state action doctrine in Maryland

1995In Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53 , 501 A.2d 817 (1985), the Court of Appeals discussed the state action doctrine at length.

1995In Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53 , 501 A.2d 817 (1985), the Court of Appeals discussed the state action doctrine at length.

1985In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 , 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), the Court said that for the state action doctrine to apply the conduct allegedly causing a deprivation of the claimed constitutional right must be fairly attributed to the state. 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753.

1985In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 , 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), the Court said that for the state action doctrine to apply the conduct allegedly causing a deprivation of the claimed constitutional right must be fairly attributed to the state. 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753.

1985The Court first noted that for the state action doctrine to be applicable, the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the state “if it is state action that enforces privately originated discrimination.” 407 U.S. at 172 , 92 S.Ct. at 1971 .

1985The Court first noted that for the state action doctrine to be applicable, the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the state “if it is state action that enforces privately originated discrimination.” 407 U.S. at 172 , 92 S.Ct. at 1971 .

2012Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 , 112 S.Ct. 2169 , 119 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992) (citation omitted).

2012Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 , 112 S.Ct. 2169 , 119 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992) (citation omitted).

2007Because the involvement of public high schools in the WIAA implicated the state action doctrine, id. at 891 , the court applied the “overriding compelling state interest” embodied in the ERA to invalidate the statewide ban on girls’ participation in high school interscholastic football.

2007Because the involvement of public high schools in the WIAA implicated the state action doctrine, id. at 891 , the court applied the "overriding compelling state interest" embodied in the ERA to invalidate the statewide ban on girls' participation in high school interscholastic football.

2001See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 , 46 n. 10 (1985); Earles v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (active supervision not required for state board action to come within doctrine); see generally 1 Areeda Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 226b at p. 466 (2d ed. 2000). 10 We note that the unsuccessful legislation proposed in 2001 would not have made collaborative agreements themselves subject to the approval of the licensing boards, but would have authorized a mechanism for the board approval or disapproval of spec

2001See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 , 46 n. 10 (1985); Earles v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (active supervision not required for state board action to come within doctrine); see generally 1 Areeda Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 226b at p. 466 (2d ed. 2000). 10 We note that the unsuccessful legislation proposed in 2001 would not have made collaborative agreements themselves subject to the approval of the licensing boards, but would have authorized a mechanism for the board approval or disapproval of spec

1999Consequently, we shall begin by analyzing the actions of appellee Ovid and the union appellees as alleged in the amended complaint to determine whether those actions amount to state action under Supreme Court precedent. 13 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), the Supreme Court said the following of the state action doctrine: It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil Rights Cases [ 109 U.S. 3 , 3 S.Ct. 18 , 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) ], that “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendme

1999Consequently, we shall begin by analyzing the actions of appellee Ovid and the union appellees as alleged in the amended complaint to determine whether those actions amount to state action under Supreme Court precedent. 13 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), the Supreme Court said the following of the state action doctrine: It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil Rights Cases [ 109 U.S. 3 , 3 S.Ct. 18 , 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) ], that “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendme

1999Consequently, we shall begin by analyzing the actions of appellee Ovid and the union appellees as alleged in the amended complaint to determine whether those actions amount to state action under Supreme Court precedent. 13 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), the Supreme Court said the following of the state action doctrine: It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil Rights Cases [ 109 U.S. 3 , 3 S.Ct. 18 , 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) ], that “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendme

1999Consequently, we shall begin by analyzing the actions of appellee Ovid and the union appellees as alleged in the amended complaint to determine whether those actions amount to state action under Supreme Court precedent. 13 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), the Supreme Court said the following of the state action doctrine: It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil Rights Cases [ 109 U.S. 3 , 3 S.Ct. 18 , 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) ], that “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendme

1999Consequently, we shall begin by analyzing the actions of appellee Ovid and the union appellees as alleged in the amended complaint to determine whether those actions amount to state action under Supreme Court precedent. 13 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), the Supreme Court said the following of the state action doctrine: It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil Rights Cases [ 109 U.S. 3 , 3 S.Ct. 18 , 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) ], that “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendme

1999Although in Polk County the Court found it unnecessary to consider the comparative scope of the state action and color of state law inquiries, id. at 322 n. 12, 102 S.Ct. 445 , in Lugar it held that the “under-color-of-state-law requirement” is broader than the state action requirement, such that “conduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory requirement of action under color of state law,” while the reverse is not true.

1999Although in Polk County the Court found it unnecessary to consider the comparative scope of the state action and color of state law inquiries, id. at 322 n. 12, 102 S.Ct. 445 , in Lugar it held that the “under-color-of-state-law requirement” is broader than the state action requirement, such that “conduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory requirement of action under color of state law,” while the reverse is not true.

1998Dundalk Liquor II , 201 Md. at 68 -69 .

