second stage analysis in Georgia

2017S., 319 Ga. App. at 148 (1) (“Because we have found the evidence does not support a determination that the deprivation is likely to continue, we need not consider whether the children were being harmed by the deprivation and do not reach the second stage of the inquiry concerning the best interests of the children.”).

2017S., 319 Ga. App. at 148 (1) (“Because we have found the evidence does not support a determination that the deprivation is likely to continue, we need not consider whether the children were being harmed by the deprivation and do not reach the second stage of the inquiry concerning the best interests of the children.”). 32 See In the Interest of T.

2012Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 56-57 (2) (b) (i).

2012Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 56-57 (2) (b) (i).

2022Id.

2010See id.

2016“Absent an abuse of discretion, we must affirm the trial court’s balancing and weighing of the four Barker factors.” State v. Thompson , 334 Ga. App. 692, 693 ( 780 SE2d 67 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2016“Absent an abuse of discretion, we must affirm the trial court’s balancing and weighing of the four Barker factors.” State v. Thompson , 334 Ga. App. 692, 693 ( 780 SE2d 67 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2016While the trial court properly concluded that the five-year delay10 between Smith’s arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial, it failed to consider the length of the delay for a second time11 “as one of the four criteria that must be weighted in the balance at the second stage of the analysis.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Stewart v. State, 310 Ga. App. 551, 553 (2) (a) ( 713 SE2d 708 ) (2011).

2016While the trial court properly concluded that the five-year delay10 between Smith’s arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial, it failed to consider the length of the delay for a second time11 “as one of the four criteria that must be weighted in the balance at the second stage of the analysis.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Stewart v. State, 310 Ga. App. 551, 553 (2) (a) ( 713 SE2d 708 ) (2011).

2016“As a delay approaches one year, it generally is presumptively prejudicial.”Id. at592 (1) (footnote omitted). “[I]fthe trial court finds thatthe *282 delay has passed the point of presumptive prejudice, it must then engage in the second stage of the analysis,” in which it considers “(i) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (ii) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, (iii) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial, and (iv) whether he or she suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Id. at 591 (citation

2015“The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches on the date of the arrest or when formal charges are initiated, whichever first occurs.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fallen v. State, 289 Ga. 247, 248 (1) ( 710 SE2d 559 ) (2011).

2015“The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches on the date of the arrest or when formal charges are initiated, whichever first occurs.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fallen v. State, 289 Ga. 247, 248 (1) ( 710 SE2d 559 ) (2011).

2013H., 273 Ga. App. 424, 426 ( 615 SE2d 231 ) (2005) (“Due process requires that, prior to the termination of his parental rights, the father receive notice and an opportunity to be heard.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also In the Interest of B.

2013H., 273 Ga. App. 424, 426 ( 615 SE2d 231 ) (2005) (“Due process requires that, prior to the termination of his parental rights, the father receive notice and an opportunity to be heard.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also In the Interest of B.

2012See Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 895, 899 (1) ( 723 SE2d 100 ) (2012) (while the trial court miscalculated the length of the delay by two months, it correctly found that the delay was presumptively prejudicial and proceeded to the second-stage analysis). (b) Barker-Doggett Analysis. 1.

2012See Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 895, 899 (1) ( 723 SE2d 100 ) (2012) (while the trial court miscalculated the length of the delay by two months, it correctly found that the delay was presumptively prejudicial and proceeded to the second-stage analysis). (b) Barker-Doggett Analysis. 1.

2011State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 506 ( 696 SE2d 613 ) (2010); State v. Shirley, 311 Ga. App. 141 ( 714 SE2d 636 ) (2011); Teasley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 153, 157 (1) ( 704 SE2d 248 ) (2010). 2.

2011State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 506 ( 696 SE2d 613 ) (2010); State v. Shirley, 311 Ga. App. 141 ( 714 SE2d 636 ) (2011); Teasley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 153, 157 (1) ( 704 SE2d 248 ) (2010). 2.

2011State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 506 ( 696 SE2d 613 ) (2010); State v. Shirley, 311 Ga. App. 141 ( 714 SE2d 636 ) (2011); Teasley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 153, 157 (1) ( 704 SE2d 248 ) (2010). 2.

2011State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 506 ( 696 SE2d 613 ) (2010); State v. Shirley, 311 Ga. App. 141 ( 714 SE2d 636 ) (2011); Teasley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 153, 157 (1) ( 704 SE2d 248 ) (2010). 2.