commencement hearing in California

1991(See, e.g., Baker v. Civil Service Com. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 590, 594 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 162 ]; People v. Tappan (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 812, 817 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 585 ]; In re Cavanaugh (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 316, 321 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 422 ]; Rohr v. Johnson (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 208, 212 [ 150 P.2d 5 ].) However, former Code of Civil Procedure section 170 included express language even more limiting than the cases interpreting the statute: an objection “shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity, . . . and in any event before the commencement of the hearing of any issue of fact . . . .” (

1991(See, e.g., Baker v. Civil Service Com. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 590, 594 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 162 ]; People v. Tappan (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 812, 817 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 585 ]; In re Cavanaugh (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 316, 321 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 422 ]; Rohr v. Johnson (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 208, 212 [ 150 P.2d 5 ].) However, former Code of Civil Procedure section 170 included express language even more limiting than the cases interpreting the statute: an objection “shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity, . . . and in any event before the commencement of the hearing of any issue of fact . . . .” (

1966If the motion is directed to a hearing (other than the trial of a cause), the motion must be made not later than the commencement of the hearing.” However, the section has been interpreted to mean that where the hearing is a part or a continuation of an original proceeding, the motion must be made before the original proceeding is commenced (Jacobs v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 187, 190-191 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ]).

1966If the motion is directed to a hearing (other than the trial of a cause), the motion must be made not later than the commencement of the hearing.” However, the section has been interpreted to mean that where the hearing is a part or a continuation of an original proceeding, the motion must be made before the original proceeding is commenced (Jacobs v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 187, 190-191 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ]).

1979Where a litigant has not previously exercised his privilege under 170.6 he may do so in a proceeding supplemental to the original action as to a judge other than any judge who has previously heard any phase of the matter, provided that he does so before the commencement of the hearing of the supplemental proceedings by such judge and within the time limitations specified in the section.’)” (Lyons v. Superior Court, supra, 73 Cal. App.3d at pp. 627-628, fn. omitted.) In Smith v. Municipal Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 121 ], a case somewhat more analogous to the instant case, t

1979Where a litigant has not previously exercised his privilege under 170.6 he may do so in a proceeding supplemental to the original action as to a judge other than any judge who has previously heard any phase of the matter, provided that he does so before the commencement of the hearing of the supplemental proceedings by such judge and within the time limitations specified in the section.’)” (Lyons v. Superior Court, supra, 73 Cal. App.3d at pp. 627-628, fn. omitted.) In Smith v. Municipal Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 121 ], a case somewhat more analogous to the instant case, t

1986Appellant argues that although the statutory time limits for submission of the medical director’s letter to the district attorney, the filing of the petition for extended commitment and the commencement of the hearing may or may not be jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (cf. In re Johns (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 577, 580-581 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 443 ] and People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 890 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ], it is clear from the statute that the maximum term of commitment is “jurisdictional” in that appellant must be released from custody when the term expires; therefore, the cour

1986Appellant argues that although the statutory time limits for submission of the medical director’s letter to the district attorney, the filing of the petition for extended commitment and the commencement of the hearing may or may not be jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (cf. In re Johns (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 577, 580-581 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 443 ] and People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 890 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ], it is clear from the statute that the maximum term of commitment is “jurisdictional” in that appellant must be released from custody when the term expires; therefore, the cour

1962In People v. Smith, *707 196 Cal.App.2d 854 , 859 2 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 330 ], the court states: “We construe it to be the intent of the Legislature that where a litigant has not previously exercised his privilege under 170.6 he may do so in a proceeding supplemental to the original action as to a judge other than any judge who has previously heard any phase of the matter, provided that he does so before the commencement of the hearing of the supplemental proceedings by such judge and within the time limitations specified in the section.” (See also Spector v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 839, 843 [ 13

1962In People v. Smith, *707 196 Cal.App.2d 854 , 859 2 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 330 ], the court states: “We construe it to be the intent of the Legislature that where a litigant has not previously exercised his privilege under 170.6 he may do so in a proceeding supplemental to the original action as to a judge other than any judge who has previously heard any phase of the matter, provided that he does so before the commencement of the hearing of the supplemental proceedings by such judge and within the time limitations specified in the section.” (See also Spector v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 839, 843 [ 13

