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13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
American Medical International, Inc. v. Fellergreen1 sentence2025Consistent with these general standing principles and with partition’s purpose of splitting title amongst current owners (ante, at p. 4), the statute provides that a partition action “may be commenced and maintained by” “[a]n owner of an estate of inheritance . . . in real property where such property or estate therein is owned by several persons concurrently or in successive estates.” 6 (§ 872.210, subd. (a)(2); see also American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1013 [“ ‘The only indispensable requirement to [a partition] award is that a clear title be shown’ ” | 1 | 1 |
Grosset v. Wenaasgreen2 sentences2024(Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1119 (Grosset); Sirott v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 371 , 376–377 (Sirott) [limited liability company].) The purpose of the ownership requirement is to combat strike suits. ( Grosset, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1109 & 1114.) The idea is to stop a litigation-hungry plaintiff unconnected with the company from swooping in and buying a few shares just to bring a derivative suit. 2024(Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1119 (Grosset); Sirott v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 371 , 376–377 (Sirott) [limited liability company].) The purpose of the ownership requirement is to combat strike suits. ( Grosset, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1109 & 1114.) The idea is to stop a litigation-hungry plaintiff unconnected with the company from swooping in and buying a few shares just to bring a derivative suit. | 1 | 1 |
Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc.green2 sentences2022(See ante, at pp. 17–18.) Moreover, California courts have stated, in other factual circumstances, that “the ‘ownership’ element of the alter ego doctrine is not applicable in this context.” (Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1219, fn. 7 [an interinsurance exchange]; see also Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343 & fn. 27 [defendant insurer “did not need to own [defendant insurance exchange] for application of the alter ego or single enterprise doctrine,” citing Tran].) To summarize, none of the cases just described supports the notion that the alter ego doctrine may 2022(See ante, at pp. 17–18.) Moreover, California courts have stated, in other factual circumstances, that “the ‘ownership’ element of the alter ego doctrine is not applicable in this context.” (Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1219, fn. 7 [an interinsurance exchange]; see also Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343 & fn. 27 [defendant insurer “did not need to own [defendant insurance exchange] for application of the alter ego or single enterprise doctrine,” citing Tran].) To summarize, none of the cases just described supports the notion that the alter ego doctrine may | 1 | 1 |
Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc.green1 sentence2022(See ante, at pp. 17–18.) Moreover, California courts have stated, in other factual circumstances, that “the ‘ownership’ element of the alter ego doctrine is not applicable in this context.” (Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1219, fn. 7 [an interinsurance exchange]; see also Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343 & fn. 27 [defendant insurer “did not need to own [defendant insurance exchange] for application of the alter ego or single enterprise doctrine,” citing Tran].) To summarize, none of the cases just described supports the notion that the alter ego doctrine may | 1 | 1 |
Burden v. Snowdengreen2 sentences2015To hold otherwise would make the definition of “ ‘Possessory interests’ ” supplied by section 107, subdivision (b) essentially superfluous, in contravention of a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. 7 (See Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin *687 (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1135 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 176 P.3d 654 ] [“courts should avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage”].) The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, which we determine by looking first to “the language of the statute, giving effect to its ‘plain meaning.’ ” (Kimmel 2015To hold otherwise would make the definition of “ ‘Possessory interests’ ” supplied by section 107, subdivision (b) essentially superfluous, in contravention of a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. 7 (See Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin *687 (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1135 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 176 P.3d 654 ] [“courts should avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage”].) The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, which we determine by looking first to “the language of the statute, giving effect to its ‘plain meaning.’ ” (Kimmel | 1 | 1 |
Kimmel v. Golandgreen2 sentences2015To hold otherwise would make the definition of “ ‘Possessory interests’ ” supplied by section 107, subdivision (b) essentially superfluous, in contravention of a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. 7 (See Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin *687 (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1135 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 176 P.3d 654 ] [“courts should avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage”].) The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, which we determine by looking first to “the language of the statute, giving effect to its ‘plain meaning.’ ” (Kimmel 2015To hold otherwise would make the definition of “ ‘Possessory interests’ ” supplied by section 107, subdivision (b) essentially superfluous, in contravention of a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. 7 (See Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin *687 (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1135 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 176 P.3d 654 ] [“courts should avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage”].) The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, which we determine by looking first to “the language of the statute, giving effect to its ‘plain meaning.’ ” (Kimmel | 1 | 1 |
Metcalf v. County of San Joaquingreen2 sentences2015To hold otherwise would make the definition of “ ‘Possessory interests’ ” supplied by section 107, subdivision (b) essentially superfluous, in contravention of a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. 7 (See Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin *687 (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1135 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 176 P.3d 654 ] [“courts should avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage”].) The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, which we determine by looking first to “the language of the statute, giving effect to its ‘plain meaning.’ ” (Kimmel 2015To hold otherwise would make the definition of “ ‘Possessory interests’ ” supplied by section 107, subdivision (b) essentially superfluous, in contravention of a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. 7 (See Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin *687 (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1135 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 176 P.3d 654 ] [“courts should avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage”].) The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, which we determine by looking first to “the language of the statute, giving effect to its ‘plain meaning.’ ” (Kimmel | 1 | 1 |
In Re Schwarzkopfgreen1 sentence2014But the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Praske is plaintiff’s “rubber stamp.” Moreover, under general principles of trust law, “trust beneficiaries hold ‘an equitable estate or beneficial interest in’ property held in trust and 18 are ‘ “regarded as the real owner[s] of [that] property.” ’ [Citation.]” (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1319 ; see In re Schwartzkopf (9th Cir. 2010) 626 F.3d 1032 , 1039 [under California law, “equitable ownership in a trust is sufficient to meet the ownership requirement for purposes of alter ego liability”].) ii. | 1 | 1 |
