first and second factors in Illinois

2023The sanction is a monetary penalty, and the penalty imposed is “certainly nothing approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 104 .

2023The sanction is a monetary penalty, and the penalty imposed is “certainly nothing approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 104 .

2019Belluomini, 346 Ill.

2018Belluomini , 346 Ill.

2017“A single witness’ identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness viewed the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification.” Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 307 . ¶ 41 With respect to the first and second factors, the witness’s opportunity to observe the offender during the incident and the degree of attention, defendant argues that Officers Sedlacek and Park would not have enough time, as they were chasing him through the alley, to see his face and be able to correctly identify him.

2017“A single witness’ identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness viewed the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification.” Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 307 . ¶ 41 With respect to the first and second factors, the witness’s opportunity to observe the offender during the incident and the degree of attention, defendant argues that Officer Sedlacek and Officer Park would not have enough time, as they were chasing him through the alley, to see his face and be able to correctly identify him.

2025Specifically, the court found that none of the facts relating to the first and second factors were revealed during the trial, but that “common sense” suggested that the space at the K-Mart store where the defendant and the protected parties encountered one another was not “particularly small or desolate.” Id.

2023Sollami, 201 Ill. 2d at 17 . ¶ 35 When the dangerous condition is open and obvious, the first and second factors carry little weight “because a defendant is ordinarily not required to foresee injury from a dangerous condition that is open and obvious,” and a defendant may presume that persons encountering a potentially dangerous condition will appreciate and avoid the risks and therefore, the likelihood of injury is slight.

2023Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 36 . ¶ 36 As for the remaining factors, the burden on the City to guard against injuries such as Patricia’s would be unreasonably high where the City has hundreds if not thousands of miles of sidewalk to maintain.

2022Segal, 136 Ill. 2d at 288 . ¶ 47 With regard to the first and second factors, we already have discussed plaintiffs’ unexcused five-month delay in mailing the request for waiver of service under section 2-213(a) coupled with - 17 - No. 1-22-0150 the additional unexcused five-month delay in serving defendant after he failed to respond to the waiver request. ¶ 48 With regard to the third and fourth factors, plaintiffs knew of defendant’s location and where to serve him at least six months prior to the service date of March 2, 2021, as his correct address in Florida was listed on the original summ

1984(E.g., Dumas v. Lloyd (1972), 6 Ill.

1984The first and second factors are generally given more weight than the other four, and the first factor is considered the most important of the first two. ( E.g., Dumas v. Lloyd *131 (1972), 6 Ill.

1968Chapter 24, Cities and Villages, section 11-109-1 of the 1963 Illinois Revised Statutes states: “The corporate authorities of each municipality may construct, repair, and regulate the use of culverts, drains, sewers, and cesspools.” (Emphasis supplied.) The case of Village of Millstadt v. Bereitschaft, 344 Ill 550, 176 NE 746 , which is similar to the case before us, involved such an exercise of discretion.