second stage analysis in New York

2015If, on the other hand, sufficient evidence corroborates an eyewitness’s identification of the defendant, then there is no obligation on the part of the trial court to proceed to the second stage of analysis, because testimony concerning eyewitness identifications is unnecessary” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 ).

2015With respect to the second stage of the analysis, we conclude that the proposed testimony “satisfies the general criteria for the admissibility of expert proof” (Muhammad, 17 NY3d at 546 ), i.e., it is “ ‘(1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror’ ” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 , quoting LeGrand, 8 NY3d at 452 ).

2015With respect to the second stage of the analysis, we conclude that the proposed testimony “satisfies the general criteria for the admissibility of expert proof” (Muhammad, 17 NY3d at 546 ), i.e., it is “ ‘(1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror’ ” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 , quoting LeGrand, 8 NY3d at 452 ).

2015With respect to the second stage of the analysis, we conclude that the proposed testimony “satisfies the general criteria for the admissibility of expert proof” (Muhammad, 17 NY3d at 546 ), i.e., it is “ ‘(1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror’ ” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 , quoting LeGrand, 8 NY3d at 452 ).

2015Defendant sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. Nancy Franklin, a psychologist, concerning various factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications, including “the level of violence of the interaction [event violence], the length of time of the incident [event duration], [and] the presence of a weapon or other attention-calling object [weapon focus].” Those factors are clearly relevant to the eyewitness’s identification of defendant (see Abney, 13 NY3d at 268 ).

2015Defendant sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. Nancy Franklin, a psychologist, concerning various factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications, including “the level of violence of the interaction [event violence], the length of time of the incident [event duration], [and] the presence of a weapon or other attention-calling object [weapon focus].” Those factors are clearly relevant to the eyewitness’s identification of defendant (see Abney, 13 NY3d at 268 ).

2015With respect to the second stage of the analysis, we conclude that the proposed testimony “satisfies the general criteria for the admissibility of expert proof” (Muhammad, 17 NY3d at 546 ), i.e., it is “ ‘(1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror’ ” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 , quoting LeGrand, 8 NY3d at 452 ).

2015With respect to the second stage of the analysis, we conclude that the proposed testimony “satisfies the general criteria for the admissibility of expert proof” (Muhammad, 17 NY3d at 546 ), i.e., it is “ ‘(1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror’ ” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 , quoting LeGrand, 8 NY3d at 452 ).

2012If Congress has not, the second stage of the analysis is to “look first to the agency regulations, which are entitled to deference if they resolve the ambiguity in a reasonable manner” (Coeur Alaska, Inc., 557 US at 277-278 ; see United States v Mead Corp., 533 US 218, 226-227 [2001]).

2011Young, 7 NY3d at 45 ).

1996This second stage of inquiry, whether to apply further freedom-restricting sanctions, is parallel to the second step of the parole and probation revocation process, to determine whether "the parolee [should] be recommitted to prison or * * * other steps [should] be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation" ( Morrissey v Brewer , 408 US, at 480 , supra ).

1996This second stage of inquiry, whether to apply further freedom-restricting sanctions, is parallel to the second step of the parole and probation revocation process, to determine whether "the parolee [should] be recommitted to prison or * * * other steps [should] be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation” (Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US, at 480 , supra).

1981A confession which follows an illegal arrest will be admissible against a defendant only if shown to be an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion (Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590 ; Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471 ).

1981A confession which follows an illegal arrest will be admissible against a defendant only if shown to be an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion (Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590 ; Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471 ).