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9 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Julie Hersh v. John Tatum and Mary Ann Tatumgreen2 sentences2020The Supreme Court began its analysis by substituting the statutory 2 “When it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is covered by the Act, the defendant need show no more.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017). 6 definitions for the defined terms “exercise of the right to petition” and “communication.” Id. 2020The Supreme Court began its analysis by substituting the statutory 2 “When it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is covered by the Act, the defendant need show no more.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017). 6 definitions for the defined terms “exercise of the right to petition” and “communication.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2011Indeed, this facet of Sixth Amendment protection “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be the best.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006). 17 Wheat v. United States, supra, at 159. 2011Indeed, this facet of Sixth Amendment protection “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be the best.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006). 17 Wheat v. United States, supra, at 159. | 1 | 1 |
City of Dallas v. Jenningsgreen1 sentence2004City of Dallas v. Jennings, supra at 313. | 1 | 1 |
San Jacinto River Authority v. Dukegreen1 sentence1991See Duke, 783 S.W.2d at 209-210 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Houston Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch
green
2 sentences2015Mel Acres nevertheless sought market value damages, ordinarily recoverable only in permanent nuisance cases, because the “stigma” of poisonous waste on its ranch land, remediated or not, would permanently undermine the value of the property among potential buyers, where “perception is everything.” 443 S.W.3d at 824 . 26 Without deciding whether stigma damages can ever be recovered in Texas,5 the Supreme Court began its analysis recognizing that “[e]ven when it is legally possible to recover stigma damages, it is often legally impossible to prove them.” Houston Unlimited, 443 S.W.3d at 827 . 2015Mel Acres nevertheless sought market value damages, ordinarily recoverable only in permanent nuisance cases, because the “stigma” of poisonous waste on its ranch land, remediated or not, would permanently undermine the value of the property among potential buyers, where “perception is everything.” 443 S.W.3d at 824 . 26 Without deciding whether stigma damages can ever be recovered in Texas,5 the Supreme Court began its analysis recognizing that “[e]ven when it is legally possible to recover stigma damages, it is often legally impossible to prove them.” Houston Unlimited, 443 S.W.3d at 827 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 160-61 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Wheat v. United States
green
2 sentences2011BOWEN — 10 forcing him to go to trial with counsel who is guaranteed to be conflict-free in derogation of his concomitant Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel of choice.15 The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that “the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment[.]” 16 On the other hand, the Court emphasized, this right may be “circumscribed” by other Sixth Amendment considerations whose “essential aim . . . is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will 2011BOWEN — 10 forcing him to go to trial with counsel who is guaranteed to be conflict-free in derogation of his concomitant Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel of choice.15 The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that “the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment[.]” 16 On the other hand, the Court emphasized, this right may be “circumscribed” by other Sixth Amendment considerations whose “essential aim . . . is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 775-81, 114 S.Ct. at 1944-46 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences1989Strictly speaking, Oregon v. Elstad, supra, did not address the issue of due process voluntariness, eo nomine. *429 Rather, the Court confronted the analogous question whether Elstad’s earlier, un-cautioned statement vitiated the otherwise apparent voluntariness of his waiver of Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and obtain counsel before questioning, subsequent to his second, fully warned confession. 11 The Supreme Court began its analysis of this issue, in part IIB of its opinion, by reiterating a point it had made in another context in part IIA, that “[t]he failure of police to adminis 1989Strictly speaking, Oregon v. Elstad, supra, did not address the issue of due process voluntariness, eo nomine. *429 Rather, the Court confronted the analogous question whether Elstad’s earlier, un-cautioned statement vitiated the otherwise apparent voluntariness of his waiver of Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and obtain counsel before questioning, subsequent to his second, fully warned confession. 11 The Supreme Court began its analysis of this issue, in part IIB of its opinion, by reiterating a point it had made in another context in part IIA, that “[t]he failure of police to adminis | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Michigan v. Mosley
green
1 sentence1988Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege as been once invoked." Miranda, supra. The Supreme Court began an analysis of that passage by noting it states "that `the interrogation must cease' when the person in custody indicates that `he wishes to remain silent,'" but "it does not say under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible." Id., 423 U.S., at 101 , 96 S.Ct., at 325. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.