13 California opinions name it 1 courts 1931–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp.green2 sentences2014XV, § 1; see OCM, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 198 [setting forth constitutional usury provisions as originally enacted].) Case law construing the usury law establishes that a party must clearly come “within the definitive edict of the constitutional provision of a ‘borrower’ ” to pursue a usury claim. 2014XV, § 1; see OCM, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 198 [setting forth constitutional usury provisions as originally enacted].) Case law construing the usury law establishes that a party must clearly come “within the definitive edict of the constitutional provision of a ‘borrower’ ” to pursue a usury claim. | 2 | 2 |
ROES v. Wonggreen2 sentences2014(Barnes v. *1103 Hartman (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 514 ]; see Roes v. Wong, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 378.) By its express terms, the constitutional proscription does not apply to the receipt of interest in excess of the statutory rate from a judgment debtor. 2014(Barnes v. Hartman (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 ; see also Roes v. Wong, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 378 .) By its express terms, the constitutional proscription does not apply to the receipt of interest in excess of the statutory rate from a judgment debtor. | 2 | 2 |
Barnes v. Hartmangreen2 sentences2014(Barnes v. *1103 Hartman (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 514 ]; see Roes v. Wong, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 378.) By its express terms, the constitutional proscription does not apply to the receipt of interest in excess of the statutory rate from a judgment debtor. 2014(Barnes v. *1103 Hartman (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 514 ]; see Roes v. Wong, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 378.) By its express terms, the constitutional proscription does not apply to the receipt of interest in excess of the statutory rate from a judgment debtor. | 1 | 3 |
Casey v. Proctorgreen2 sentences2017Semantics aside, construing the release as a waiver of a usury claim would undermine the “theory” of California usury law, which is “that society benefits by the *990 prohibition of loans at excessive interest rates, even though both parties are willing to negotiate them.” (Stock, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 817 .) Wilcox cites Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 111 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 307 , 378 P.2d 579 ] for the following proposition: ”[T]he policy of the law is to encourage out-of-court settlements. 2017Semantics aside, construing the release as a waiver of a usury claim would undermine the “theory” of California usury law, which is “that society benefits by the *990 prohibition of loans at excessive interest rates, even though both parties are willing to negotiate them.” (Stock, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 817 .) Wilcox cites Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 111 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 307 , 378 P.2d 579 ] for the following proposition: ”[T]he policy of the law is to encourage out-of-court settlements. | 1 | 1 |
Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2010(See Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 ].) * See footnote, ante, page 1267. 2010(See Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 ].) * See footnote, ante, page 1267. | 1 | 1 |
Schmidlin v. City of Palo Altogreen2 sentences2010(Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 791 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 365 ] [plaintiff “bound by the allegations in [her] verified complaint”].) Accordingly, the issue of Moore’s standing to “derivatively assert the rights of AFC to the usury defense on the notes of AFCH and IFC” is moot in light of our foregoing conclusion that AFC’s obligations are exempt from the usury law. 2010(Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 791 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 365 ] [plaintiff “bound by the allegations in [her] verified complaint”].) Accordingly, the issue of Moore’s standing to “derivatively assert the rights of AFC to the usury defense on the notes of AFCH and IFC” is moot in light of our foregoing conclusion that AFC’s obligations are exempt from the usury law. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Ajax Construction Co.green2 sentences2007(See also Martin v. Ajax Construction Co. (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 425, 431 [ 269 P.2d 132 ].) However, no published case has addressed whether the guarantors of a loan may expressly waive a usury defense. 2007(See also Martin v. Ajax Construction Co. (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 425, 431 [ 269 P.2d 132 ].) However, no published case has addressed whether the guarantors of a loan may expressly waive a usury defense. | 1 | 1 |
Penziner v. West American Finance Co.green2 sentences1999Holcom did not appeal. [3] The initiative measure, which was adopted in 1918, remains in full force to the extent that it does not conflict with the subsequently adopted constitutional provision. ( Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 160, 170-178 , 74 P.2d 252 .) We refer to the constitutional and the initiative provisions collectively as the "usury law". [4] There are a number of published authorities in which a junior lienholder or other assignee of the borrower successfully asserted a usury claim or defense. 1999Holcom did not appeal. [3] The initiative measure, which was adopted in 1918, remains in full force to the extent that it does not conflict with the subsequently adopted constitutional provision. ( Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 160, 170-178 , 74 P.2d 252 .) We refer to the constitutional and the initiative provisions collectively as the "usury law". [4] There are a number of published authorities in which a junior lienholder or other assignee of the borrower successfully asserted a usury claim or defense. | 1 | 1 |
Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp.green2 sentences1999(See Garms v. Jensen (1894) 103 Cal. 374 , 37 P. 337 ; Nuckolls v. Bank of California (1937) 10 Cal.2d 278 , 74 P.2d 271 ; Roesch v. De Mota. supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 572 , 150 P.2d 422 ; Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp. (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 576, 579-580 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 654 .) However, because the issue of the standing of the junior lienholder to assert usury was not raised or addressed in these decisions, they cannot be cited as authority that such standing exists. 1999(See Garms v. Jensen (1894) 103 Cal. 374 , 37 P. 337 ; Nuckolls v. Bank of California (1937) 10 Cal.2d 278 , 74 P.2d 271 ; Roesch v. De Mota. supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 572 , 150 P.2d 422 ; Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp. (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 576, 579-580 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 654 .) However, because the issue of the standing of the junior lienholder to assert usury was not raised or addressed in these decisions, they cannot be cited as authority that such standing exists. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roesch v. De Mota
