state action requirement in California

2019(See Pruneyard, supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 908 , 153 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 592 P.2d 341 ; see also Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1083 , 1098, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 501 , 290 P.3d 1116 ( Ralphs Grocery ) ["the free speech guarantee of the federal Constitution's First Amendment, as currently construed by the nation's high court, does not extend to speech activities on privately owned sidewalks in front of the entrances to stores"].) A plurality of the court also has concluded that article I, section 2 contains a state action requirement, which is satisfi

2019(See Pruneyard, supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 908 , 153 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 592 P.2d 341 ; see also Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1083 , 1098, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 501 , 290 P.3d 1116 ( Ralphs Grocery ) ["the free speech guarantee of the federal Constitution's First Amendment, as currently construed by the nation's high court, does not extend to speech activities on privately owned sidewalks in front of the entrances to stores"].) A plurality of the court also has concluded that article I, section 2 contains a state action requirement, which is satisfi

1998"Similarly, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure provided in article I, section 13 of the California Constitution is subject to a state action requirement. ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 19 [ 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ]; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 557, fn. 5, 558-559 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 , 709 P.2d 1287 ]; People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357, 365 [ 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 , 594 P.2d 1000 ].)" (2a) Plaintiffs do not deny that defendants' actions were those of private actors and that the state played no role in causing Jo

1998"Similarly, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure provided in article I, section 13 of the California Constitution is subject to a state action requirement. ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 19 [ 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ]; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 557, fn. 5, 558-559 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 , 709 P.2d 1287 ]; People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357, 365 [ 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 , 594 P.2d 1000 ].)" (2a) Plaintiffs do not deny that defendants' actions were those of private actors and that the state played no role in causing Jo

2009(Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352, 366-367 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 521 P.2d 441 ].) We reject appellant’s vagueness claim because she has failed to show that the state action requirement was satisfied.

2009(Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352, 366-367 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 521 P.2d 441 ].) We reject appellant’s vagueness claim because she has failed to show that the state action requirement was satisfied.

2006(Jones v. Kmart, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 333, fn. 1 ; People v. Plesniarski (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 108, 114 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 196 ].) Thus, by saying the Bane Act applies to all persons whether or not acting under color of law, the Legislature intended to apply its provisions to private actors as well as public officials (at least to the extent the alleged constitutional violation does not have a state action requirement).

2001Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 468 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ( Gay Law Students Assn.); see also Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 333 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 949 P.2d 941 [stating that the search and seizure provision of the California Constitution—article I, section 13—contains a state action limitation even though the provision contains no such limiting language].) We declined to apply that provision "without regard to any state action doctrine whatsoever" absent some "suggestion" in the provision's history for abandoning such a limitation. ( Gay Law Students Assn., at p. 468, 1

2003NOTES [*] Kennard, J., and Moreno, J., dissented. [1] Because the parties did not raise the question of whether there is a state action requirement, we do not address that issue, as our colleague has done in his concurring and dissenting opinion. [2] Some types of business, such as adult book stores, massage parlors, and bars, are excluded for the additional reason that Albertson's believes its customers would consider them obnoxious and would prefer not to shop near such businesses. [3] The community in Laguna Publishing included 20,000 residents, occupied 8 square miles, and had its own syst

2003NOTES [*] Kennard, J., and Moreno, J., dissented. [1] Because the parties did not raise the question of whether there is a state action requirement, we do not address that issue, as our colleague has done in his concurring and dissenting opinion. [2] Some types of business, such as adult book stores, massage parlors, and bars, are excluded for the additional reason that Albertson's believes its customers would consider them obnoxious and would prefer not to shop near such businesses. [3] The community in Laguna Publishing included 20,000 residents, occupied 8 square miles, and had its own syst

1998"Similarly, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure provided in article I, section 13 of the California Constitution is subject to a state action requirement. ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 19 [ 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ]; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 557, fn. 5, 558-559 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 , 709 P.2d 1287 ]; People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357, 365 [ 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 , 594 P.2d 1000 ].)" (2a) Plaintiffs do not deny that defendants' actions were those of private actors and that the state played no role in causing Jo

1998"Similarly, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure provided in article I, section 13 of the California Constitution is subject to a state action requirement. ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 19 [ 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ]; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 557, fn. 5, 558-559 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 , 709 P.2d 1287 ]; People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357, 365 [ 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 , 594 P.2d 1000 ].)" (2a) Plaintiffs do not deny that defendants' actions were those of private actors and that the state played no role in causing Jo

1994The NCAA correctly observes that our decisions construing other provisions in the declaration of rights impose a state action requirement (e.g., People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357, 365 [ 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 , 594 P.2d 1000 ] [search and seizure]; Garfinkle v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 268, 281-282 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 208 , 578 P.2d 925 ], app. dism. (1978) 439 U.S. 949 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 340 , 99 S.Ct. 343 ] [due process]; Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352, 366 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 , 521 P.2d 441 , 65 A.L.R.3d 1266 ] [same]).

1994The NCAA correctly observes that our decisions construing other provisions in the declaration of rights impose a state action requirement (e.g., People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357, 365 [ 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 , 594 P.2d 1000 ] [search and seizure]; Garfinkle v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 268, 281-282 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 208 , 578 P.2d 925 ], app. dism. (1978) 439 U.S. 949 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 340 , 99 S.Ct. 343 ] [due process]; Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352, 366 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 , 521 P.2d 441 , 65 A.L.R.3d 1266 ] [same]).

