Or. 354 [ 59 P.2d 396 ]; State v. Horton (1905) 139 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Morales
green
2 sentences1986(See People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ]; and People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 157 ].) Defendant argues, by analogy to this “felony manslaughter” doctrine, that the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine should be extended to noninherently dangerous misdemeanors committed without due caution and circumspection, and that he should have been given the benefit of such an extension in the instructions to the jury. 1986(See People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ]; and People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 157 ].) Defendant argues, by analogy to this “felony manslaughter” doctrine, that the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine should be extended to noninherently dangerous misdemeanors committed without due caution and circumspection, and that he should have been given the benefit of such an extension in the instructions to the jury. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.