evidence at the suppression hearing in Georgia

2004“Because the evidence at the suppression hearing was uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses was presented, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of law to the undisputed facts.” (Citation omitted.) Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 259 ( 497 SE2d 790 ) (1998).

2004“Because the evidence at the suppression hearing was uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses was presented, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of law to the undisputed facts.” (Citation omitted.) Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 259 ( 497 SE2d 790 ) (1998).

2021Young performed a u- turn, activated his emergency lights, and pursued Hill, who pulled over shortly 1 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1) ( 770 SE2d 636 ) (2015).

2021Young performed a u- turn, activated his emergency lights, and pursued Hill, who pulled over shortly 1 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1) ( 770 SE2d 636 ) (2015).

2020Nimmons advised that she noticed the same hole in the padding last week, but there was no camera. cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” (punctuation omitted)). 60 Reid, 321 Ga. App. at 654 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Palmer, 285 Ga. at 78 (“[A] magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.” (punctuation omitted); Galloway, 332 Ga. App. at 390 (same). 61 The stipulated facts and the evidence at

2020Nimmons advised that she noticed the same hole in the padding last week, but there was no camera. cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” (punctuation omitted)). 60 Reid, 321 Ga. App. at 654 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Palmer, 285 Ga. at 78 (“[A] magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.” (punctuation omitted); Galloway, 332 Ga. App. at 390 (same). 61 The stipulated facts and the evidence at

2020See Johnson, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 849 ; see also Harris, supra, 236 Ga. App. at 528-529 (2) (b) (ii); Williams, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 347-348 ; Rogers, supra, 206 Ga. App. at 660-661 (4); Miranda, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 221 (3). 4 During Campbell’s testimony, the prosecutor asked, “When you entered – so you asked him to come in and he backed in indicating to you that y’all could enter?” to which Campbell replied, without elaboration, “Yeah.” The State’s isolated apparent attempt to elicit a characterization of the intent behind what was, at best, an ambiguous action by Little adds nothing t

2020See Johnson, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 849 ; see also Harris, supra, 236 Ga. App. at 528-529 (2) (b) (ii); Williams, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 347-348 ; Rogers, supra, 206 Ga. App. at 660-661 (4); Miranda, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 221 (3). 4 During Campbell’s testimony, the prosecutor asked, “When you entered – so you asked him to come in and he backed in indicating to you that y’all could enter?” to which Campbell replied, without elaboration, “Yeah.” The State’s isolated apparent attempt to elicit a characterization of the intent behind what was, at best, an ambiguous action by Little adds nothing t

2020Nimmons advised that she noticed the same hole in the padding last week, but there was no camera. cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” (punctuation omitted)). 60 Reid, 321 Ga. App. at 654 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Palmer, 285 Ga. at 78 (“[A] magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.” (punctuation omitted); Galloway, 332 Ga. App. at 390 (same). 61 The stipulated facts and the evidence at

2020See Johnson, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 849 ; see also Harris, supra, 236 Ga. App. at 528-529 (2) (b) (ii); Williams, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 347-348 ; Rogers, supra, 206 Ga. App. at 660-661 (4); Miranda, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 221 (3). 4 During Campbell’s testimony, the prosecutor asked, “When you entered – so you asked him to come in and he backed in indicating to you that y’all could enter?” to which Campbell replied, without elaboration, “Yeah.” The State’s isolated apparent attempt to elicit a characterization of the intent behind what was, at best, an ambiguous action by Little adds nothing t

2020See Johnson, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 849 ; see also Harris, supra, 236 Ga. App. at 528-529 (2) (b) (ii); Williams, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 347-348 ; Rogers, supra, 206 Ga. App. at 660-661 (4); Miranda, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 221 (3). 4 During Campbell’s testimony, the prosecutor asked, “When you entered – so you asked him to come in and he backed in indicating to you that y’all could enter?” to which Campbell replied, without elaboration, “Yeah.” The State’s isolated apparent attempt to elicit a characterization of the intent behind what was, at best, an ambiguous action by Little adds nothing t

