supermajority requirement in California

2020XIII A, section 4.” (Altadena Library, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, fn. 1 .) For similar reasons, the Associations are mistaken in relying on Dublin, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 264 , which involved a recycling plan that was added to the Alameda County Charter by “Measure D,” a 1990 initiative 18 approved by a majority of county voters.

2020XIII A, section 4.” (All Persons, at p. 719, quoting Altadena Library, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, fn. 1 .) Following the sound reasoning of the All Persons court’s resolution of the controlling issues, we conclude the trial court here erred in concluding Proposition 13 imposes a supermajority voting requirement on the electorate for passage of voter initiatives.

2013(See Martinez v. Regents of University of California (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1289 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 241 P.3d 855 ] [“ ‘though not binding’ ” they can, in appropriate circumstances, be “ ‘entitled to great weight when courts attempt to discern legislative intent’ ”]; Walnut Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 234, 248, fn. 9 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ] [“The opinion of the Legislative Counsel, although not binding on the court, is entitled to consideration.”].) Some seven years after the passage of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court observed that, because of th

2013(See Martinez v. Regents of University of California (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1289 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 241 P.3d 855 ] [“ ‘though not binding’ ” they can, in appropriate circumstances, be “ ‘entitled to great weight when courts attempt to discern legislative intent’ ”]; Walnut Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 234, 248, fn. 9 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ] [“The opinion of the Legislative Counsel, although not binding on the court, is entitled to consideration.”].) Some seven years after the passage of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court observed that, because of th

1987The United States Supreme Court, in Gordon v. Lance, supra, 403 U.S. 1 , distinguished a supermajority requirement from laws which denied the vote entirely to people without property (Cipriano v. Houma (1969) 395 U.S. 701 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 647 , 89 S.Ct. 1897 ]) or gave less weight to the votes of people in *591 one county than those in another.

1987Consequently no sector of the population may be said to be ‘fenced out’ from the franchise because of the way they will vote.” (403 U.S. at p. 5 [ 29 L.Ed.2d at p. 276 ], italics added.) Likewise, in the instant case, if Proposition 13 had singled out education and imposed a supermajority requirement solely on tax increases to be used for that purpose the library supporters might well have had a valid equal protection claim under Hunter v. Erickson .

2020“Opinions are not authority for propositions not considered” (Asahi Kasel Pharma Corp. v. Actelion LTD (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 945, 962, fn. 13 ), and Altadena Library takes pains to spell out that the “opinion is confined to the specific constitutional issue the library supporters raised,” not purporting to decide “every other constitutional challenge which might be lodged against the supermajority requirement in art.

2013(See Martinez v. Regents of University of California (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1289 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 241 P.3d 855 ] [“ ‘though not binding’ ” they can, in appropriate circumstances, be “ ‘entitled to great weight when courts attempt to discern legislative intent’ ”]; Walnut Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 234, 248, fn. 9 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ] [“The opinion of the Legislative Counsel, although not binding on the court, is entitled to consideration.”].) Some seven years after the passage of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court observed that, because of th

2013(See Martinez v. Regents of University of California (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1289 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 241 P.3d 855 ] [“ ‘though not binding’ ” they can, in appropriate circumstances, be “ ‘entitled to great weight when courts attempt to discern legislative intent’ ”]; Walnut Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 234, 248, fn. 9 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ] [“The opinion of the Legislative Counsel, although not binding on the court, is entitled to consideration.”].) Some seven years after the passage of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court observed that, because of th

2013(See Martinez v. Regents of University of California (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1289 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 241 P.3d 855 ] [“ ‘though not binding’ ” they can, in appropriate circumstances, be “ ‘entitled to great weight when courts attempt to discern legislative intent’ ”]; Walnut Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 234, 248, fn. 9 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ] [“The opinion of the Legislative Counsel, although not binding on the court, is entitled to consideration.”].) Some seven years after the passage of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court observed that, because of th

2013(See Martinez v. Regents of University of California (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1289 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 241 P.3d 855 ] [“ ‘though not binding’ ” they can, in appropriate circumstances, be “ ‘entitled to great weight when courts attempt to discern legislative intent’ ”]; Walnut Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 234, 248, fn. 9 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ] [“The opinion of the Legislative Counsel, although not binding on the court, is entitled to consideration.”].) Some seven years after the passage of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court observed that, because of th

