commencement hearing in Connecticut

1996Barra v. Ridgefield Card Gift Gallery, Ltd., 194 Conn. 400 , 404 , 480 A.2d 552 (1984).

1992The Connecticut Supreme Court has indicated that a petition to wind up a corporation may be withdrawn as of right only if the withdrawal is filed before the appraiser commences work on an appraisal, that is, before the fact-finding function has begun, consonant with 52-80 C.G.S. which provides that after the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact, a plaintiff may withdraw an action only by leave of the court for cause shown; Barra v. Ridgefield Card Gift Gallery, Ltd., 194 Conn. 400 , 404-05 (1984); Spears v. Kerars Realty Co., 171 Conn. 699 , 703 (1976).

2015Although the informality of such proceedings might make it ‘‘difficult in some cases to determine at what point the appraiser commences his fact-finding function . . . this fact-finding function cannot com- mence prior to the appraiser’s formal appointment by the court.’’ Id.6 In the context of marital dissolution actions, this court in Grimm v. Grimm, 74 Conn. App. 406, 410 , 812 A.2d 152 (2002), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 911 , 821 A.2d 766 (2003), held that testimony limited to one question on the day that trial was scheduled to begin was sufficient to commence a hearing on the merits and that

2015Although the informality of such proceedings might make it ‘‘difficult in some cases to determine at what point the appraiser commences his fact-finding function . . . this fact-finding function cannot com- mence prior to the appraiser’s formal appointment by the court.’’ Id.6 In the context of marital dissolution actions, this court in Grimm v. Grimm, 74 Conn. App. 406, 410 , 812 A.2d 152 (2002), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 911 , 821 A.2d 766 (2003), held that testimony limited to one question on the day that trial was scheduled to begin was sufficient to commence a hearing on the merits and that

2023Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coher- ency of our construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commis- sion, 199 Conn. App. 115, 130 , 235 A.3d 526 , cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959 , 239 A.3d 320 (2020). ‘‘[W]hen construing a statute, we do not interpret some clauses in a manner that nullifies others, but rather read the statute as a whole and so as to reconcile all parts as far as possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2023Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coher- ency of our construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commis- sion, 199 Conn. App. 115, 130 , 235 A.3d 526 , cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959 , 239 A.3d 320 (2020). ‘‘[W]hen construing a statute, we do not interpret some clauses in a manner that nullifies others, but rather read the statute as a whole and so as to reconcile all parts as far as possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2023Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coher- ency of our construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commis- sion, 199 Conn. App. 115, 130 , 235 A.3d 526 , cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959 , 239 A.3d 320 (2020). ‘‘[W]hen construing a statute, we do not interpret some clauses in a manner that nullifies others, but rather read the statute as a whole and so as to reconcile all parts as far as possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2023Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coher- ency of our construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commis- sion, 199 Conn. App. 115, 130 , 235 A.3d 526 , cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959 , 239 A.3d 320 (2020). ‘‘[W]hen construing a statute, we do not interpret some clauses in a manner that nullifies others, but rather read the statute as a whole and so as to reconcile all parts as far as possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2018Id., at 157, 535 A.2d 377 ; see General Statutes § 52-80 ("[t]he plaintiff may withdraw any action ... before the commencement of a hearing on [its] merits").

2009After the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact in any such action, the plaintiff may withdraw such action, or any other party thereto may withdraw any cross complaint or counterclaim filed therein by him, only by leave of court for cause shown." [14] We acknowledge that then Judge Borden, in his dissenting opinion in Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc., supra, 16 Conn. App. at 587 , 548 A.2d 744 , appears to view "`square one'" under Housing Authority v. Hird, supra, 13 Conn.App. at 157 , 535 A.2d 377 , as the status quo preceding the filing of the summary process complaint

2016It thus rejected the defendants' argument that they had timely objected to a referral because "[t]he defendants 'utterly neglected' to raise the issue of their lack of consent until after the hearing had ended and the referee had filed his report." The court noted that "[t]he appropriate time to object in this case would have been at the time of the referral, or at least prior to the commencement of the hearing before the referee. " (Emphasis added.) Id.

