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13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Retina Consultants, P.C.green2 sentences2023See Coleman v. Retina Consultants, 286 Ga. 317, 320 (1) ( 687 SE2d 457 ) (2009) (“Even if only a portion of a non-compete clause in an employment contract would be unenforceable, the entire covenant must fail because this [c]ourt will not apply the blue-pencil theory of severability to such restrictive covenants.”). 15 Blue-penciling was allowed, however, in the context of contracts for the sale of a business. 2023See Coleman v. Retina Consultants, 286 Ga. 317, 320 (1) ( 687 SE2d 457 ) (2009) (“Even if only a portion of a non-compete clause in an employment contract would be unenforceable, the entire covenant must fail because this [c]ourt will not apply the blue-pencil theory of severability to such restrictive covenants.”). 15 Blue-penciling was allowed, however, in the context of contracts for the sale of a business. | 3 | 4 |
SRB Investment Services, LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.green2 sentences2025The court ruled that the non-compete clause in Herzig’s and Rose’s August 2022 employment contracts was “invalid because the scope of prohibited work is overbroad.” The court also ruled that Herzig’s August 2022 contract “was mutually rescinded and replaced with a new contract of employment which contained no such covenants.” The plaintiffs appeal. “[A]n interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the power to grant it must be prudently and cautiously exercised[.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) SRB Investment Svcs. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5 (3) ( 709 SE2d 2 2025The court ruled that the non-compete clause in Herzig’s and Rose’s August 2022 employment contracts was “invalid because the scope of prohibited work is overbroad.” The court also ruled that Herzig’s August 2022 contract “was mutually rescinded and replaced with a new contract of employment which contained no such covenants.” The plaintiffs appeal. “[A]n interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the power to grant it must be prudently and cautiously exercised[.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) SRB Investment Svcs. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5 (3) ( 709 SE2d 2 | 1 | 1 |
Thornton v. Kumargreen1 sentence2024Reading the PEA and the Amendment as a whole,3 Dr. Matthews was not bound by the non-compete clause. 3 See Thornton, 240 Ga. App. at 898-899 (“The law favors a construction that will uphold the contract as a whole, and the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part.”). 7 2. | 1 | 1 |
Lynas v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived 2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived | 1 | 1 |
One Bluff Drive, LLC v. K. A. P., Inc.green1 sentence2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived | 1 | 1 |
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Rucker Construction Inc.green2 sentences2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived 2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Mooregreen2 sentences2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived 2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived | 1 | 1 |
Green v. KEY CUSTOM HOMES, INC.green1 sentence2019Throughout this litigation, Yash essentially argued that NYG violated the non- compete clause in the MSA by placing its consultants directly with EMC instead of both arguments essentially challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize the jury’s verdict as to waiver, and are, as explained further, subject to the same standard of review. 7 Green v. Key Custom Homes, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 800, 802 (1) ( 692 SE2d 56 ) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 8 Id. (punctuation omitted). 9 Id. at 802-03 (1) (punctuation omitted). 10 doing so exclusively through Yash, as required under the terms of the M | 1 | 1 |
Agsouth Farm Credit, Aca v. Gowen Timber Company, Inc.green2 sentences2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived 2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived | 1 | 1 |
Board of Commissioners v. City Commissionersgreen2 sentences2019The construction of a contract is, of course, a question of law for the court,39 and involves three steps.40 First, we must decide whether “the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous.”41 If it is, the contract must be “enforced according to its plain terms, and the contract alone is looked to for meaning.”42 Next, if the language of the contract is “ambiguous in some respect,” the rules of contract construction “must be applied by the court to resolve the ambiguity.”43 Lastly, if ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, “the issue of what the ambiguous language Ap 2019The construction of a contract is, of course, a question of law for the court,39 and involves three steps.40 First, we must decide whether “the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous.”41 If it is, the contract must be “enforced according to its plain terms, and the contract alone is looked to for meaning.”42 Next, if the language of the contract is “ambiguous in some respect,” the rules of contract construction “must be applied by the court to resolve the ambiguity.”43 Lastly, if ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, “the issue of what the ambiguous language Ap | 1 | 1 |
