unequivocal rule in California

1969The inheritance tax is imposed on the beneficial succession to property. ( Estate of Barter (1947) 30 Cal.2d 549 , 557 [ 184 P.2d 305 ]; Estate of Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453 , 458 [ 159 P.2d 630 ].) Grogan holds that everything in the nature of a change of ownership effected through a will is taxable because the tax is on the vehicle carrying the right rather than on the right itself and that, therefore, a bequest in a will in payment of a debt is subject to a tax.

1966The inheritance tax is imposed on the beneficial succession to property. ( Estate of Barter (1947) 30 Cal.2d 549, 557 [ 184 P.2d 305 ]; Estate of Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453, 458 [ 159 P.2d 630 ].) Grogan holds that everything in the nature of a change of ownership effected through a will is taxable because the tax is on the vehicle carrying the right rather than on the right itself and that, therefore, a bequest in a will in payment of a debt is subject to a tax.

1969In disposing of the rule pronounced in Estate of Grogan, 63 Cal.App. 536 [ 219 P. 87 ] to the effect that any transfer by will is taxable, the court in Vai said (pp. 151-152): “We conclude that the foregoing unequivocal rule of Grogan must be disapproved, for it makes the imposition of the tax dependent upon form rather than substance.

1969In disposing of the rule pronounced in Estate of Grogan, 63 Cal.App. 536 [ 219 P. 87 ] to the effect that any transfer by will is taxable, the court in Vai said (pp. 151-152): “We conclude that the foregoing unequivocal rule of Grogan must be disapproved, for it makes the imposition of the tax dependent upon form rather than substance.

1966It is in effect a declaration of law that when a will is used as a means of conveyance of property a tax must be paid for that privilege." (Accord, In re Gould's Estate (1898) 156 N.Y. 423 [ 51 N.E. 287 ].) We conclude that the foregoing unequivocal rule of Grogan must be disapproved, for it makes the imposition of the tax dependent upon form rather than substance.

1966It is in effect a declaration of law that when a will is used as a means of conveyance of property a tax must he paid for that privilege.” (Accord, In re Gould’s Estate (1898) 156 N.V. 423 [ 51 N.E. 287 ].) We conclude that the foregoing unequivocal rule of Grogan must he disapproved, for it makes the imposition of the tax dependent upon form rather than substance.

2025First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial.” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913 , 931–932.) On appeal, Bacci makes several arguments about his waiver of counsel, arguing that he made an unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 and that the trial court erred by failing to first inquire

2025First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial.” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913 , 931–932.) On appeal, Bacci makes several arguments about his waiver of counsel, arguing that he made an unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 and that the trial court erred by failing to first inquire

2025First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial.” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913 , 931–932.) On appeal, Bacci makes several arguments about his waiver of counsel, arguing that he made an unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 and that the trial court erred by failing to first inquire

2016Moreover, it is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity “ ‘must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” (United States v. Testan (1976) 424 U.S. 392, 399 , quoting United States v. King (1969) 395 U.S. 1, 4 .) The policy language relied by plaintiffs does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the immunity expressed in section 850.4.

2016Moreover, it is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity “ ‘must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” (United States v. Testan (1976) 424 U.S. 392, 399 , quoting United States v. King (1969) 395 U.S. 1, 4 .) The policy language relied by plaintiffs does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the immunity expressed in section 850.4.

2016Bearing in mind that a trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 may not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that such discretion was exercised “‘in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]’” (People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1124–1125), we conclude that the trial court did 4 not err in admitting the evidence of the 2010 crime. // // // 4 Our conclusions that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and that the court did not err in admitting the prior crime evidence obviate a nee

2015And the very type of language appearing in these agreements—construed in its ordinary and popular sense (Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1129 )—has been held to constitute a class action waiver, even when it does not expressly use the terms "class" or "representative" actions.

2009Although some of these cases may stop short of declaring an unequivocal rule, they support the proposition, stated explicitly in Jones , that “California follows the long-standing rule that the employees of a business constructively possess the business owner’s property during a robbery.” (Id., at p. 490.) For example, in an early case, Dean, supra, 66 Cal.App. 602 , the defendant and his accomplices broke into a theater safe and took the money inside.

2001Thus, we are compelled to find the trial court erred in violating this mandate. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) The third rule is that any Wheeler/Batson violation not remedied in the trial court by the mandatory remedy of quashing the venire and beginning jury *458 selection anew with a new panel requires reversal regardless of its prejudicial impact on the parties. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ; People v. Smith, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 850

2001Thus, we are compelled to find the trial court erred in violating this mandate. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) The third rule is that any Wheeler/Batson violation not remedied in the trial court by the mandatory remedy of quashing the venire and beginning jury *458 selection anew with a new panel requires reversal regardless of its prejudicial impact on the parties. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ; People v. Smith, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 850

2001Thus, we are compelled to find the trial court erred in violating this mandate. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) The third rule is that any Wheeler/Batson violation not remedied in the trial court by the mandatory remedy of quashing the venire and beginning jury *458 selection anew with a new panel requires reversal regardless of its prejudicial impact on the parties. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ; People v. Smith, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 850

2001Thus, we are compelled to find the trial court erred in violating this mandate. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) The third rule is that any Wheeler/Batson violation not remedied in the trial court by the mandatory remedy of quashing the venire and beginning jury *458 selection anew with a new panel requires reversal regardless of its prejudicial impact on the parties. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ; People v. Smith, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 850

1991For example, the majority recite the holding of Richmond , reiterated without demur in subsequent cases, that the elitist requirement for a supermajority is “fundamentally undemocratic,” and that the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of permitting voters to enact measures by a majority vote. ( Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 202-205; see also Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin (1985) 38 Cal.3d 100, 106 (maj. opn.), 110 (conc. & dis. opn. of Lucas, J.) [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 133 , 695 P.2d 220 ]; Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 52 ; Fenton

1991For example, the majority recite the holding of Richmond , reiterated without demur in subsequent cases, that the elitist requirement for a supermajority is "fundamentally undemocratic," and that the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of permitting voters to enact measures by a majority vote. ( Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 202-205; see also Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin (1985) 38 Cal.3d 100, 106 (maj. opn.), 110 (conc. & dis. opn. of Lucas, J.) [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 133 , 695 P.2d 220 ]; Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 52 ; Fento