1988“The appropriate time to object in this case would have been at the time of the referral, or at least prior to the commencement of the hearing before the referee.” Id.

1996General Statutes § 52-80 provides in part that "the plaintiff may withdraw any action so returned to and entered in the docket of any court, before the commencement of a hearing on the merits thereof." As stated in Matey v. Waterbury, 24 Conn. App. 93 , at 96 : A plaintiff may withdraw any action as of CT Page 9029 right before the commencement of a hearing on the merits thereof; General Statutes § 52-80 ; and does not need the permission of the court for cause shown if a hearing on an issue of fact has not commenced.

1992Barra v. Ridgefield Card Gift Gallery, Ltd., 194 Conn. 400 , 404 (1084), Matey v. City of Waterbury, et al, 24 Conn. App. 93 , 96 , 97 (1991).

2024Thus, it is clear that the court is not permitted to decide issues outside of those raised in the pleadings.’ Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, 210 Conn. App. 725, 753 , 271 A.3d 141 (2022). ‘‘Practice Book § 25-26 (e) provides in relevant part: ‘Each motion for modification shall state the specific factual and legal basis for the claimed modification . . . .’ In Prial v. Prial, [ 67 Conn. App. 7 , 12–13, 787 A.2d 50 (2001)], the Appellate Court held [that] it was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider grounds not raised in a motion to modify financial orders. . . . ‘‘At the commencement o

2024Thus, it is clear that the court is not permitted to decide issues outside of those raised in the pleadings.’ Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, 210 Conn. App. 725, 753 , 271 A.3d 141 (2022). ‘‘Practice Book § 25-26 (e) provides in relevant part: ‘Each motion for modification shall state the specific factual and legal basis for the claimed modification . . . .’ In Prial v. Prial, [ 67 Conn. App. 7 , 12–13, 787 A.2d 50 (2001)], the Appellate Court held [that] it was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider grounds not raised in a motion to modify financial orders. . . . ‘‘At the commencement o

2024Thus, it is clear that the court is not permitted to decide issues outside of those raised in the pleadings.’ Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, 210 Conn. App. 725, 753 , 271 A.3d 141 (2022). ‘‘Practice Book § 25-26 (e) provides in relevant part: ‘Each motion for modification shall state the specific factual and legal basis for the claimed modification . . . .’ In Prial v. Prial, [ 67 Conn. App. 7 , 12–13, 787 A.2d 50 (2001)], the Appellate Court held [that] it was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider grounds not raised in a motion to modify financial orders. . . . ‘‘At the commencement o

2021Under [the] law, the effect of a withdrawal, so far as the pendency of the action is concerned, is strictly analogous to that presented after the rendition of a final judgment or the erasure of the case from the docket.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Twine, 120 Conn. App. 823 , 826–27, 993 A.2d 470 (2010).

2021Under [the] law, the effect of a withdrawal, so far as the pendency of the action is concerned, is strictly analogous to that presented after the rendition of a final judgment or the erasure of the case from the docket.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Twine, 120 Conn. App. 823 , 826–27, 993 A.2d 470 (2010).

2019"Significantly ... [this] court ... [has] recognized that in certain circumstances, a withdrawal of a petition prior to the commencement of a hearing on the merits could be deemed to be with prejudice ...." (Emphasis in original.) Marra v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 174 Conn. App. at 456 , 166 A.3d 678 .

2019"Significantly ... [this] court ... [has] recognized that in certain circumstances, a withdrawal of a petition prior to the commencement of a hearing on the merits could be deemed to be with prejudice ...." (Emphasis in original.) Marra v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 174 Conn. App. at 456 , 166 A.3d 678 .