2012Section 1356, “part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (the Act), provides that a homeowners association, or any member, may petition the superior court for a reduction in the percentage of affirmative votes required to amend the [governing documents] if they require approval by ‘owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association . . . .’ [Citation.] [Fn. omitted.] The court may, but need not, grant the petition if it finds all of the following: Notice was properly given; the balloting was properly conducted; reasonable efforts were made to permit eligible me

2012Section 1356, “part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (the Act), provides that a homeowners association, or any member, may petition the superior court for a reduction in the percentage of affirmative votes required to amend the [governing documents] if they require approval by ‘owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association . . . .’ [Citation.] [Fn. omitted.] The court may, but need not, grant the petition if it finds all of the following: Notice was properly given; the balloting was properly conducted; reasonable efforts were made to permit eligible me

1997(See Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 488-489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ] [A new tax imposed after a positive vote by two-thirds of the electorate was a valid special tax under article XIIIA.]; see also Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 13-15 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) 9 We also have no occasion to address the cross-appeal brought by the Taxpayers, which concerned the trial court’s decision not to consider as evidence the declaration of Mr. Kiani, who opined that the City’s rent board did not, in fact, allow owners who are also landlord

1997(See Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 488-489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ] [A new tax imposed after a positive vote by two-thirds of the electorate was a valid special tax under article XIIIA.]; see also Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 13-15 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) 9 We also have no occasion to address the cross-appeal brought by the Taxpayers, which concerned the trial court’s decision not to consider as evidence the declaration of Mr. Kiani, who opined that the City’s rent board did not, in fact, allow owners who are also landlord

1997(See Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 488-489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ] [A new tax imposed after a positive vote by two-thirds of the electorate was a valid special tax under article XIIIA.]; see also Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 13-15 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) 9 We also have no occasion to address the cross-appeal brought by the Taxpayers, which concerned the trial court’s decision not to consider as evidence the declaration of Mr. Kiani, who opined that the City’s rent board did not, in fact, allow owners who are also landlord

1997(See Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 488-489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ] [A new tax imposed after a positive vote by two-thirds of the electorate was a valid special tax under article XIIIA.]; see also Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 13-15 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) 9 We also have no occasion to address the cross-appeal brought by the Taxpayers, which concerned the trial court’s decision not to consider as evidence the declaration of Mr. Kiani, who opined that the City’s rent board did not, in fact, allow owners who are also landlord

1993In the exercise of its police power, a municipality has the right to fix and collect reasonable regulatory charges in order to cover all direct and incidental costs attendant to its regulation. ( County of Plumas v. Wheeler (1906) 149 Cal. 758, 764 [ 87 P. 909 ].) Such charges are exempt from the supermajority requirement of article XIII A, section 4. ( Pennell v. City of San Jose (1986) 42 Cal.3d 365, 375 [ 228 Cal. Rptr. 726 , 721 P.2d 1111 ].) Such a surcharge, however, is a special tax when it is insufficiently related to accomplishing its purported regulatory purpose.

1993In the exercise of its police power, a municipality has the right to fix and collect reasonable regulatory charges in order to cover all direct and incidental costs attendant to its regulation. ( County of Plumas v. Wheeler (1906) 149 Cal. 758, 764 [ 87 P. 909 ].) Such charges are exempt from the supermajority requirement of article XIII A, section 4. ( Pennell v. City of San Jose (1986) 42 Cal.3d 365, 375 [ 228 Cal. Rptr. 726 , 721 P.2d 1111 ].) Such a surcharge, however, is a special tax when it is insufficiently related to accomplishing its purported regulatory purpose.

1993(County of Plumas v. Wheeler (1906) 149 Cal. 758, 764 [ 87 P. 909 ].) Such charges are exempt from the supermajority requirement of article XIII A, section 4.

1993(County of Plumas v. Wheeler (1906) 149 Cal. 758, 764 [ 87 P. 909 ].) Such charges are exempt from the supermajority requirement of article XIII A, section 4.

1991At the end of our Richmond opinion, in response to the fear expressed in the lone dissent (that “wholesale avoidance” of the supermajority requirement of section 4 would result if new districts were created without the power to impose a property tax), we stated that this “problem can be dealt with if and when the issue arises.” (Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 208.) This chance comment cannot be seized upon to render the wholesale reliance on our holding by local taxing agencies to be unreasonable.

1991At the end of our Richmond opinion, in response to the fear expressed in the lone dissent (that "wholesale avoidance" of the supermajority requirement of section 4 would result if new districts were created without the power to impose a property tax), we stated that this "problem can be dealt with if and when the issue arises." ( Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 208.) This chance comment cannot be seized upon to render the wholesale reliance on our holding by local taxing agencies to be unreasonable.