Dunlap v. Dunlapgreen2 sentences2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived 2019And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that after verdict and judgment, it is “too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.”36 Put another way, when a motion for summary judgment is “overruled on an issue and the case proceeds to trial and the evidence at the trial authorizes the verdict (judgment) on that issue, any error in overruling the motion for summary judgment is harmless.”37 Thus, regardless of whether NYG breached the MSA’s non-compete clause, the jury found that Yash waived | 1 | 1 |
Gold Coast Media, Inc. v. Meltzergreen1 sentence2012See Gold Coast Media v. Meltzer, 751 So.2d 645 -646 (Fla. Ct. App. 3d 1999) (finding valid a non-compete 17 clause that prohibited a former employee from working in any capacity for a “business in competition, directly or indirectly,” with the former employer, anywhere in the United States or Puerto Rico). | 1 | 1 |
William N. Robbins, P.C. v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2009A non-compete clause, such as the one at issue here, is invalid where it “contain[s] no limitation regarding duration.” William N. Robbins, P.C. v. Burns, 227 Ga. App. 262, 264 (1) ( 488 SE2d 760 ) (1997). 2009A non-compete clause, such as the one at issue here, is invalid where it “contain[s] no limitation regarding duration.” William N. Robbins, P.C. v. Burns, 227 Ga. App. 262, 264 (1) ( 488 SE2d 760 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Tidwell Homes, Inc. v. Shedd Leasing Co.green2 sentences1996Case No. A96A1522 4. “ ‘Parties may by mutual consent abandon a contract so as to make it not thereafter binding.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Tidwell Homes v. Shedd Leasing Co., 191 Ga. App. 892, 894 (1) ( 383 SE2d 334 ). 1996Case No. A96A1522 4. “ ‘Parties may by mutual consent abandon a contract so as to make it not thereafter binding.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Tidwell Homes v. Shedd Leasing Co., 191 Ga. App. 892, 894 (1) ( 383 SE2d 334 ). | 1 | 1 |
Colquitt v. Network Rental, Inc.green2 sentences1991Colquitt v. Network Rental, 195 Ga. App. 244, 246 (2a) ( 393 SE2d 28 ) (1990). 1991Colquitt v. Network Rental, 195 Ga. App. 244, 246 (2a) ( 393 SE2d 28 ) (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Chavis.
green
1 sentence2020Those terms provided that Aaron’s brothers would purchase his interest in the company for $850,000.2 1 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Francis v. Chavis, 345 Ga. App. 641 ( 814 SE2d 778 ) (2018). 2 The written settlement terms included additional provisions such as the absence of a non-compete clause for Aaron, a schedule for initial partial payments to Aaron (which were made), the transfer of equipment to the company, payment of 2 As agreed to at the mediation, drafts of a Settlement, Release, and Stock Purchase Agreement (“Purchase Agreement”) and certain other ancillary agreements were | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Spencer R.
green
2 sentences2019Throughout this litigation, Yash essentially argued that NYG violated the non- compete clause in the MSA by placing its consultants directly with EMC instead of both arguments essentially challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize the jury’s verdict as to waiver, and are, as explained further, subject to the same standard of review. 7 Green v. Key Custom Homes, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 800, 802 (1) ( 692 SE2d 56 ) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 8 Id. (punctuation omitted). 9 Id. at 802-03 (1) (punctuation omitted). 10 doing so exclusively through Yash, as required under the terms of the M 2019Throughout this litigation, Yash essentially argued that NYG violated the non- compete clause in the MSA by placing its consultants directly with EMC instead of both arguments essentially challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize the jury’s verdict as to waiver, and are, as explained further, subject to the same standard of review. 7 Green v. Key Custom Homes, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 800, 802 (1) ( 692 SE2d 56 ) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 8 Id. (punctuation omitted). 9 Id. at 802-03 (1) (punctuation omitted). 10 doing so exclusively through Yash, as required under the terms of the M | 1 | 2019–2019 |
OAKHURST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, INC. v. Hendrix
green
1 sentence2019The construction of a contract is, of course, a question of law for the court,39 and involves three steps.40 First, we must decide whether “the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous.”41 If it is, the contract must be “enforced according to its plain terms, and the contract alone is looked to for meaning.”42 Next, if the language of the contract is “ambiguous in some respect,” the rules of contract construction “must be applied by the court to resolve the ambiguity.”43 Lastly, if ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, “the issue of what the ambiguous language Ap | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co.
