evidence at the suppression hearing in Massachusetts

2026We briefly summarize the facts as the judge found them, supplementing them with other evidence that the judge either explicitly or implicitly credited,1 see Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 436 (2015), and with our independent review of body-worn video footage that was part of the evidence at the suppression hearing.

2023See Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001) (factors relevant to custody include [1] place of interrogation; [2] whether officers conveyed to defendant any belief or opinion that defendant is suspect; [3] nature of interrogation; and [4] whether, at time statement was made, defendant was free to end interview, as evidenced by whether interview terminated with arrest).

2009Hensley cites Commonwealth v. Hosey, 368 Mass. 571, 577 (1975), for the proposition that “[k] no wing what they did [about Hensley’s mental and physical condition], the police should have been sensitive to whether the defendant was genuinely in a position to understand the significance of a waiver of his rights, in particular the importance of having a lawyer with him during the interrogation.” However, the evidence at the suppression hearing demonstrated that the police were meticulous in ensuring that Hensley had the ability and capacity knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently to waive his

2002The defendant maintains that the judge erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police because the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support the finding that his statements were made after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), given that (a) he had invoked his right to an attorney, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882 , cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); and (b) the incriminating statements were elicited by the police more than six hours afte

2002In his affidavit in support of the application, Trooper O’Neil justified the warrantless entry on the ground that “potential co-conspirators could be aware of the [pjolice detection” of Graciano and the defendant. 3 The judge correctly determined that this was the only explanation entered in evidence during the suppression hearing of a “possible reason for entering the apartment in the manner [the police] did,” and in effect concluded that there was no exigency, in that the circumstances described did not constitute “such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay

2001See Commonwealth v. Guyton , 405 Mass, at 503, where the court stated: 17 “The judge’s finding that... the defendant had ‘extensive contact with the police and juvenile authorities and was well aware of his Miranda rights,’ even if it were warranted by the evidence at the suppression hearing, does not satisfy [the second alternative of Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass, at 134], Extensive contact with the police and other authorities by itself does not demonstrate unusual sophistication or knowledge about the Miranda rights.” 18 Proceeding with the “special caution” where a juvenile’s waive

1986Compare Commonwealth v. Simmons, 383 Mass. 46 , 55 n.4 (1981), S.C., 392 Mass. at 47, 48-49, 50 .

1986Compare Commonwealth v. Simmons, 383 Mass. 46 , 55 n.4 (1981), S.C., 392 Mass. at 47, 48-49, 50 .

1986No separate State constitutional argument has been advanced. 5 In Commonwealth v. Cadoret, 388 Mass. at 150 , we said: “The Commonwealth argues that it met its burden (see Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 [1974]) of showing the absence of any reasonable expectation of privacy because The Loft was a public place.” In Cadoret the posture of the burden of proof was not in issue, and our statement was not intended to be an endorsement of the Commonwealth’s conclusion regarding the burden of proof being on the Commonwealth.

1986See Commonwealth v. Cadoret, 388 Mass. 148 (1983); Commonwealth v. Cadoret, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 654 (1983). 3 The evidence at the suppression hearing indicated that two officers made observations at The Loft, but the affidavits referred only to observations made by Officer Daniel Dovidio. 4 The defendants’ argument is limited to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

1986No separate State constitutional argument has been advanced. 5 In Commonwealth v. Cadoret, 388 Mass. at 150 , we said: “The Commonwealth argues that it met its burden (see Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 [1974]) of showing the absence of any reasonable expectation of privacy because The Loft was a public place.” In Cadoret the posture of the burden of proof was not in issue, and our statement was not intended to be an endorsement of the Commonwealth’s conclusion regarding the burden of proof being on the Commonwealth.