Supreme Court began analysis in Florida

2018The plurality opinion of the supreme court began its analysis with the observation that, “[t]he real issue presented here is whether our decision in Melbourne requires a trial court to strictly adhere to the procedure as outlined in Melbourne and its progeny.” Spencer, 238 So. 3d at 711 .

2018The plurality opinion of the supreme court began its analysis with the observation that, “[t]he real issue presented here is whether our decision in Melbourne requires a trial court to strictly adhere to the procedure as outlined in Melbourne and its progeny.” Spencer, 238 So. 3d at 711 .

2018Id. at 169- 70.

2018Id. at 169- 70.

2014The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have split over the exclusiveness of these statutory grounds when parties take the FAA shortcut to confirm, vacate, or modify an award, with some saying the recitations are exclusive, and others regarding them as mere threshold provisions open to expansion by agreement.” Id. at 583 .

2014The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have split over the exclusiveness of these statutory grounds when parties take the FAA shortcut to confirm, vacate, or modify an award, with some saying the recitations are exclusive, and others regarding them as mere threshold provisions open to expansion by agreement.” Id. at 583 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 .

2014Hall Street first argued that “expandable judicial review authority” has been the law since Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

2014Hall Street first argued that “expandable judicial review au *1130 thority” has been the law since Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 , 74 S.Ct. 182 , 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953).

2014Id.

2014Id.

2016Id. at 58 .

2016Id. at 58 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 .

2016The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting the principle, set forth above, that “OEC 703 does not render otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible merely because it was the basis for the expert’s opinion.” Id. at 70 .

2013The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the commonality requirement is often misread because “any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common ‘questions.’ ” Id. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.

2010In reaching its conclusion in Doe, the supreme court began its analysis with the two-step inquiry for establishing long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: first, the complaint must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within one of the statutory requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute and, second, the defendant’s activities must constitute sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy federal due process concerns. 620 So.2d at 1005 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989)).

2010In reaching its conclusion in Doe, the supreme court began its analysis with the two-step inquiry for establishing long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: first, the complaint must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within one of the statutory requirements of Florida's long-arm statute and, second, the defendant's activities must constitute sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy federal due process concerns. 620 So.2d at 1005 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)).

2008The supreme court began its analysis of the economic loss rule with a broad definition, stating, "The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that sets forth the circumstances under which a tort action is prohibited if the only damages suffered are economic losses," which the court defined as "simply put, disappointed economic expectations." Id. at 536 , 536 n. 1.

1995While a bright line rule was found to be impractical, the supreme court nevertheless recognized the lack of consistency in decisions of the lower courts and a lack of guidance available to the lower courts and therefore adopted the approach established by the Third District Court of Appeal in Hill v. Hill, supra .

1995The supreme court began its analysis by noting that Florida law presumes that both parents will participate in child-rearing after divorce. § 61.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. The court acknowledged that courts both within and without Florida have grappled with the difficulty posed when the custodial parent seeks to remove a child from the area of the former marital home recognizing that "[t]here are an infinite number of situations that must be evaluated in light of the best interests of the families involved." 621 So.2d at 419 .

1993The supreme court began its analysis by stating, "Any meaningful decision as to the proper scope of judicial review of a zoning decision must start with a characterization of the nature of that decision." 507 P.2d at 25-26 .

1993Most jurisdictions, including Oregon itself, heretofore had "state[d] that a zoning ordinance is a legislative act and is thereby entitled to presumptive validity." 507 P.2d at 26 .

1984The Supreme Court began its analysis with the explanation that the sixth amendment right to counsel exists in order to ensure the fundamental right to a fair trial, i.e., a trial "in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding." 104 S.Ct. at 2063 .

1984The benchmark for judging claims of ineffectiveness, the Supreme Court held, is whether the conduct of counsel "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 2064 .