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Coleman v. Retina Consultants, 286 Ga. 317 ( 687 SE2d 457 ) (2009) (The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in issuing an injunction that enforced a non-compete clause in an employment contract because the clause was unlimited as to duration and territory and, thus, invalid as a matter of law.); Essex Group v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553 ( 501 SE2d 501 ) (1998) (The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an injunction that prohibited an employee who had extensive knowledge of his former employer’s logistic systems, which we 2012See, e.g., Coleman v. Retina Consultants, 286 Ga. 317 ( 687 SE2d 457 ) (2009) (The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in issuing an injunction that enforced a non-compete clause in an employment contract because the clause was unlimited as to duration and territory and, thus, invalid as a matter of law.); Essex Group v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553 ( 501 SE2d 501 ) (1998) (The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an injunction that prohibited an employee who had extensive knowledge of his former employer’s logistic systems, which we | 1 | 2012–2012 |
McNease v. National Motor Club of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009McNease v. National Motor Club of America, Inc., 238 Ga. 53 (2) ( 231 SE2d 58 ) (1976). 2009McNease v. National Motor Club of America, Inc., 238 Ga. 53 (2) ( 231 SE2d 58 ) (1976). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Delli-Gatti v. Mansfield
green
1 sentence1998Id. at 78-79 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Osta v. Moran
green
2 sentences1996The precedent of Darugar v. Hodges, 221 Ga. App. 227 ( 471 SE2d 33 ); Dougherty, McKinnon &c. v. Greenwald, Denzik &c., supra; and Osta v. Moran, 208 Ga. App. 544 ( 430 SE2d 837 ) is not controlling, as *81 the restrictive covenants and attendant circumstances therein are substantively distinguishable. 1996The precedent of Darugar v. Hodges, 221 Ga. App. 227 ( 471 SE2d 33 ); Dougherty, McKinnon &c. v. Greenwald, Denzik &c., supra; and Osta v. Moran, 208 Ga. App. 544 ( 430 SE2d 837 ) is not controlling, as *81 the restrictive covenants and attendant circumstances therein are substantively distinguishable. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical Associates
green
1 sentence1996Rather, we find Rash, supra, and McAlpin, supra, to be controlling and that the trial court erred in finding the non-compete clause to be unreasonable and unenforceable. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Darugar v. Hodges
green
2 sentences1996The precedent of Darugar v. Hodges, 221 Ga. App. 227 ( 471 SE2d 33 ); Dougherty, McKinnon &c. v. Greenwald, Denzik &c., supra; and Osta v. Moran, 208 Ga. App. 544 ( 430 SE2d 837 ) is not controlling, as *81 the restrictive covenants and attendant circumstances therein are substantively distinguishable. 1996The precedent of Darugar v. Hodges, 221 Ga. App. 227 ( 471 SE2d 33 ); Dougherty, McKinnon &c. v. Greenwald, Denzik &c., supra; and Osta v. Moran, 208 Ga. App. 544 ( 430 SE2d 837 ) is not controlling, as *81 the restrictive covenants and attendant circumstances therein are substantively distinguishable. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
McAlpin v. Coweta Fayette Surgical Associates, P. C.
green
1 sentence1996Rather, we find Rash, supra, and McAlpin, supra, to be controlling and that the trial court erred in finding the non-compete clause to be unreasonable and unenforceable. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.