2018If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." This court has previously recognized that "[a]lthough we generally restrict our review of a statute's legislative history to the discussions conducted on the floor of the House of Representatives or of the Senate, we will consider such committee hearing testimony of individuals addressing the proposed enactment when such testimony provides particular illum

2018If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." This court has previously recognized that "[a]lthough we generally restrict our review of a statute's legislative history to the discussions conducted on the floor of the House of Representatives or of the Senate, we will consider such committee hearing testimony of individuals addressing the proposed enactment when such testimony provides particular illum

2018Although the plaintiff's "right ... to withdraw his action before a hearing on the merits ... is absolute and unconditional"; (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) Sicaras v. Hartford , 44 Conn. App. 771 , 775-76, 692 A.2d 1290 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916 , 696 A.2d 340 (1997) ; such withdrawal in no way impairs the right of the defendant to prosecute a previously filed counterclaim.

2018Although the plaintiff's "right ... to withdraw his action before a hearing on the merits ... is absolute and unconditional"; (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) Sicaras v. Hartford , 44 Conn. App. 771 , 775-76, 692 A.2d 1290 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916 , 696 A.2d 340 (1997) ; such withdrawal in no way impairs the right of the defendant to prosecute a previously filed counterclaim.

2018Although the plaintiff's "right ... to withdraw his action before a hearing on the merits ... is absolute and unconditional"; (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) Sicaras v. Hartford , 44 Conn. App. 771 , 775-76, 692 A.2d 1290 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916 , 696 A.2d 340 (1997) ; such withdrawal in no way impairs the right of the defendant to prosecute a previously filed counterclaim.

2018Although the plaintiff's "right ... to withdraw his action before a hearing on the merits ... is absolute and unconditional"; (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) Sicaras v. Hartford , 44 Conn. App. 771 , 775-76, 692 A.2d 1290 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916 , 696 A.2d 340 (1997) ; such withdrawal in no way impairs the right of the defendant to prosecute a previously filed counterclaim.

2017After the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact in any such action, the plaintiff may withdraw such action ... only by leave of court for cause shown." "If the requisite hearing has not commenced, then the plaintiff's right to withdraw is 'absolute and unconditional.' " Melendez v. Commissioner of Correction , 141 Conn.App. 836 , 843, 62 A.3d 629 , cert. denied, 310 Conn. 921 , 77 A.3d 143 (2013) ; see also Daigneault v. Consolidated Controls Corp./Eaton Corp. , 89 Conn.App. 712 , 714, 875 A.2d 46 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 913 , 888 A.2d 83 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217 , 126 S.C

2017After the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact in any such action, the plaintiff may withdraw such action ... only by leave of court for cause shown." "If the requisite hearing has not commenced, then the plaintiff's right to withdraw is 'absolute and unconditional.' " Melendez v. Commissioner of Correction , 141 Conn.App. 836 , 843, 62 A.3d 629 , cert. denied, 310 Conn. 921 , 77 A.3d 143 (2013) ; see also Daigneault v. Consolidated Controls Corp./Eaton Corp. , 89 Conn.App. 712 , 714, 875 A.2d 46 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 913 , 888 A.2d 83 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217 , 126 S.C

2017After the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact in any such action, the plaintiff may withdraw such action ... only by leave of court for cause shown." "The term 'with prejudice' means '[w]ith loss of all rights; in a way that finally disposes of a party's claim and bars any future action on that claim ....' " Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction , 147 Conn.App. 748 , 756, 83 A.3d 1174 , cert. denied, 311 Conn. 928 , 86 A.3d 1057 (2014).

2017After the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact in any such action, the plaintiff may withdraw such action ... only by leave of court for cause shown." "The term 'with prejudice' means '[w]ith loss of all rights; in a way that finally disposes of a party's claim and bars any future action on that claim ....' " Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction , 147 Conn.App. 748 , 756, 83 A.3d 1174 , cert. denied, 311 Conn. 928 , 86 A.3d 1057 (2014).

