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13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoungreen2 sentences2020(See Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 269 [“ ‘[A] party may be estopped from asserting that the licensing agreement between FFA and SMG.” (See fn. 4, ante.) And in any event, the parole evidence rule “does not . . . prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence ‘to explain the meaning of a written contract . . . [if] the meaning urged is one to which the written contract terms are reasonably susceptible.’ ” (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 343 .) 8 lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract’s arbitrati 2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 | 3 | 4 |
Grey v. American Management Servicesgreen2 sentences2020As noted, the Employment Agreement, which defines “Company” as DKD of Davis, contains an integration clause that states: “This agreement is the entire agreement between the Company and the employee . . . and this agreement takes the place of all prior and contemporaneous agreements . . . .” (See Grey v. 10 American Management Services (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 803, 805, 807 [plain language of integration clause contained in subsequent employment agreement reflected intent to supersede earlier job application].) Any attempt by defendants to vary the terms of the Employment Agreement is barred by t 2020(See Grey v. American Management Services (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 803, 805, 807 [plain language of integration clause contained in subsequent employment agreement reflected intent to supersede earlier job application].) Accordingly, any attempt by defendants to vary the terms of the Employment Agreement is barred by the parole evidence rule. | 2 | 2 |
P. A. Smith Co. v. Mullergreen2 sentences2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 | 1 | 2 |
ALLIANCE TITLE COMPANY, INC. v. Bouchergreen1 sentence2020(See Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 269 [“ ‘[A] party may be estopped from asserting that the licensing agreement between FFA and SMG.” (See fn. 4, ante.) And in any event, the parole evidence rule “does not . . . prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence ‘to explain the meaning of a written contract . . . [if] the meaning urged is one to which the written contract terms are reasonably susceptible.’ ” (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 343 .) 8 lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract’s arbitrati | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Comstock Insurance Co.green2 sentences2013Moreover, because the issue of fraud was not made to the trial court, we have proceeded in conformity with the principle that “ ‘when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or *163 understanding ....’” (Edwards v. Comstock Insurance Co. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1167 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 807 ], quoting Smith v. Occidental Etc. 2013Moreover, because the issue of fraud was not made to the trial court, we have proceeded in conformity with the principle that “ ‘when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or *163 understanding ....’” (Edwards v. Comstock Insurance Co. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1167 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 807 ], quoting Smith v. Occidental Etc. | 1 | 1 |
Munchow v. Kraszewskigreen2 sentences1977The parole evidence rule is not intended to be a shield for fraud (Munchow v. Kraszewski, 56 Cal.App.3d 831, 836 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 762 ], and cases cited). 1977The parole evidence rule is not intended to be a shield for fraud (Munchow v. Kraszewski, 56 Cal.App.3d 831, 836 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 762 ], and cases cited). | 1 | 1 |
Kett v. Graesergreen2 sentences1977The contention has no merit (Kett v. Graeser, 241 Cal.App.2d 571, 573 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 727 ]). *251 Shell Oil Company argues that the parole evidence rule bars recovery here. 1977The contention has no merit (Kett v. Graeser, 241 Cal.App.2d 571, 573 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 727 ]). *251 Shell Oil Company argues that the parole evidence rule bars recovery here. | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Keatinggreen2 sentences1970(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 802 [ 197 P.2d 713 ]; see Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal.App.2d 435, 455 [ 261 P.2d 529 ].) Seaside attacks the court’s findings in several particulars, contending in essence that the court, in each instance, varied the terms of the sales contract in violation of the parole evidence rule. 1970(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 802 [ 197 P.2d 713 ]; see Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal.App.2d 435, 455 [ 261 P.2d 529 ].) Seaside attacks the court’s findings in several particulars, contending in essence that the court, in each instance, varied the terms of the sales contract in violation of the parole evidence rule. | 1 | 1 |
