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13 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1987–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tremouliaris v. Pinagreen2 sentences2002The contract contained a mortgage contingency clause which provided that “(i]f the BUYERS having used due diligence fail in good faith to obtain a loan commitment within 30 days then this agreement shall become null and void ...” Id. at 723 . 2001However, “[t]he essential function of a mortgage contingency clause is to enable a purchaser to escape liability and to assure the return of his deposit in the event that he is unable to obtain file amount or type of financing prerequisite to his realty purchase.” Id. at 726 . | 4 | 5 |
Stabile v. McCarthygreen2 sentences1996A mortgage contingency clause permits a buyer to avoid his contractual obligation to purchase and to escape liability therefor upon the “happening of a condition precedent,” Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399, 402-403 (1957); namely, the buyer’s failure, after sufficient, appropriate effort, to obtain financing “in a stated amount and on stated terms” specified in the contingency clause. 1994See Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568, 571 (1981); Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399, 402-403 (1957). | 2 | 4 |
Lynch v. Andrewgreen2 sentences2004Lynch v. Andrew, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626 (1985). 1996Whether the Kulakowskis acted “diligently” to obtain the requisite financing contemplated by paragraph 27 was a “factual question, the determination of which is entitled to the customary appellate deference.” Lynch v. Andrew, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 625 (1985). | 2 | 3 |
Sechrest v. Safiolgreen2 sentences1994See Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568, 571 (1981); Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399, 402-403 (1957). 1989See, e.g., Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568 (1981); Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399 (1957); Lynch v. Andrew, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 623 (1985). | 2 | 2 |
Churgin v. Hobbiegreen1 sentence2007See Tremouliaris v. Pina, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 726 (1987); Churgin v. Hobbie, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 305 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Nardozzigreen1 sentence2004A mortgage contingency clause is not intended to afford a haven to a buyer not acting in good faith seeking an escape from the agreement See Berry v. Nardozzi, 362 Mass. 145, 149 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Charles River Park, Inc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authoritygreen2 sentences2002The Judsons counter in their cross motion for summary judgment that the mortgage contingency clause contained no date by which they were required to give notice of termination, only their deadline for obtaining financing. 2 They further assert that they gave notice within a reasonable time in December 1998 and, therefore, properly invoked the mortgage contingency clause. 3 See Charles River Park, Inc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 795, 814 (1990). 2002The Judsons counter in their cross motion for summary judgment that the mortgage contingency clause contained no date by which they were required to give notice of termination, only their deadline for obtaining financing. 2 They further assert that they gave notice within a reasonable time in December 1998 and, therefore, properly invoked the mortgage contingency clause. 3 See Charles River Park, Inc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 795, 814 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Miracle Revival Center Move of God Church v. Kindredgreen2 sentences1987See Miracle Revival Center Move of God Church v. Kindred, 615 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). 1987See Miracle Revivial Center Move of God Church v. Kindred, 615 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bossi v. Whalen
green
2 sentences2001By imposing a deadline, a mortgage contingency clause ‘provide[s] him with a date by which he could know whether the buyers would have financing and would be bound to go through with the purchase.’” Id. at 967 . 1987By imposing a deadline, a mortgage contingency clause “provide[s] him with a date by which he could know whether the buyers would have financing and would be bound to go through with the purchase.” Bossi v. Whalen, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 967 . | 2 | 1987–2001 |
National Starch & Chemical Co. v. Greenberg
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Alfeo v. Dinsmore
neutral
1 sentence2021The Alfeo court observed that such a clause "incidentally benefits the seller by setting a certain date by which the deal may fail or after which the seller knows the buyer is bound to perform." Id. at 253 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. DeCologero
green
1 sentence2000Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
DeWolfe New England v. Tich
neutral
1 sentence1999The trial judge then concluded, however, that even though the plaintiffs gave notice before the deadline expired, “it was too late” because “[a] mortgage commitment under the terms of the parties’ contract had been issued by the lender and the plaintiffs’ choices were to either close on the property or forfeit their deposit.” This conclusion cannot be sustained “upon a reasonable view of the evidence adduced at trial.” See DeWolfe New England v. Tich, 1989 Mass. App. Div. 182, 184 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.