1998For example, in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy , 479 U.S. 335 (1987), the Court found that while the New York state legislature had clearly adopted a policy of resale price maintenance for the liquor industry, the state itself did not establish prices, review the reasonableness of price schedules, monitor market conditions, or otherwise supervise pricing decisions.

1995Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 , 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1615 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 , 83 S.Ct. 1119, 1121 , 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963)).

1995Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 , 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1615 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 , 83 S.Ct. 1119, 1121 , 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963)).

1995Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 , 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1615 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 , 83 S.Ct. 1119, 1121 , 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963)).

1995Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 , 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1615 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 , 83 S.Ct. 1119, 1121 , 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963)).

1995Id. at 74-75 , 501 A.2d 817 (discussing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 , 92 S.Ct. 1965 , 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972) and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 , 102 S.Ct. 2777 , 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982)).

1995Id. at 74-75 , 501 A.2d 817 (discussing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 , 92 S.Ct. 1965 , 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972) and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 , 102 S.Ct. 2777 , 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982)).

1993In rejecting that contention we assumed, arguendo, that the statute would be invalid under the Sherman Act but for the state action exception recognized in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 , 63 S.Ct. 307 , 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). 292 Md. at 7 , 437 A.2d at 196 .

1993In rejecting that contention we assumed, arguendo, that the statute would be invalid under the Sherman Act but for the state action exception recognized in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 , 63 S.Ct. 307 , 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). 292 Md. at 7 , 437 A.2d at 196 .

1992Discussion “A defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession____” State v. Brown, 324 Md. 532, 540 , 597 A.2d 978 (1991) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)).

1992Discussion “A defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession____” State v. Brown, 324 Md. 532, 540 , 597 A.2d 978 (1991) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)).

1992Discussion “A defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession____” State v. Brown, 324 Md. 532, 540 , 597 A.2d 978 (1991) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)).

1992Discussion “A defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession____” State v. Brown, 324 Md. 532, 540 , 597 A.2d 978 (1991) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)).

1992As this court explained in Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197, 204 , 594 A.2d 609 (1991), aff'd, 327 Md. 494 , 610 A.2d 782 (1992), “[t]here is no constitutional right not to give an involuntary confession; there is only a constitutional right not to be compelled to do so by government.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellant submits that the state action requirement is satisfied by the very admission of his confession at trial.

1992As this court explained in Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197, 204 , 594 A.2d 609 (1991), aff'd, 327 Md. 494 , 610 A.2d 782 (1992), “[t]here is no constitutional right not to give an involuntary confession; there is only a constitutional right not to be compelled to do so by government.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellant submits that the state action requirement is satisfied by the very admission of his confession at trial.

1992As this court explained in Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197, 204 , 594 A.2d 609 (1991), aff'd, 327 Md. 494 , 610 A.2d 782 (1992), “[t]here is no constitutional right not to give an involuntary confession; there is only a constitutional right not to be compelled to do so by government.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellant submits that the state action requirement is satisfied by the very admission of his confession at trial.

1992As this court explained in Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197, 204 , 594 A.2d 609 (1991), aff'd, 327 Md. 494 , 610 A.2d 782 (1992), “[t]here is no constitutional right not to give an involuntary confession; there is only a constitutional right not to be compelled to do so by government.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellant submits that the state action requirement is satisfied by the very admission of his confession at trial.

1989The state action doctrine as it applies to local governments exempts actions by counties or municipalities which are "in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.” See Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 , 102 S.Ct. 835 , 70 L.Ed.2d 810 (1982). 5 .

1989The state action doctrine as it applies to local governments exempts actions by counties or municipalities which are "in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.” See Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 , 102 S.Ct. 835 , 70 L.Ed.2d 810 (1982). 5 .

1981In Bates, the court distinguished a case decided a year earlier, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 , 96 S.Ct. 3110 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1976), which had found that a utility’s activities in giving away light bulbs were not immune from antitrust attack on the ground that the giveaway program was embodied in a tariff approved by a state regulatory commission and hence constituted state action.

1981In Bates, the court distinguished a case decided a year earlier, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 , 96 S.Ct. 3110 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1976), which had found that a utility’s activities in giving away light bulbs were not immune from antitrust attack on the ground that the giveaway program was embodied in a tariff approved by a state regulatory commission and hence constituted state action.

1981In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 , 95 S.Ct. 2004 , 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a minimum fee schedule propounded by a county bar association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar because the Court found that the anticompetitive activities involved had not been "compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.” 421 U.S. at 791 .

1981There the United States Supreme Court held that the anticompetitive activities fell within the state action exception to Sherman Act since they were " 'compelled by the direction of the State acting as a sovereign,’ ” 433 U.S. at 360, quoting Goldfarb, supra, 421 U.S. at 791 , through the aegis of its Supreme Court — the "ultimate body wielding *9 the State’s power over the practice of law,” Bates, supra, 433 U.S. at 360.