commencement hearing in New York

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2019It is the court's responsibility to advise such a respondent of the right to counsel of his own choosing, or assigned counsel where appropriate, before the commencement of a hearing or other proceedings ( see Hickland v Hickland , 56 AD2d 978, 980 [1977]; see also Matter of Gaudette v Gaudette , 263 AD2d 620, 621 [1999]).

2019It is the court's responsibility to advise such a respondent of the right to counsel of his own choosing, or assigned counsel where appropriate, before the commencement of a hearing or other proceedings ( see Hickland v Hickland , 56 AD2d 978, 980 [1977]; see also Matter of Gaudette v Gaudette , 263 AD2d 620, 621 [1999]).

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2019It is the court's responsibility to advise such a respondent of the right to counsel of his own choosing, or assigned counsel where appropriate, before the commencement of a hearing or other proceedings ( see Hickland v Hickland , 56 AD2d 978, 980 [1977]; see also Matter of Gaudette v Gaudette , 263 AD2d 620, 621 [1999]).

2019It is the court's responsibility to advise such a respondent of the right to counsel of his own choosing, or assigned counsel where appropriate, before the commencement of a hearing or other proceedings ( see Hickland v Hickland , 56 AD2d 978, 980 [1977]; see also Matter of Gaudette v Gaudette , 263 AD2d 620, 621 [1999]).

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013Our dissenting colleague also notes that if this were a matter involving a defendant’s uncounseled waiver of her privilege against self-incrimination, the evidence obtained from a defendant pursuant to a knowing waiver of that constitutional right, prior to counsel’s entry in the matter, would not be subject to suppression (see People v Garofolo, 46 NY2d at 601-602).

2013Our dissenting colleague also notes that if this were a matter involving a defendant’s uncounseled waiver of her privilege against self-incrimination, the evidence obtained from a defendant pursuant to a knowing waiver of that constitutional right, prior to counsel’s entry in the matter, would not be subject to suppression (see People v Garofolo, 46 NY2d at 601-602).

2012In light of the fact that the mother did not have notice that the terms of her visitation would be an issue during this proceeding, the modification of the prior order must be reversed (see Matter of Revet v Revet, 90 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2011]; Matter of Myers v Markey, 74 AD3d 1344, 1345 [2010]).

2012In light of the fact that the mother did not have notice that the terms of her visitation would be an issue during this proceeding, the modification of the prior order must be reversed (see Matter of Revet v Revet, 90 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2011]; Matter of Myers v Markey, 74 AD3d 1344, 1345 [2010]).

2012In light of the fact that the mother did not have notice that the terms of her visitation would be an issue during this proceeding, the modification of the prior order must be reversed (see Matter of Revet v Revet, 90 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2011]; Matter of Myers v Markey, 74 AD3d 1344, 1345 [2010]).

2012In light of the fact that the mother did not have notice that the terms of her visitation would be an issue during this proceeding, the modification of the prior order must be reversed (see Matter of Revet v Revet, 90 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2011]; Matter of Myers v Markey, 74 AD3d 1344, 1345 [2010]).

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013Any delay in the commencement of the hearing was de minimis, and would have been obviated by merely recalling the case later that day, after the complainant had an opportunity to arrive in court (see Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2011Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the petition (see Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]; see also Matter of Stephen H., 251 AD2d 664, 665 [1998]).

2008Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the petitions on that basis (see Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490 [2002]; Matter of lola C., 262 AD2d 558, 559 [1999]; Matter of Latoya McD., 262 AD2d 564 [1999]; Matter of Stephen H., 251 AD2d 664 [1998]; Matter of Lawrence C., 152 AD2d 693, 694 [1989]).

2008Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the petitions on that basis (see Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490 [2002]; Matter of lola C., 262 AD2d 558, 559 [1999]; Matter of Latoya McD., 262 AD2d 564 [1999]; Matter of Stephen H., 251 AD2d 664 [1998]; Matter of Lawrence C., 152 AD2d 693, 694 [1989]).

2002Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the proceeding on that basis (see Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 ; see also Matter of David G., 249 AD2d 50, 51 ; Matter of Stephen H., 251 AD2d 664 , 665; Matter of Lawrence C., 152 AD2d 693, 694 ).

2005Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the delay in the commencement of his hearing (see Matter of Granger v Goord, 6 AD3d 902, 902 [2004]; Matter of Taylor v Coughlin, 135 AD2d 992, 993 [1987].

1991While there was a delay in the commencement of the hearing, such delay was authorized because of petitioner’s transfer from one facility to another on May 29, 1990 (see, Matter of Taylor v Coughlin, 135 AD2d 992, 993 ; see also, Matter of Vogelsang v Coombe, 66 NY2d 835 , affg 105 AD2d 913 ).

2024At the commencement of the hearing on September 1, 2022, counsel for CMC requested a combined hearing addressing both petitioner's emergency status under Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 and the involuntary admission on medical certification under Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27, while utilizing the more "stringent standard" applicable to a section 9.39 hearing ( Matter of Rueda v Charmaine D. , 17 NY3d 522, 530-531 [2011]).

2022Turning to petitioner's procedural contentions, we are unpersuaded that petitioner was denied employee assistance as the record reflects that petitioner refused, both before and at the commencement of the hearing, to choose from any of the available employee assistants ( see Matter of Swinton v Venettozzi , 164 AD3d 1584 , 1585 [2018]; Matter of Lashway v Fischer , 110 AD3d 1420, 1420-1421 [2013]).

2022Thus, due process requirements are met so long as the defendant is given formal notice of the charges, an opportunity to be heard, and an initial adjournment of the hearing upon the defendant's request ( see CPL 410.30, 410.70 [1], [3]; Black v Romano , 471 US 606, 610-612 [1985]; Gagnon v Scarpelli , 411 US 778 [1973]; People v Oskroba , 305 NY 113 [1953]; People v Ebert , 18 AD3d 963 [2005]).

2019"In any event, the time requirements [contained in 7 NYCRR 251-5.1] are directory, not mandatory, and an inmate must demonstrate prejudice as a result of any delay prior to the commencement of such a hearing" ( Matter of Ayuso v Venettozzi , 159 AD3d 1208 , 1209-1210 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Shearer v Annucci , 155 AD3d 1277, 1278 [2017]).