Brewer v. Second Baptist Churchgreen2 sentences1970(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 802 [ 197 P.2d 713 ]; see Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal.App.2d 435, 455 [ 261 P.2d 529 ].) Seaside attacks the court’s findings in several particulars, contending in essence that the court, in each instance, varied the terms of the sales contract in violation of the parole evidence rule. 1970(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 802 [ 197 P.2d 713 ]; see Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal.App.2d 435, 455 [ 261 P.2d 529 ].) Seaside attacks the court’s findings in several particulars, contending in essence that the court, in each instance, varied the terms of the sales contract in violation of the parole evidence rule. | 1 | 1 |
Thoroman v. Davidgreen2 sentences1966(Thoroman v. David, 199 Cal. 386, 390 [ 249 P. 513 ].) That rule, however, is *21 subject to the qualification that even where a writing appears on its face to constitute a complete agreement, where several documents relating to the same transaction are offered as constituting the agreement, extrinsic evidence to show that the several documents were intended to constitute a single agreement may be received without violating the parole evidence rule. 1966(Thoroman v. David, 199 Cal. 386, 390 [ 249 P. 513 ].) That rule, however, is *21 subject to the qualification that even where a writing appears on its face to constitute a complete agreement, where several documents relating to the same transaction are offered as constituting the agreement, extrinsic evidence to show that the several documents were intended to constitute a single agreement may be received without violating the parole evidence rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
green
2 sentences2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Parker v. Meneley
green
2 sentences2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Santa Monica Rent Control Board v. Bluvshtein
green
2 sentences2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 2018Code, § 1625 ; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) However, the rule does not prohibit consideration of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writing if the writing is reasonably susceptible to the meaning shown. ( Casa Herrera , at p. 343, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 , 83 P.3d 497 .) The parole evidence rule also does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to show that a writing is a sham. ( P. A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal. 219 , 222, 256 P. 411 ; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass'n
green
1 sentence2013Each indemnity agreement must be viewed based on the particular language used in the instrument and, if ambiguous, the surrounding circumstances. 27 Defendants' reliance on the California Supreme Court's recent decision in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assoc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169 (Riverisland) is misplaced.7 In Riverisland, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the statutory exception to the parole evidence rule that allows a party to present extrinsic evidence to show that a written agreement was procured by fraud, even if the alleged misrepresentations | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Garcia v. Truck Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences1993Exchange (1984) 36 Cal.3d 426, 435 , at footnote 3 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 435 , 682 P.2d 1100 ], cited Witkin on the issue but did not resolve the issue, which had not been raised on appeal, because it found that the extrinsic evidence was admissible in any event. 1993Exchange (1984) 36 Cal.3d 426, 435 , at footnote 3 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 435 , 682 P.2d 1100 ], cited Witkin on the issue but did not resolve the issue, which had not been raised on appeal, because it found that the extrinsic evidence was admissible in any event. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Alameda County Title Insurance v. Panella
green
2 sentences1962Co. v. Panella (1933) 218 Cal. 510 [ 24 P.2d 163 ], which held that the answer on its face showed that the oral agreement was inadmissible under the parole evidence rule, and therefore was demurrable. 1962Co. v. Panella (1933) 218 Cal. 510 [ 24 P.2d 163 ], which held that the answer on its face showed that the oral agreement was inadmissible under the parole evidence rule, and therefore was demurrable. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Mooney v. Cyriacks
green
2 sentences1960(Mooney v. Cyriacks, 185 Cal. 70 [ 195 P. 922 ].) It is equally well established that a principal is under a positive duty to make a disclosure and cannot escape liability for failure to do so by relying on a contract provision to the effect that there are no other representations than those made in the written agreement. 1960(Mooney v. Cyriacks, 185 Cal. 70 [ 195 P. 922 ].) It is equally well established that a principal is under a positive duty to make a disclosure and cannot escape liability for failure to do so by relying on a contract provision to the effect that there are no other representations than those made in the written agreement. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.