Supreme Court began analysis in Maryland

2024That exemption, the Court said, “shields from mandatory disclosure ‘commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.’” Id. at 433 .

2017The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting the general rule of NLRA preemption: “When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Id. at 187-88, 98 S.Ct. 1745 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ).

2017The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting the general rule of NLRA preemption: “When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Id. at 187-88, 98 S.Ct. 1745 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ).

2017The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting the general rule of NLRA preemption: “When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Id. at 187-88, 98 S.Ct. 1745 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ).

2012The Supreme Court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the challenged statute by noting that there is no “litmus-paper test that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 , 103 S.Ct. at 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d at 558 .

2012The Supreme Court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the challenged statute by noting that there is no “litmus-paper test that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 , 103 S.Ct. at 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d at 558 .

2011The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the applicability of the “prophylactic rule” of Edwards “requires courts to ‘determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.’ ” 512 U.S. at 548 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 (emphasis in original), quoting in part Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).

2011The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the applicability of the “prophylactic rule” of Edwards “requires courts to ‘determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.’ ” 512 U.S. at 548 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 (emphasis in original), quoting in part Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).

2011The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the applicability of the “prophylactic rule” of Edwards “requires courts to ‘determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.’ ” 512 U.S. at 548 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 (emphasis in original), quoting in part Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).

1999The Supreme Court began its analysis by drawing from Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019—the case establishing absolute immunity for legislators as to claims under § 1983—the principle that § 1983 was to be read “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.” Id. at 418, 96 S.Ct. at 989 , 47 L.Ed.2d at 136 . *767 After determining that, at common law, prosecutors enjoyed an absolute immunity from civil liability with respect to their prosecutorial conduct, the Court observed that “[t]he common-law immun

1999The Supreme Court began its analysis by drawing from Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019—the case establishing absolute immunity for legislators as to claims under § 1983—the principle that § 1983 was to be read “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.” Id. at 418, 96 S.Ct. at 989 , 47 L.Ed.2d at 136 . *767 After determining that, at common law, prosecutors enjoyed an absolute immunity from civil liability with respect to their prosecutorial conduct, the Court observed that “[t]he common-law immun

1999The Supreme Court began its analysis by drawing from Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019—the case establishing absolute immunity for legislators as to claims under § 1983—the principle that § 1983 was to be read “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.” Id. at 418, 96 S.Ct. at 989 , 47 L.Ed.2d at 136 . *767 After determining that, at common law, prosecutors enjoyed an absolute immunity from civil liability with respect to their prosecutorial conduct, the Court observed that “[t]he common-law immun

1999The Supreme Court began its analysis by drawing from Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019—the case establishing absolute immunity for legislators as to claims under § 1983—the principle that § 1983 was to be read “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.” Id. at 418, 96 S.Ct. at 989 , 47 L.Ed.2d at 136 . *767 After determining that, at common law, prosecutors enjoyed an absolute immunity from civil liability with respect to their prosecutorial conduct, the Court observed that “[t]he common-law immun

1997The Supreme Court began its analysis by squarely allocating the burden of persuasion to the prosecutor to show entitlement to immunity, function by function: These decisions have also emphasized that the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. 500 U.S. at 486 , 111 S.Ct. at 1939 .

1997The Supreme Court began its analysis by squarely allocating the burden of persuasion to the prosecutor to show entitlement to immunity, function by function: These decisions have also emphasized that the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. 500 U.S. at 486 , 111 S.Ct. at 1939 .

1994The Court’s opinion in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 , 79 S.Ct. 209 [214] (1958), states the rule: “This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation, can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 447 U.S. at 387 , 100 S.Ct. at 2252 .

1994The Court’s opinion in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 , 79 S.Ct. 209 [214] (1958), states the rule: “This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation, can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 447 U.S. at 387 , 100 S.Ct. at 2252 .

1994The Court’s opinion in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 , 79 S.Ct. 209 [214] (1958), states the rule: “This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation, can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 447 U.S. at 387 , 100 S.Ct. at 2252 .

1994The Court’s opinion in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 , 79 S.Ct. 209 [214] (1958), states the rule: “This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation, can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 447 U.S. at 387 , 100 S.Ct. at 2252 .

1993The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that “even where the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is a narrow exception to the rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause is no bar to retrial.” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 678 , 102 S.Ct. at 2088 .

1993The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that “even where the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is a narrow exception to the rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause is no bar to retrial.” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 678 , 102 S.Ct. at 2088 .

1987The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), the seminal case on intergovernmental tax immunity.