Fitzsimmons v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1960There are no other parties who either now, at the time the suit was filed, or at the time the agreement was entered into . . . have or have had any interest in the said real estate business.” In listing the contentions of the parties the order does not show any issue raised by defendants over the ownership of the claim by the new partners. * The pretrial order controls the subsequent course of the case in accordance with rule 8.8, Rules of the Superior Court (Fitzsimmons v. Jones, 179 Cal.App.2d 5, 9 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 373 ].) *703 At the trial counsel for both parties stated the issues. 1960There are no other parties who either now, at the time the suit was filed, or at the time the agreement was entered into . . . have or have had any interest in the said real estate business.” In listing the contentions of the parties the order does not show any issue raised by defendants over the ownership of the claim by the new partners. * The pretrial order controls the subsequent course of the case in accordance with rule 8.8, Rules of the Superior Court (Fitzsimmons v. Jones, 179 Cal.App.2d 5, 9 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 373 ].) *703 At the trial counsel for both parties stated the issues. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Russell
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Winston
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Hodges
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Uselding
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Crawford v. State
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Lewis
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Cates v. State
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Self
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Martin
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Edwards v. State
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Mejia
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Commonwealth v. Dombrauskas
green
2 sentences1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] 1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 [ 662 A.2d 308 ]; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wn.App. 654 [ 713 P.2d 142 ] [rejecting majority’s reasoning in Butler]; People v. Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 [ 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 ] [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 [ 295 S.E.2d 46 ] [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 [ 418 A.2d 493 ] [citing favorably to Justice Mosk’s dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 [ 536 P.2d 1392 ] | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Alamo School District v. Jones
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 761), such as a fee simple (Alamo School Dist. v. Jones (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 180, 184 ) or a tenancy in common (Gunn v. Gunn (1929) 102 Cal.App. 606, 607 ). 7 This ownership requirement was met, the siblings claim, because Decedent’s estate was an intestate estate when they filed their partition claim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gunn v. Gunn
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 761), such as a fee simple (Alamo School Dist. v. Jones (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 180, 184 ) or a tenancy in common (Gunn v. Gunn (1929) 102 Cal.App. 606, 607 ). 7 This ownership requirement was met, the siblings claim, because Decedent’s estate was an intestate estate when they filed their partition claim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hogan v. Ingold
green
2 sentences2024(Hogan v. Ingold (1952) 38 Cal.2d 802 , 805–807 (Hogan); see Corp. Code, § 800, subd. (b)(1) [contemporaneous ownership].) California law requires continuous as well as contemporaneous ownership. 2024(Ibid.) The bond requirement can, under some circumstances, force plaintiffs to post substantial sums to pursue a derivative suit. ( Hogan, supra, 38 Cal.2d at pp. 805–807; see Corp. Code, § 800, subds. (c) & (d).) The goal is to create a deterrent to unwarranted shareholder derivative lawsuits by providing a mechanism for securing some portion of a prevailing defendant’s expenses. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Melinda S. Workman v. Verde Wellness Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023(See, e.g., Pall, supra, 995 N.Y.S.2d at p. 402 [“Because the N-PCL specifically eliminated the ability of less than five percent of shareholders to continue an action by posting security for expenses, we conclude that the ownership requirement of N-PCL 623(a) must continue throughout the action in order to maintain standing”]; Workman, supra, 382 P.3d at p. 819 .)16 Insofar as an expert consensus exists, it is to be found in the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act and the Restatement of the Law, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations (Restatement). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Newcrete Products v. City of Wilkes-Barre
green
1 sentence2022Ct. 2012) 37 A.3d 7, 13 .) This was because “a redevelopment authority is not authorized to sell ownership interests, [so] City is not capable of being an equity interest holder in Authority, and thus, City cannot be liable for Authority’s debts by veil piercing.” (Id. at pp. 13–14.) As we have already stated, the ownership principle is inapt in the context of public entities, and we do not consider that a legal bar to 28 application of the alter ego doctrine. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2014But the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Praske is plaintiff’s “rubber stamp.” Moreover, under general principles of trust law, “trust beneficiaries hold ‘an equitable estate or beneficial interest in’ property held in trust and 18 are ‘ “regarded as the real owner[s] of [that] property.” ’ [Citation.]” (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1319 ; see In re Schwartzkopf (9th Cir. 2010) 626 F.3d 1032 , 1039 [under California law, “equitable ownership in a trust is sufficient to meet the ownership requirement for purposes of alter ego liability”].) ii. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith
green
1 sentence2007(Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 615 .) The cousin argued the complaint was untimely because Ankoanda had known about the cousin’s ownership claim to the property for four years, but a three-year statute of limitations applied to actions based on fraud or mistake. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. William Kent Estate Co.
green
2 sentences1997Kent Estate Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 156 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 215 ] (hereafter, Kent Estate) held that tidal boundaries were to be set by a fixed line, and concluded that the estimates of the mean high tide line used by Mr. Uzes, upon which the Coastal Commission relied in denying the permit, were reasonable and constituted substantial evidence supporting an ownership claim by the State to portions of the proposed project site. 1997Kent Estate Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 156 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 215 ] (hereafter, Kent Estate) held that tidal boundaries were to be set by a fixed line, and concluded that the estimates of the mean high tide line used by Mr. Uzes, upon which the Coastal Commission relied in denying the permit, were reasonable and constituted substantial evidence supporting an ownership claim by the State to portions of the proposed project site. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Strang v. Ryan
neutral
1 sentence1938(See, however, Strang v. Ryan, 46 Cal. 33 .) The trial court’s judgment did not undertake to determine what respondent’s present rights may be. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.