2020See Johnson, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 849 ; see also Harris, supra, 236 Ga. App. at 528-529 (2) (b) (ii); Williams, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 347-348 ; Rogers, supra, 206 Ga. App. at 660-661 (4); Miranda, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 221 (3). 4 During Campbell’s testimony, the prosecutor asked, “When you entered – so you asked him to come in and he backed in indicating to you that y’all could enter?” to which Campbell replied, without elaboration, “Yeah.” The State’s isolated apparent attempt to elicit a characterization of the intent behind what was, at best, an ambiguous action by Little adds nothing t

2020See Johnson, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 849 ; see also Harris, supra, 236 Ga. App. at 528-529 (2) (b) (ii); Williams, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 347-348 ; Rogers, supra, 206 Ga. App. at 660-661 (4); Miranda, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 221 (3). 4 During Campbell’s testimony, the prosecutor asked, “When you entered – so you asked him to come in and he backed in indicating to you that y’all could enter?” to which Campbell replied, without elaboration, “Yeah.” The State’s isolated apparent attempt to elicit a characterization of the intent behind what was, at best, an ambiguous action by Little adds nothing t

2002(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Castillo v. State, 232 Ga. App. 354, 355-356 ( 502 SE2d 261 ) (1998). [However,] [w]here, as in this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing was uncontroverted, and there was no question regarding the credibility of witnesses, we review the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress to ensure that there was a substantial basis for it.

2002(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Castillo v. State, 232 Ga. App. 354, 355-356 ( 502 SE2d 261 ) (1998). [However,] [w]here, as in this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing was uncontroverted, and there was no question regarding the credibility of witnesses, we review the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress to ensure that there was a substantial basis for it.

1986Also, we have often held that, "[o]n appeal, a trial court's ruling on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. [Cits.]" Muff v. State, *26 254 Ga. 45, 48 ( 326 SE2d 454 ) (1985); See also Cunningham v. State, 255 Ga. 727 ( 342 SE2d 299 ) (1986).

1986Also, we have often held that, "[o]n appeal, a trial court's ruling on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. [Cits.]" Muff v. State, *26 254 Ga. 45, 48 ( 326 SE2d 454 ) (1985); See also Cunningham v. State, 255 Ga. 727 ( 342 SE2d 299 ) (1986).

1986Also, we have often held that, "[o]n appeal, a trial court's ruling on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. [Cits.]" Muff v. State, *26 254 Ga. 45, 48 ( 326 SE2d 454 ) (1985); See also Cunningham v. State, 255 Ga. 727 ( 342 SE2d 299 ) (1986).

1986Also, we have often held that, "[o]n appeal, a trial court's ruling on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. [Cits.]" Muff v. State, *26 254 Ga. 45, 48 ( 326 SE2d 454 ) (1985); See also Cunningham v. State, 255 Ga. 727 ( 342 SE2d 299 ) (1986).

1986Here, in open court, after hearing all the evidence at the suppression hearing, the state conceded, "[T]here is probably no probable cause, especially there being a warrantless arrest." The trial court held, "Under the facts of this case, the Court has no alternative but to find that Deputy Johnson's acts of picking up the defendant, taking him to jail, and locking him in a cell, constituted a warrantless arrest for which there was no probable cause." "There was evidence to support the findings of the court of [a lack of] probable cause as the trior of fact, and it is not shown that the court

1986Here, in open court, after hearing all the evidence at the suppression hearing, the state conceded, "[T]here is probably no probable cause, especially there being a warrantless arrest." The trial court held, "Under the facts of this case, the Court has no alternative but to find that Deputy Johnson's acts of picking up the defendant, taking him to jail, and locking him in a cell, constituted a warrantless arrest for which there was no probable cause." "There was evidence to support the findings of the court of [a lack of] probable cause as the trior of fact, and it is not shown that the court