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7 New Jersey opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brunetti v. Borough of New Milfordgreen1 sentence2021Plaintiff contends the court's finding he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies was erroneous because "[a]dministrative courts [do] not have jurisdiction to hear the issue regarding access to, and/or disclosure of . . . juvenile records of law enforcement." He also argues "[a]dministrative [c]ourts do NOT have jurisdiction to award attorney fees or monetary damages and therefore it was impossible for [p]laintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his civil cause of action." Furthermore, he argues "[b]y the time the Appellate Division rendered its decision, the football se | 1 | 1 |
Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A.green1 sentence2019Brownlee also argues that TSI's dispute resolution rules did not contain an unequivocal waiver of her right to judicial resolution of her claims and truncated the statute of limitations for her claims, that TSI was barred by promissory estoppel from enforcing its dispute resolution program against her, and that her continued employment could not constitute her acceptance of the program. "[A]rbitration . . . is a favored means of dispute resolution." Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006); see, e.g., Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 84-85 (2002); Garfinkel v. Morristown | 1 | 1 |
HOJNOWSKI EX REL. HOJNOWSKI v. Vans Skate Parkgreen1 sentence2019Brownlee also argues that TSI's dispute resolution rules did not contain an unequivocal waiver of her right to judicial resolution of her claims and truncated the statute of limitations for her claims, that TSI was barred by promissory estoppel from enforcing its dispute resolution program against her, and that her continued employment could not constitute her acceptance of the program. "[A]rbitration . . . is a favored means of dispute resolution." Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006); see, e.g., Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 84-85 (2002); Garfinkel v. Morristown | 1 | 1 |
Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.green1 sentence2019Brownlee also argues that TSI's dispute resolution rules did not contain an unequivocal waiver of her right to judicial resolution of her claims and truncated the statute of limitations for her claims, that TSI was barred by promissory estoppel from enforcing its dispute resolution program against her, and that her continued employment could not constitute her acceptance of the program. "[A]rbitration . . . is a favored means of dispute resolution." Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006); see, e.g., Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 84-85 (2002); Garfinkel v. Morristown | 1 | 1 |
Ramey Construction Company, Inc. v. The Apache Tribe Of The Mescalero Reservationgreen1 sentence1999See also Ramey Construction Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F. 2d 315 (10th Cir. 1982) (Consent to partial summary judgment on retainage claim was insufficient to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity as to other matters). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ishmael Gallopgreen1 sentence1989In United States v. Gallop, 838 F. 2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1988), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2858 , 101 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1988), defendant, after the court denied his request for a new attorney, "indicated that he had no choice but to represent himself." The court, after noting that the trial judge should not force a defendant to cooperate with an attorney if he is adamant that he cannot proceed with his appointed counsel, stated that "[t]he proper procedure, though not necessarily the exclusive one, is to order the defendant, as the district court had done in the instant case, to proceed pro | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Baskervillegreen1 sentence1989But cf. State v. Baskerville, 73 N.J. 230, 233-234 (1977) (defendant may produce at trial testimony of his own polygraph expert in the absence of an unequivocal stipulation to the contrary; issue of enforcement of an unequivocal waiver of the right to produce evidence raised but not decided). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
green
2 sentences1999By failing to avail themselves of the procedures for obtaining a waiver of immunity under tribal law, Danka Business Systems and Danka Funding failed to satisfy the conditions necessary for an unequivocal waiver identified in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 . 1999By failing to avail themselves of the procedures for obtaining a waiver of immunity under tribal law, Danka Business Systems and Danka Funding failed to satisfy the conditions necessary for an unequivocal waiver identified in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Langeveld v. L. R. Z. H. Corp.
green
1 sentence1997Notably, our Supreme Court in Langeveld determined that even in the case of an unconditional guaranty a creditor may not impair the collateral unless “the instrument of guaranty specifically frees the creditor from liability for such impairment.” Id. at 53 , 376 A.2d 931 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In re Murray
neutral
2 sentences1993"It is a requisite to waiver of a legal right that there be a `clear, unequivocal and decisive act of a party showing such a purpose or acts amounting to an estoppel on his part'." West Jersey Title, Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 27 N.J. 141, 152 , 141 A. 2d 780 (1958). "`Waiver' is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; it presupposes a full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender." Id. at 152-53 , 141 A. 2d 780 . 1993"It is a requisite to waiver of a legal right that there be a `clear, unequivocal and decisive act of a party showing such a purpose or acts amounting to an estoppel on his part'." West Jersey Title, Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 27 N.J. 141, 152 , 141 A. 2d 780 (1958). "`Waiver' is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; it presupposes a full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender." Id. at 152-53 , 141 A. 2d 780 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Michael C. Tuitt v. Michael Fair, Massachusetts Commissioner of Corrections
green
1 sentence1989The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that a defendant's right to proceed pro se may be conditioned on an unequivocal waiver of the right to counsel, although the federal court pointed out that "the trial court could have adopted alternative courses...." 822 F. 2d at 177 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Gallop v. United States
green
1 sentence1989In United States v. Gallop, 838 F. 2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1988), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2858 , 101 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1988), defendant, after the court denied his request for a new attorney, "indicated that he had no choice but to represent himself." The court, after noting that the trial judge should not force a defendant to cooperate with an attorney if he is adamant that he cannot proceed with his appointed counsel, stated that "[t]he proper procedure, though not necessarily the exclusive one, is to order the defendant, as the district court had done in the instant case, to proceed pro | 1 | 1989–1989 |
McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Ass'n Council
green
1 sentence1989In United States v. Gallop, 838 F. 2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1988), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2858 , 101 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1988), defendant, after the court denied his request for a new attorney, "indicated that he had no choice but to represent himself." The court, after noting that the trial judge should not force a defendant to cooperate with an attorney if he is adamant that he cannot proceed with his appointed counsel, stated that "[t]he proper procedure, though not necessarily the exclusive one, is to order the defendant, as the district court had done in the instant case, to proceed pro | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.