commencement hearing in Georgia

2016Husband then filed a timely notice of appeal. *138 In Kent v. Kent, 289 Ga. 821 ( 716 SE2d 212 ) (2011), this Court reiterated the longstanding, bright-line procedural rule that a party’s right to a transcript of a civil proceeding is not waived “unless the [trial] court makes a ruling ‘at the commencement of the hearing’ that the party ‘expressly refused,’by “ ‘direct and appropriate language,’ ” to share in the costs of the takedown.” Id. at 824 (quoting Giddings v. Starks, 240 Ga. 496, 496-497 ( 241 SE2d 208 ) (1978)).

2016Husband then filed a timely notice of appeal. *138 In Kent v. Kent, 289 Ga. 821 ( 716 SE2d 212 ) (2011), this Court reiterated the longstanding, bright-line procedural rule that a party’s right to a transcript of a civil proceeding is not waived “unless the [trial] court makes a ruling ‘at the commencement of the hearing’ that the party ‘expressly refused,’by “ ‘direct and appropriate language,’ ” to share in the costs of the takedown.” Id. at 824 (quoting Giddings v. Starks, 240 Ga. 496, 496-497 ( 241 SE2d 208 ) (1978)).

1979See also Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697 (1), 698 (238 *854 SE2d 334) (1977).

1979See Code § 38-118 ; Boyd v. State, 207 Ga. 567 (1) ( 63 SE2d 394 ) (1951); Gilbert v. State, 235 Ga. 501 ( 220 SE2d 262 ) (1975); Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697 (1) ( 238 SE2d 334 ) (1977).

2019Cf. Frazier v. Deen, 221 Ga. App. 153, 154 ( 470 SE2d 914 ) (1996) (waiver of garage 3 In an attempt to show arbitrariness, New Image points to a phrase in the Administrator’s statement at the commencement of the hearing: “we require site plans in certain instances and this is one of those instances . . .” However, prior to this comment, the Administrator explained that the reason a site plan may be required is to facilitate her department’s task of determining whether a property is permitted under the zoning classifications.

2019Cf. Frazier v. Deen, 221 Ga. App. 153, 154 ( 470 SE2d 914 ) (1996) (waiver of garage 3 In an attempt to show arbitrariness, New Image points to a phrase in the Administrator’s statement at the commencement of the hearing: “we require site plans in certain instances and this is one of those instances . . .” However, prior to this comment, the Administrator explained that the reason a site plan may be required is to facilitate her department’s task of determining whether a property is permitted under the zoning classifications.

2017See generally In re Bowens, 308 Ga. App. 241, 243 (1) ( 706 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (“[I]n a contempt hearing before a judge sitting as the trier of fact, the hearing judge, and not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.”).

2017See generally In re Bowens, 308 Ga. App. 241, 243 (1) ( 706 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (“[I]n a contempt hearing before a judge sitting as the trier of fact, the hearing judge, and not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.”).

2016See also id. at 826 & n. 1 (overruling several Court of Appeals cases to the extent that they affirmed the denial of a motion for a transcript where the appellant had expressly refused to participate in the takedown, but there was no ruling by the trial court to that effect at the beginning of the proceeding); Beringer v. Emory, 326 Ga.App. 260, 262-263 ( 756 SE2d 329 ) (2014) (relying on Kent to reverse the denial of the mother’s motion to compel the transcript of a contempt hearing, where the record showed that she expressly refused to participate in the take-down, but did not show that the

2016See also id. at 826 & n. 1 (overruling several Court of Appeals cases to the extent that they affirmed the denial of a motion for a transcript where the appellant had expressly refused to participate in the takedown, but there was no ruling by the trial court to that effect at the beginning of the proceeding); Beringer v. Emory, 326 Ga.App. 260, 262-263 ( 756 SE2d 329 ) (2014) (relying on Kent to reverse the denial of the mother’s motion to compel the transcript of a contempt hearing, where the record showed that she expressly refused to participate in the take-down, but did not show that the

