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10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rushing v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992In Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252 (D.C.1977), where it was not clear from the suppression hearing testimony whether circumstances giving rise to probable cause occurred prior to the search, 7 this court remanded the case for further development of the evidence on probable cause because a witness’ remark at trial, relied upon by the government to establish probable cause, might “not provide the full story.” Id. at 257 . 1992In Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252 (D.C.1977), where it was not clear from the suppression hearing testimony whether circumstances giving rise to probable cause occurred prior to the search, 7 this court remanded the case for further development of the evidence on probable cause because a witness’ remark at trial, relied upon by the government to establish probable cause, might “not provide the full story.” Id. at 257 . | 3 | 3 |
UNITED STATES v. DAVID D. LEWISgreen2 sentences2024We have viewed these record facts in the light most favorable either to the prevailing party, Lewis, 147 A.3d at 239 , or to the court’s ruling, 6 see, e.g., Bingman, 267 A.3d at 1087. 2018United States v. Lewis , 147 A.3d 236 , 239 (D.C. 2016) (en banc). | 2 | 3 |
Germany v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See Mayo, 315 A.3d at 617; cf. Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217, 1221 (D.C. 2009) (“[W]e are not limited to considering the facts the court found at the conclusion of the suppression hearing; rather, ‘[i]n deciding whether the motion to suppress was properly denied, we may of course consider all of the evidence at the suppression hearing as well as the undisputed trial testimony.’” (quoting Lewis v. United States, 594 A.2d 542 , 543 n.3, 546 (D.C. 1991))). 13 and then you know like, you saw the way he started acting.” The record does not support the government’s contention and the trial 2024Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217, 1221 (D.C. 2009) (explaining that, in evaluating whether a “motion to suppress was properly denied, we may of course consider all of the evidence at the suppression hearing” (quoting Lewis v. United States, 594 A.2d 542 , 543 n.3 (D.C. 1991))); see, e.g., T.W. v. United States, 292 A.3d 790 , 803 (D.C. 2023) (“not[ing] that our conclusion that T.W. was seized is heavily influenced by the body-worn camera footage” introduced at the suppression hearing, which “captures just how jarring the officers’ approach was in this case”); Bingman v. United States, 2 | 2 | 2 |
Franklin R. Masiello v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991See Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 257 (D.C.1977); Masiello v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 32 , 34, 304 F.2d 399, 401 (1962), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). 4 . 1989See Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 257 (D.C.1977); Masiello v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 32 , 34, 304 F.2d 399, 401 (1962). 17 . | 2 | 2 |
West v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Moreover, there is no reason to conclude based on the record or on common knowledge that older midsized white American sedans like a Sable or a Lumina with tinted windows and (. . . continued) whether the motion to suppress was properly denied, we may of course consider all the evidence at the suppression hearing as well as the undisputed trial testimony.‖ West v. United States, 604 A.2d 422, 427 (D.C. 1992). 34 four doors constituted a sizeable percentage of cars traveling south in that place and at that time of day. 2017But, "in deciding whether the motion to suppress was properly denied, we may of course consider all the evidence at the suppression hearing as well as the undisputed trial testimony.” West v. United States, 604 A.2d 422, 427 (D.C. 1992). . | 1 | 1 |
Cartnail v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Cartnail, 753 A.2d at 530 (stating that “[i]n looking at the description of the suspects, undoubtedly physical characteristics, such as race, gender, ethnicity, hair color, facial features, age, body build, or apparel of a suspect permits winnowing of innocent travelers” (citing Lafave, supra, § 9.4(g), at 195-96)). | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1983E.g., Robertson v. United States, 429 A.2d 192, 195 (D.C.1981); cf., Howard v. United States, 452 A.2d 966 (D.C.1982). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. United States
green
2 sentences2024See Mayo, 315 A.3d at 617; cf. Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217, 1221 (D.C. 2009) (“[W]e are not limited to considering the facts the court found at the conclusion of the suppression hearing; rather, ‘[i]n deciding whether the motion to suppress was properly denied, we may of course consider all of the evidence at the suppression hearing as well as the undisputed trial testimony.’” (quoting Lewis v. United States, 594 A.2d 542 , 543 n.3, 546 (D.C. 1991))). 13 and then you know like, you saw the way he started acting.” The record does not support the government’s contention and the trial 2024Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217, 1221 (D.C. 2009) (explaining that, in evaluating whether a “motion to suppress was properly denied, we may of course consider all of the evidence at the suppression hearing” (quoting Lewis v. United States, 594 A.2d 542 , 543 n.3 (D.C. 1991))); see, e.g., T.W. v. United States, 292 A.3d 790 , 803 (D.C. 2023) (“not[ing] that our conclusion that T.W. was seized is heavily influenced by the body-worn camera footage” introduced at the suppression hearing, which “captures just how jarring the officers’ approach was in this case”); Bingman v. United States, 2 | 4 | 1992–2024 |
CIAN PRIDGEN v. UNITED STATES.
green
2 sentences2018However one describes it, Officer Sanchez‘s act of cutting Mr. Miles off with his car was a surprising and intimidating move that was in any event more provocative than what happened in Wardlow. 23 2012) (explaining that ―the judicial concern over provoked flight . . . pertains to situations in which police have engaged in the sort of provocative conduct that could cause a reasonable individual to take flight for reasons other than criminal culpability‖); cf. Pridgen, 134 A.3d at 303 & n.17 (declining to focus the reasonable suspicion analysis on the defendant‘s flight, and instead focusing on 2018However one describes it, Officer Sanchez‘s act of cutting Mr. Miles off with his car was a surprising and intimidating move that was in any event more provocative than what happened in Wardlow. 23 2012) (explaining that ―the judicial concern over provoked flight . . . pertains to situations in which police have engaged in the sort of provocative conduct that could cause a reasonable individual to take flight for reasons other than criminal culpability‖); cf. Pridgen, 134 A.3d at 303 & n.17 (declining to focus the reasonable suspicion analysis on the defendant‘s flight, and instead focusing on | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Mosely v. United States
green
1 sentence1992This court also has recognized that “[i]n deciding whether the motion to suppress was properly denied, we may of course consider all of the evidence at the suppression hearing as well as the undisputed trial testimony.” Lewis v. United States, 594 A.2d 542 , 543 n. 3 (D.C.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1225 , 117 L.Ed.2d 460 (1992). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1991See Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 257 (D.C.1977); Masiello v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 32 , 34, 304 F.2d 399, 401 (1962), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). 4 . 1991See Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 257 (D.C.1977); Masiello v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 32 , 34, 304 F.2d 399, 401 (1962), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). 4 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences1983Accordingly, we turn for guidance to Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, where the Court, in holding that “interrogation” under Miranda is not limited to express questioning, defined interrogation as “any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. at 1689 . 1983Accordingly, we turn for guidance to Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, where the Court, in holding that “interrogation” under Miranda is not limited to express questioning, defined interrogation as “any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. at 1689 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Howard v. United States
neutral
1 sentence1983E.g., Robertson v. United States, 429 A.2d 192, 195 (D.C.1981); cf., Howard v. United States, 452 A.2d 966 (D.C.1982). 7 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.