2016Accord Hunt v. Naugatuck, 273 Conn. 97, 99, 105 , 868 A.2d 54 (2005) (although plaintiff sustained impairment during course of employment as police officer in that he was ‘‘placed . . . on a prescription medication to control his hypertension’’ following ‘‘abnormally high’’ blood pressure readings, ‘‘the plaintiff was not seeking an award of specific monetary benefits when he filed his [notice of claim pursuant to § 31-294c] because his hypertension had not ripened into a partial or total disability’’); Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 295, 303 , 620 A.2d 176 (‘‘[t]h

2016Accord Hunt v. Naugatuck, 273 Conn. 97, 99, 105 , 868 A.2d 54 (2005) (although plaintiff sustained impairment during course of employment as police officer in that he was ‘‘placed . . . on a prescription medication to control his hypertension’’ following ‘‘abnormally high’’ blood pressure readings, ‘‘the plaintiff was not seeking an award of specific monetary benefits when he filed his [notice of claim pursuant to § 31-294c] because his hypertension had not ripened into a partial or total disability’’); Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 295, 303 , 620 A.2d 176 (‘‘[t]h

2016Accord Hunt v. Naugatuck, 273 Conn. 97, 99, 105 , 868 A.2d 54 (2005) (although plaintiff sustained impairment during course of employment as police officer in that he was ‘‘placed . . . on a prescription medication to control his hypertension’’ following ‘‘abnormally high’’ blood pressure readings, ‘‘the plaintiff was not seeking an award of specific monetary benefits when he filed his [notice of claim pursuant to § 31-294c] because his hypertension had not ripened into a partial or total disability’’); Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 295, 303 , 620 A.2d 176 (‘‘[t]h

2016Accord Hunt v. Naugatuck, 273 Conn. 97, 99, 105 , 868 A.2d 54 (2005) (although plaintiff sustained impairment during course of employment as police officer in that he was ‘‘placed . . . on a prescription medication to control his hypertension’’ following ‘‘abnormally high’’ blood pressure readings, ‘‘the plaintiff was not seeking an award of specific monetary benefits when he filed his [notice of claim pursuant to § 31-294c] because his hypertension had not ripened into a partial or total disability’’); Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 295, 303 , 620 A.2d 176 (‘‘[t]h

2016Accordingly, in this opinion, we refer to the mother alone as the respondent. 2 ‘‘A finding of neglect is not necessarily predicated on actual harm, but can exist when there is a potential risk of neglect.’’ In re Brianna C., 98 Conn. App. 797, 802 , 912 A.2d 505 (2006). 3 Prior to the commencement of the hearing on the termination petition, the respondent filed a motion to transfer guardianship to Gwendolyn C., the respondent’s adoptive mother.

2016Accordingly, in this opinion, we refer to the mother alone as the respondent. 2 ‘‘A finding of neglect is not necessarily predicated on actual harm, but can exist when there is a potential risk of neglect.’’ In re Brianna C., 98 Conn. App. 797, 802 , 912 A.2d 505 (2006). 3 Prior to the commencement of the hearing on the termination petition, the respondent filed a motion to transfer guardianship to Gwendolyn C., the respondent’s adoptive mother.

2015That section permits, in relevant part, a plaintiff to withdraw an action ‘‘before the commencement of a hearing on the merits thereof,’’ but requires a demonstration of cause and permission of the court ‘‘[a]fter the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-80. ‘‘If a statute . . . does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common under- standing of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Love, 246 Conn. 402, 408 , 717 A.2d 670 (1998).

2015That section permits, in relevant part, a plaintiff to withdraw an action ‘‘before the commencement of a hearing on the merits thereof,’’ but requires a demonstration of cause and permission of the court ‘‘[a]fter the commencement of a hearing on an issue of fact . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-80. ‘‘If a statute . . . does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common under- standing of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Love, 246 Conn. 402, 408 , 717 A.2d 670 (1998).