2014At the outset, we note that in civil cases, “a court reporter and official transcript are not generally required, although a transcript may be needed to obtain full appellate review.”3 And after notes from a proceeding have been transcribed, “the court reporter must certify the transcript and file the original and one copy with the clerk of the trial court.”4 Then, upon filing, the transcript becomes “a public record that is equally available to all parties.”5 Nevertheless, a party who elects at the start of a proceeding to “solely bear the takedown costs for preparing a transcript may keep an

2014At the outset, we note that in civil cases, “a court reporter and official transcript are not generally required, although a transcript may be needed to obtain full appellate review.”3 And after notes from a proceeding have been transcribed, “the court reporter must certify the transcript and file the original and one copy with the clerk of the trial court.”4 Then, upon filing, the transcript becomes “a public record that is equally available to all parties.”5 Nevertheless, a party who elects at the start of a proceeding to “solely bear the takedown costs for preparing a transcript may keep an

2014At the outset, we note that in civil cases, “a court reporter and official transcript are not generally required, although a transcript may be needed to obtain full appellate review.”3 And after notes from a proceeding have been transcribed, “the court reporter must certify the transcript and file the original and one copy with the clerk of the trial court.”4 Then, upon filing, the transcript becomes “a public record that is equally available to all parties.”5 Nevertheless, a party who elects at the start of a proceeding to “solely bear the takedown costs for preparing a transcript may keep an

2009This paragraph shall be construed and applied so as to save any rights of the parties which they may have to trial by jury. 5 Kim v. State of Ga., 272 Ga. 343, 344 ( 528 SE2d 798 ) (2000). 6 Ga. Const, of 1983, Art.

2009This paragraph shall be construed and applied so as to save any rights of the parties which they may have to trial by jury. 5 Kim v. State of Ga., 272 Ga. 343, 344 ( 528 SE2d 798 ) (2000). 6 Ga. Const, of 1983, Art.

1999OCGA § 9-11-65 (a) (2) provides that “[b]efore or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application.” The trial court’s order recites specifically that the court used the authority granted by this Code section and “advanced and consolidated the trial on the merits of the Count Nine claim for injunctive relief with the hearing of Plaintiff’s motion.” It is well established that a court may do so “if the parties have not objected or

1999OCGA § 9-11-65 (a) (2) provides that “[b]efore or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application.” The trial court’s order recites specifically that the court used the authority granted by this Code section and “advanced and consolidated the trial on the merits of the Count Nine claim for injunctive relief with the hearing of Plaintiff’s motion.” It is well established that a court may do so “if the parties have not objected or

1985See Mathis v. State, 242 Ga. 761, 763 (2) ( 251 SE2d 305 ); Dollar v. State, 161 Ga. App. 428, 430 (4) ( 288 SE2d 689 ). 2.

1985See Mathis v. State, 242 Ga. 761, 763 (2) ( 251 SE2d 305 ); Dollar v. State, 161 Ga. App. 428, 430 (4) ( 288 SE2d 689 ). 2.

1985See Mathis v. State, 242 Ga. 761, 763 (2) ( 251 SE2d 305 ); Dollar v. State, 161 Ga. App. 428, 430 (4) ( 288 SE2d 689 ). 2.

1985See Mathis v. State, 242 Ga. 761, 763 (2) ( 251 SE2d 305 ); Dollar v. State, 161 Ga. App. 428, 430 (4) ( 288 SE2d 689 ). 2.

1979"Because of the previous adjudication finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, a presumption of (the defendant’s) insanity existed at the commencement of the hearing. [Cits.]” Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611, 612 ( 251 SE2d 832 ) (1979).

1979"Because of the previous adjudication finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, a presumption of (the defendant’s) insanity existed at the commencement of the hearing. [Cits.]” Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611, 612 ( 251 SE2d 832 ) (1979).