ambit rule in Pennsylvania

2023In support, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) and Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018).4 In Bennett, our Supreme Court held that while “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not invoke the exception under section 9545(b)(1)(ii), and an allegation of abandonment by counsel falls within the ambit of that exception.” Commonwealth v. (Carl) Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2021In Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007), our Supreme Court held that while “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not invoke the exception under section 9545(b)(1)(ii), and an allegation of abandonment by counsel falls within the ambit of that exception.” Commonwealth v. (Carl) Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa. Super. 2017). ____________________________________________ 6 Section 9545(b)(2) was recently amended to enlarge the deadline from sixty days to one year.

2017Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 212-13 (Pa. 2003) (most citations omitted). - 20 - J-S18024-17 An improper reference to the defendant’s silence can be harmless error if “it is clear that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Mitchell, 839 A.2d at 214 .

2017Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 212-13 (Pa. 2003) (most citations omitted). - 20 - J-S18024-17 An improper reference to the defendant’s silence can be harmless error if “it is clear that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Mitchell, 839 A.2d at 214 .

2023In support, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) and Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018).4 In Bennett, our Supreme Court held that while “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not invoke the exception under section 9545(b)(1)(ii), and an allegation of abandonment by counsel falls within the ambit of that exception.” Commonwealth v. (Carl) Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2021In Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007), our Supreme Court held that while “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not invoke the exception under section 9545(b)(1)(ii), and an allegation of abandonment by counsel falls within the ambit of that exception.” Commonwealth v. (Carl) Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa. Super. 2017). ____________________________________________ 6 Section 9545(b)(2) was recently amended to enlarge the deadline from sixty days to one year.

2014Baldwin manifested this Court’s belief that the General Assembly would have intended for such considerations to be taken into account, see Baldwin, 498 Pa. at 259 , 445 A.2d at 1210 , but the Legislature’s response was to dictate precisely the opposite, see Act of June 26, 1989, P.L. 26, No. 9, § 4(b)(3) (recodified, as amended, at 65 Pa.C.S. § 1104(b)(3)).

2014Baldwin manifested this Court’s belief that the General Assembly would have intended for such considerations to be taken into account, see Baldwin, 498 Pa. at 259 , 445 A.2d at 1210 , but the Legislature’s response was to dictate precisely the opposite, see Act of June 26, 1989, P.L. 26, No. 9, § 4(b)(3) (recodified, as amended, at 65 Pa.C.S. § 1104(b)(3)).

2016No. 1042.3(a); see generally Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 275-76 (Pa. 2006) (discussing the policies behind rules of civil procedure governing professional liability claims).

2010Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 576 Pa. 258, 277 , 839 A.2d 202, 212-13 (2003) (internal citations omitted). “[W]here a prosecutor’s reference to a defendant’s silence is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel at trial, there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 553 Pa. 285, 303 , 719 A.2d 242, 251 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 830 , 120 S.Ct. 86 , 145 L.Ed.2d 73 (1999).

2010Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 576 Pa. 258, 277 , 839 A.2d 202, 212-13 (2003) (internal citations omitted). “[W]here a prosecutor’s reference to a defendant’s silence is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel at trial, there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 553 Pa. 285, 303 , 719 A.2d 242, 251 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 830 , 120 S.Ct. 86 , 145 L.Ed.2d 73 (1999).

2006Co., 856 A.2d 1260, 1264-1265 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc) (stating that the court had jurisdiction to review whether the “Who Is Insured” definition in the policy impermis-sibly narrowed and conflicted with the plain language of the MVFRL and, as such, was enforceable and void as against public policy). ¶ 11 In numerous instances, however, the courts of this Commonwealth concluded that the claims raised by the petitioner did not fall under the ambit of this rule and refused to review the arbitrators’ decisions.

2006Co., 856 A.2d 1260, 1264-1265 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc) (stating that the court had jurisdiction to review whether the "Who Is Insured" definition in the policy impermissibly narrowed and conflicted with the plain language of the MVFRL and, as such, was enforceable and void as against public policy). ¶ 11 In numerous instances, however, the courts of this Commonwealth concluded that the claims raised by the petitioner did not fall under the ambit of this rule and refused to review the arbitrators' decisions.