1962In People v. Smith, *707 196 Cal.App.2d 854 , 859 2 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 330 ], the court states: “We construe it to be the intent of the Legislature that where a litigant has not previously exercised his privilege under 170.6 he may do so in a proceeding supplemental to the original action as to a judge other than any judge who has previously heard any phase of the matter, provided that he does so before the commencement of the hearing of the supplemental proceedings by such judge and within the time limitations specified in the section.” (See also Spector v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 839, 843 [ 13

1962In People v. Smith, *707 196 Cal.App.2d 854 , 859 2 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 330 ], the court states: “We construe it to be the intent of the Legislature that where a litigant has not previously exercised his privilege under 170.6 he may do so in a proceeding supplemental to the original action as to a judge other than any judge who has previously heard any phase of the matter, provided that he does so before the commencement of the hearing of the supplemental proceedings by such judge and within the time limitations specified in the section.” (See also Spector v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 839, 843 [ 13

2025(See Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1037 [“evidence was sufficient to show appellant’s actual knowledge of his right to object to a commissioner hearing his motion, yet he failed to object and in fact allowed the commissioner to hear and decide the support arrearages”].) V.

2024The fact that a judge, court commissioner, or referee has presided at, or acted in connection with, a pretrial conference or other hearing, proceeding, or motion prior to trial, and not involving a determination of contested fact issues relating to the merits, shall not preclude the later making of the motion provided for in this paragraph at the time and in the manner herein provided.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) In the plea context, “Where sentencing is conducted by the same judge who accepts the plea, a motion to disqualify must be made before the plea bargain is accepted—otherwise the motion

2024The fact that a judge, court commissioner, or referee has presided at, or acted in connection with, a pretrial conference or other hearing, proceeding, or motion prior to trial, and not involving a determination of contested fact issues relating to the merits, shall not preclude the later making of the motion provided for in this paragraph at the time and in the manner herein provided.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) In the plea context, “Where sentencing is conducted by the same judge who accepts the plea, a motion to disqualify must be made before the plea bargain is accepted—otherwise the motion

2024The fact that a judge, court commissioner, or referee has presided at, or acted in connection with, a pretrial conference or other hearing, proceeding, or motion prior to trial, and not involving a determination of contested fact issues relating to the merits, shall not preclude the later making of the motion provided for in this paragraph at the time and in the manner herein provided.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) In the plea context, “Where sentencing is conducted by the same judge who accepts the plea, a motion to disqualify must be made before the plea bargain is accepted—otherwise the motion

2015(See Bank of America v. Carr (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 727, 735 [ 292 P.2d 587 ].) II Next, Ervin asserts that because Altafulla has never disputed the affair occurred and admitted to him that, following one of her trips with her lover, she experienced a yeast infection, his e-mails and statements to her children were literally true.

2015(See Bank of America v. Carr (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 727, 735 [ 292 P.2d 587 ].) II Next, Ervin asserts that because Altafulla has never disputed the affair occurred and admitted to him that, following one of her trips with her lover, she experienced a yeast infection, his e-mails and statements to her children were literally true.

2014(People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322 .) It considered the relevant authorities and concluded that “the statutory language and framework of Proposition 36 contemplate a determination of a petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing based on the record of conviction, as in the line of cases including [People v. ]Guerrero [(1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 ] and [People v.] Woodell[, supra, 17 Cal.4th 448 ].” (Id. at p. 1338.) That court found a “court should be guided by Guerrero and its progeny and should consider 6At the commencement of the hearing, the trial court listed for the record the numero

2014(People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322 .) It considered the relevant authorities and concluded that “the statutory language and framework of Proposition 36 contemplate a determination of a petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing based on the record of conviction, as in the line of cases including [People v. ]Guerrero [(1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 ] and [People v.] Woodell[, supra, 17 Cal.4th 448 ].” (Id. at p. 1338.) That court found a “court should be guided by Guerrero and its progeny and should consider 6At the commencement of the hearing, the trial court listed for the record the numero

2014(People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322 .) It considered the relevant authorities and concluded that “the statutory language and framework of Proposition 36 contemplate a determination of a petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing based on the record of conviction, as in the line of cases including [People v. ]Guerrero [(1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 ] and [People v.] Woodell[, supra, 17 Cal.4th 448 ].” (Id. at p. 1338.) That court found a “court should be guided by Guerrero and its progeny and should consider 6At the commencement of the hearing, the trial court listed for the record the numero