green
2 sentences2025Mother further argues, citing Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 572 , that “[a]t the very minimum, [father’s] continued payments constituted a waiver of his right to seek reimbursement because his overpayments were knowing and intentional.” Roesch, a case involving usurious promissory notes and whether plaintiffs could maintain a usury defense (id. at pp. 565- 566, 572) does not demonstrate error. 1999(See Garms v. Jensen (1894) 103 Cal. 374 , 37 P. 337 ; Nuckolls v. Bank of California (1937) 10 Cal.2d 278 , 74 P.2d 271 ; Roesch v. De Mota. supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 572 , 150 P.2d 422 ; Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp. (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 576, 579-580 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 654 .) However, because the issue of the standing of the junior lienholder to assert usury was not raised or addressed in these decisions, they cannot be cited as authority that such standing exists. | 2 | 1999–2025 |
Hardwick v. Wilcox
green
2 sentences2025(Hardwick, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 991 & fn. 3.) But the claim accrues, and the statute of limitations starts running, only when the debtor pays any amount exceeding the principal. 2023(Id. at pp. 984-985.) After a bench trial, the trial court concluded the forbearance agreement did not contain a valid waiver of usury violations. ( Hardwick, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 985, 988.) The court made factual findings that the forbearance agreement was a “‘descendant obligation growing out of the original usurious loans,’” “an extension of that original usurious transaction,” and “usurious in and of itself.” (Id. at p. 985.) “Under these circumstances, the court found, interpreting the release as a waiver of a usury claim would exempt Wilcox from the consequences of his violation | 2 | 2023–2025 |
Ghirardo v. Antonioli
green
2 sentences2014However, as the Supreme Court noted in Ghirardo, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 807 , “[w]hether a transaction violates the usury law does not depend on the margin by which the maximum rate is exceeded. 2014However, as the Supreme Court noted in Ghirardo, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 807 , “[w]hether a transaction violates the usury law does not depend on the margin by which the maximum rate is exceeded. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
GIBBO v. Berger
green
1 sentence2025(Gibbo v. Berger (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 396, 404 .) A usury claim for recovery of interest paid is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Instead, we agree with the conclusion in Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 287 , that while California “has no strong public policy against a particular rate of interest so long as the charging of that 12 rate is permitted by law to the specific lender,” it “has a strong public policy against usury, that is, the charging and receiving interest on the loan or forbearance of money in excess of the rate allowed by law.” (Italics added.) We therefore conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded California’s usury law does not reflect a fundamental p | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Mencor Enterprises, Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp.
green
1 sentence2023The appellate court held in Mencor that the propriety of the choice of law provision—specifying that Colorado law would be applied—could not be decided as a matter of law on demurrer; thus the court reversed the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff’s usury claim under California law. ( Mencor, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 440-441.) Mencor, like Hyundai Securities and Ury, fails to persuade us that the unwaivable usury law enshrined in our Constitution reflects something other than a fundamental public policy of this state. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Gil v. Mansano
green
1 sentence2023(Gil, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 744 .) Berge is similarly inapposite as it did not involve a usury claim at all. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Stock v. Meek
green
1 sentence2017Semantics aside, construing the release as a waiver of a usury claim would undermine the “theory” of California usury law, which is “that society benefits by the *990 prohibition of loans at excessive interest rates, even though both parties are willing to negotiate them.” (Stock, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 817 .) Wilcox cites Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 111 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 307 , 378 P.2d 579 ] for the following proposition: ”[T]he policy of the law is to encourage out-of-court settlements. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Shanfeld v. Munson
green
1 sentence2017(See, e.g., Credit Finance Corp. v. Mox (1932) 125 Cal.App. 583 [ 13 P.2d 937 ] (Mox).) In this case, the Forbearance Agreement did not settle or otherwise substantively dispose of a usury claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Credit Finance Corp. v. Mox
green
1 sentence2017(See, e.g., Credit Finance Corp. v. Mox (1932) 125 Cal.App. 583 [ 13 P.2d 937 ] (Mox).) In this case, the Forbearance Agreement did not settle or otherwise substantively dispose of a usury claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Garms v. Jensen
neutral
2 sentences1999(See Garms v. Jensen (1894) 103 Cal. 374 , 37 P. 337 ; Nuckolls v. Bank of California (1937) 10 Cal.2d 278 , 74 P.2d 271 ; Roesch v. De Mota. supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 572 , 150 P.2d 422 ; Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp. (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 576, 579-580 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 654 .) However, because the issue of the standing of the junior lienholder to assert usury was not raised or addressed in these decisions, they cannot be cited as authority that such standing exists. 1999(See Garms v. Jensen (1894) 103 Cal. 374 , 37 P. 337 ; Nuckolls v. Bank of California (1937) 10 Cal.2d 278 , 74 P.2d 271 ; Roesch v. De Mota. supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 572 , 150 P.2d 422 ; Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp. (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 576, 579-580 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 654 .) However, because the issue of the standing of the junior lienholder to assert usury was not raised or addressed in these decisions, they cannot be cited as authority that such standing exists. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Nichols v. Fearson
green
1 sentence1931(U. S.) 103 [ 8 L. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.