evidence at the suppression hearing in Ohio

2018Id. {¶ 5} The evidence at the suppression hearing established the following facts. -3- {¶ 6} Sometime after 3:00 p.m. on September 22, 2016, Zachary Gold was working at M&G Tattoo Supplies, his father’s business on North Dixie Drive in Harrison Township.

2017Thus, Anders argues that he still maintained an expectation of privacy in the 505 S. Davis Street residence. {¶24} In general, “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure by the government.” State v. Corbin, 194 Ohio App.3d 720 , 2011-Ohio-3491 , ¶ 24 (6th Dist.).

2014State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15 , 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978). {¶ 34} The evidence at the suppression hearing consisted of the testimony of Dayton Police Officer Michael Saylors and Detective Theresa Lawson.

2014State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15 , 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978). {¶ 34} The evidence at the suppression hearing consisted of the testimony of Dayton Police Officer Michael Saylors and Detective Theresa Lawson.

2013Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.” Id. {¶ 34} After hearing the evidence at the suppression hearing and viewing the videotape of the August 30, 2010 interrogation, the trial court concluded that Rednour’s constitutional rights were not violated because Rednour did not unambiguously articulate that he intended to remain silent or to end the interview.

2013That conclusion is suggested, but not commanded, by Deputy Hutson’s testimony that the firearms were found in that location “when attempting to check under a bed.” [Cite as State v. Hunter, 2013-Ohio-3459 .] Because we conclude that the trial court committed an error that we cannot determine to have been harmless, in its decision denying the motion to suppress the evidence of the firearms, we will reverse the convictions that depend upon that evidence, and remand this cause for further proceedings on that aspect of the suppression motion.

2009The evidence indicates that the initial search of the automobile, which uncovered marijuana seeds, was a routine search that was conducted incident to the arrest of the driver and the occupant of the front seat of the car. {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court indicated in Gant that in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, the analysis should begin with the following basic rule: {¶ 24} “ ‘[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specif

2009The evidence indicates that the initial search of the automobile, which uncovered marijuana seeds, was a routine search that was conducted incident to the arrest of the driver and the occupant of the front seat of the car. {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court indicated in Gant that in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, the analysis should begin with the following basic rule: {¶ 24} “ ‘[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specif

2009The evidence indicates that the initial search of the automobile, which uncovered marijuana seeds, was a routine search that was conducted incident to the arrest of the driver and the occupant of the front seat of the car. {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court indicated in Gant that in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, the analysis should begin with the following basic rule: {¶ 24} “ ‘[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specif

2009The evidence indicates that the initial search of the automobile, which uncovered marijuana seeds, was a routine search that was conducted incident to the arrest of the driver and the occupant of the front seat of the car. {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court indicated in Gant that in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, the analysis should begin with the following basic rule: {¶ 24} “ ‘[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specif

2009Rakas , 439 U.S. at 143 ; Williams , 73 Ohio St.3d at 166 ." State v. Henderson , Montgomery App. No. 22062, 2008-Ohio-1160 , ¶ 9 . {¶ 29} The evidence at the suppression hearing established that Lungs owned the van, and Lewis disclaimed any ownership of the van or of the dogs inside the van *Page 11 and outside his home.

2009Rakas , 439 U.S. at 143 ; Williams , 73 Ohio St.3d at 166 ." State v. Henderson , Montgomery App. No. 22062, 2008-Ohio-1160 , ¶ 9 . {¶ 29} The evidence at the suppression hearing established that Lungs owned the van, and Lewis disclaimed any ownership of the van or of the dogs inside the van *Page 11 and outside his home.

2009Rakas , 439 U.S. at 143 ; Williams , 73 Ohio St.3d at 166 ." State v. Henderson , Montgomery App. No. 22062, 2008-Ohio-1160 , ¶ 9 . {¶ 29} The evidence at the suppression hearing established that Lungs owned the van, and Lewis disclaimed any ownership of the van or of the dogs inside the van *Page 11 and outside his home.

2008McNamara , 124 Ohio App.3d at 710 .

1992I expected a yes or no answer.” *648 As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, “We may not assume, contrary to the evidence at the suppression hearing, that [the officer] intended to evoke an incriminating response by his statement to [the suspect].” Hawkins v. United States (D.C.App.1983), 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 , at fn. 6, certiorari denied (1984), 464 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 734 , 79 L.Ed.2d 193 .

1992I expected a yes or no answer.” *648 As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, “We may not assume, contrary to the evidence at the suppression hearing, that [the officer] intended to evoke an incriminating response by his statement to [the suspect].” Hawkins v. United States (D.C.App.1983), 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 , at fn. 6, certiorari denied (1984), 464 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 734 , 79 L.Ed.2d 193 .

1992I expected a yes or no answer.” *648 As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, “We may not assume, contrary to the evidence at the suppression hearing, that [the officer] intended to evoke an incriminating response by his statement to [the suspect].” Hawkins v. United States (D.C.App.1983), 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 , at fn. 6, certiorari denied (1984), 464 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 734 , 79 L.Ed.2d 193 .

1992I expected a yes or no answer.” *648 As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, “We may not assume, contrary to the evidence at the suppression hearing, that [the officer] intended to evoke an incriminating response by his statement to [the suspect].” Hawkins v. United States (D.C.App.1983), 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 , at fn. 6, certiorari denied (1984), 464 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 734 , 79 L.Ed.2d 193 .