2005See, e.g., Grieff v. Reisinger, 548 Pa. 13 , 693 A.2d 195 (1997) (holding that the actions of a fire association member, who ignited a fire when he poured paint thinner on the fire station floor to remove paint, thereby injuring a guest, constituted negligent care of the realty within the meaning of the real property exception).

2005See, e.g., Grieff v. Reisinger, 548 Pa. 13 , 693 A.2d 195 (1997) (holding that the actions of a fire association member, who ignited a fire when he poured paint thinner on the fire station floor to remove paint, thereby injuring a guest, constituted negligent care of the realty within the meaning of the real property exception).

2003See Commonwealth v. Crews, 536 Pa. 508 , 640 A.2d 395 (1994) (reference to fact that accused chose to remain silent at his extradition interview did not implicate the Turner prohibition on references to post-arrest silence); Commonwealth v. Ragan, 538 Pa. 2 , 645 A.2d 811 (1994) (questions as to why it did not occur to the defendant that he should have revealed his alibi prior to trial were questions aimed at his cognitive functioning, not his silence); Commonwealth v. Nolen, 535 Pa. 77 , 634 A.2d 192 (1993) (cross-examination designed to show that the defendant had the opportunity to hear all

2003See Commonwealth v. Crews, 536 Pa. 508 , 640 A.2d 395 (1994) (reference to fact that accused chose to remain silent at his extradition interview did not implicate the Turner prohibition on references to post-arrest silence); Commonwealth v. Ragan, 538 Pa. 2 , 645 A.2d 811 (1994) (questions as to why it did not occur to the defendant that he should have revealed his alibi prior to trial were questions aimed at his cognitive functioning, not his silence); Commonwealth v. Nolen, 535 Pa. 77 , 634 A.2d 192 (1993) (cross-examination designed to show that the defendant had the opportunity to hear all

2000We agree with this contention as well. ¶ 13 In the case of Spino v. John S. Tilley Ladder Co., 548 Pa. 286 , 696 A.2d 1169, 1172 (1997), our Supreme Court indi cated the proper focus of a litigant in a products liability case: It is well established that the concept of strict liability allows a plaintiff to recover where a product in “a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user” causes harm to the plaintiff....

2000We agree with this contention as well. ¶ 13 In the case of Spino v. John S. Tilley Ladder Co., 548 Pa. 286 , 696 A.2d 1169, 1172 (1997), our Supreme Court indi cated the proper focus of a litigant in a products liability case: It is well established that the concept of strict liability allows a plaintiff to recover where a product in “a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user” causes harm to the plaintiff....

1991See Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 364 , 92 A. 312, 316 (1914).

1991See Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 364 , 92 A. 312, 316 (1914).

1982Justices of the Peace, it is also well established, fall within the ambit of this doctrine See Pritt v. Johnson, 264 F.Supp. 167, 170 (M.D.

1981Compare Commonwealth v. Weaver, 274 Pa.Super. 593, 603 , 418 A.2d 565, 570 (1980) with Commonwealth v. Haberman, 257 Pa.Super. 127, 132 , 390 A.2d 279, 281 (1978).

1981Compare Commonwealth v. Weaver, 274 Pa.Super. 593, 603 , 418 A.2d 565, 570 (1980) with Commonwealth v. Haberman, 257 Pa.Super. 127, 132 , 390 A.2d 279, 281 (1978).

1981Compare Commonwealth v. Weaver, 274 Pa.Super. 593, 603 , 418 A.2d 565, 570 (1980) with Commonwealth v. Haberman, 257 Pa.Super. 127, 132 , 390 A.2d 279, 281 (1978).

1981Compare Commonwealth v. Weaver, 274 Pa.Super. 593, 603 , 418 A.2d 565, 570 (1980) with Commonwealth v. Haberman, 257 Pa.Super. 127, 132 , 390 A.2d 279, 281 (1978).

1971Compare Tallarico v. Bellotti, 414 Pa. 535 (1964), where an action to quiet title in the common pleas was dismissed on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction was in the Orphans’ Court, since the litigation involved the administration and distribution of real estate standing in decedent’s name at the time of his death, notwithstanding that the real issue, as in the instant case, was the interpretation and application of an inter vivos agreement by decedent which, in itself, would independently control and mandate the administration and distribution thereof.