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13 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davidson v. Davidsongreen2 sentences2002In Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 372-373 (1985), we held that a husband’s remainder interest in a trust, subject to survivorship and a spendthrift clause, was divisible under § 34. 2000L. c. 208, § 34); Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 371-372 (husband’s remainder interest in a trust, subject to a spendthrift clause and the condition of survivorship, was divisible under G. | 3 | 3 |
Lauricella v. Lauricellagreen2 sentences2015See Lauricella v. Lauricella, 409 Mass. 211, 216 (1991). 2000See Lauricella v. Lauricella, 409 Mass. at 216 (husband’s present beneficial interest in trust property, subject to a spendthrift clause, may be distributed pursuant to G. | 2 | 3 |
Broadway National Bank v. Adamsgreen2 sentences1988Strandlund also asserts that a spendthrift provision restraining only involuntary alienation would be “unfairly prejudicial to creditors.” In Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173-174 (1882), we addressed considerations of public policy with respect to a spendthrift clause that prohibited both voluntary and involuntary alienation. 1938We there adverted to the settled law of this Commonwealth sustaining the validity of spendthrift provisions for the protection of beneficiaries, citing Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 , and many other cases, and we held that in endeavoring to enforce her decree for alimony the former wife stood "no better than any other creditor.” We are not asked to go over that ground again. | 1 | 2 |
D.L. v. G.L.green2 sentences2015See D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 488, 496-497 (2004). 2015See D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 488, 496-497 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Pemberton v. Pembertongreen2 sentences2015She has no absolute right to the use of any part of the principal, and could herself compel principal payments only by showing that the trustees had abused their discretion by acting arbitrarily, capri ciously, or in bad faith”); Pemberton v. Pemberton, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 20-21 (1980) (where, in case in which trust appears to have contained ascertainable standard, we stated, “if even apart from the spendthrift clause a trustee is given the discretionary power to distribute income or principal to described beneficiaries ‘any right of any beneficiary to receive anything is subject to the condit 2015She has no absolute right to the use of any part of the principal, and could herself compel principal payments only by showing that the trustees had abused their discretion by acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith"); Pemberton v. Pemberton, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 20-21 (1980) (where, in case in which trust appears to have contained ascertainable standard, we stated, "if even apart from the spendthrift clause a trustee is given the discretionary power to distribute income or principal to described beneficiaries, 'any right of any beneficiary to receive anything is subject to the condit | 1 | 1 |
Town of Randolph v. Robertsgreen1 sentence1996See Randolph, supra at 579-580 . | 1 | 1 |
Wolfe v. Wolfegreen1 sentence1991See Wolfe v. Wolfe, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 256-257 (1985) (holding that, where husband was cosettlor and co-trustee, trust principal may be invaded under § 34 to satisfy alimony obligation); Davidson v. Davidson, supra at 371-372 (holding that husband’s remainder interest in a trust, subject to a spendthrift clause and the condition of survivorship, was divisible under § 34). 3 *215 Beyond § 34 and Massachusetts precedents, review of the opinions of other States that have considered this or analogous questions reveals no clear consensus. | 1 | 1 |
Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tysongreen1 sentence1980See Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211 (1942); Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Sargentgreen1 sentence1972See Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336, 339-340 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Speed v. Speed
green
2 sentences2018In a case with remarkably similar facts insofar as a husband involved in a motor vehicle accident causing serious injuries placed proceeds of his personal injury action into a spendthrift trust, the Georgia Supreme Court said "no settlor, disabled or otherwise, should be permitted to put his own assets in a trust, of which he is the sole *693 beneficiary, and *468 shield those assets with a spendthrift clause, because to do so is 'merely shift[ing] the settlor's assets from one pocket to another, [in an attempt to avoid creditors].' " Speed v. Speed , 263 Ga. 166 , 168, 430 S.E.2d 348 (1993), 2018In a case with remarkably similar facts insofar as a husband involved in a motor vehicle accident causing serious injuries placed proceeds of his personal injury action into a spendthrift trust, the Georgia Supreme Court said "no settlor, disabled or otherwise, should be permitted to put his own assets in a trust, of which he is the sole *693 beneficiary, and *468 shield those assets with a spendthrift clause, because to do so is 'merely shift[ing] the settlor's assets from one pocket to another, [in an attempt to avoid creditors].' " Speed v. Speed , 263 Ga. 166 , 168, 430 S.E.2d 348 (1993), | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bongaards v. Millen
green
1 sentence2003Under that rule, however, the trust property at issue here is still not subject to the plaintiff’s elective share for the simple reason that the trust was created by a third party, D’Amore, and not by Jean. 4 The rule announced in Sullivan applies only to assets of a trust “created during the marriage by the deceased spouse.” Id. at 872 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Constanza v. Verona
green
1 sentence1980See Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211 (1942); Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Rotch v. Rotch
green
1 sentence1963Rotch v. Rotch, 173 Mass. 125, 131-133 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Leverett v. Barnwell
green
1 sentence1938The strict provisions of the spendthrift clause (12) and the fact that the discretion reposed in the trustee under clause nine was not absolute and uncontrolled, as in Leverett v. Barnwell, 214 Mass. 105 , give weight to this view. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Erickson v. Erickson
green
1 sentence1938In general we prefer the reasoning in Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 77-79 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.