2001Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 468 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ( Gay Law Students Assn.); see also Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 333 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 949 P.2d 941 [stating that the search and seizure provision of the California Constitution—article I, section 13—contains a state action limitation even though the provision contains no such limiting language].) We declined to apply that provision "without regard to any state action doctrine whatsoever" absent some "suggestion" in the provision's history for abandoning such a limitation. ( Gay Law Students Assn., at p. 468, 1

1987Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458 , 468- 469.) While the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the reach of the safeguards of the state equal protection clause is not bound by the federal decisions analyzing the state action requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the latter decisions will be carefully considered insofar as they are persuasive.

2019(See Pruneyard, supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 908 , 153 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 592 P.2d 341 ; see also Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1083 , 1098, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 501 , 290 P.3d 1116 ( Ralphs Grocery ) ["the free speech guarantee of the federal Constitution's First Amendment, as currently construed by the nation's high court, does not extend to speech activities on privately owned sidewalks in front of the entrances to stores"].) A plurality of the court also has concluded that article I, section 2 contains a state action requirement, which is satisfi

2019(See Pruneyard, supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 908 , 153 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 592 P.2d 341 ; see also Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1083 , 1098, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 501 , 290 P.3d 1116 ( Ralphs Grocery ) ["the free speech guarantee of the federal Constitution's First Amendment, as currently construed by the nation's high court, does not extend to speech activities on privately owned sidewalks in front of the entrances to stores"].) A plurality of the court also has concluded that article I, section 2 contains a state action requirement, which is satisfi

2010Indeed, section 1797.224 was added to the EMS Act in order to “prescribe and exercise the degree of state direction and supervision over emergency medical services as will provide for state action immunity under federal antitrust laws for activities undertaken by local governmental entities in carrying out their prescribed functions under this division.” (§ 1797.6, subd. (b), italics added.) “Under the state action immunity doctrine, a local government may restrict trade without violating the antitrust laws if the state has ‘clearly articulated’ and affirmatively expressed its intention to all

2010(Redwood Empire, supra, 190 F.3d at p. 953.) We agree with the Authority that the “state direction and supervision” envisioned by section 1797.6, subdivision (b) “comes through the [Authority’s] review of local EMS plans submitted by local EMS agencies.” To conclude that, although the Legislature intended to provide for state direction and supervision over the creation of EOA’s (§ 1797.6, subd. (b)), and while EOA’s can be created either through a competitive process or grandfathering (§ 1797.224), the Legislature nevertheless intended the Authority should have no power to provide direction or

2009(See Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 631-632 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 774 ].) Appellant also contends that she was denied her common law right to fair procedure. “ ‘California courts have long recognized a common law right to fair procedure protecting individuals from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from private organizations which control important economic interests.’ [Citation.] Such a private organization’s actions must be both substantively rational and procedurally fair. [Citation.] What constitutes a fair procedure is not fixed or judicially prescribed. ‘[T]he ass

2009(See Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 631-632 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 774 ].) Appellant also contends that she was denied her common law right to fair procedure. “ ‘California courts have long recognized a common law right to fair procedure protecting individuals from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from private organizations which control important economic interests.’ [Citation.] Such a private organization’s actions must be both substantively rational and procedurally fair. [Citation.] What constitutes a fair procedure is not fixed or judicially prescribed. ‘[T]he ass

2009The rights to free speech and political association are “protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment [and] are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. [Citation.]” (Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967) 389 U.S. 217, 222, fn. 4 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 426 , 88 S.Ct. 353 ]; see also Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 507, 513 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 196 , 96 S.Ct. 1029 ] [“It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.”].) We reject appel

2009The rights to free speech and political association are “protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment [and] are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. [Citation.]” (Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967) 389 U.S. 217, 222, fn. 4 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 426 , 88 S.Ct. 353 ]; see also Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 507, 513 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 196 , 96 S.Ct. 1029 ] [“It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.”].) We reject appel

2009(See Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 631-632 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 774 ].) Appellant also contends that she was denied her common law right to fair procedure. “ ‘California courts have long recognized a common law right to fair procedure protecting individuals from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from private organizations which control important economic interests.’ [Citation.] Such a private organization’s actions must be both substantively rational and procedurally fair. [Citation.] What constitutes a fair procedure is not fixed or judicially prescribed. ‘[T]he ass

2009(See Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 631-632 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 774 ].) Appellant also contends that she was denied her common law right to fair procedure. “ ‘California courts have long recognized a common law right to fair procedure protecting individuals from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from private organizations which control important economic interests.’ [Citation.] Such a private organization’s actions must be both substantively rational and procedurally fair. [Citation.] What constitutes a fair procedure is not fixed or judicially prescribed. ‘[T]he ass

2009The rights to free speech and political association are “protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment [and] are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. [Citation.]” (Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967) 389 U.S. 217, 222, fn. 4 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 426 , 88 S.Ct. 353 ]; see also Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 507, 513 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 196 , 96 S.Ct. 1029 ] [“It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.”].) We reject appel

2009The rights to free speech and political association are “protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment [and] are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. [Citation.]” (Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967) 389 U.S. 217, 222, fn. 4 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 426 , 88 S.Ct. 353 ]; see also Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 507, 513 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 196 , 96 S.Ct. 1029 ] [“It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.”].) We reject appel

2009Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d *500 277, 929 P.2d 596 ].) “Only those actions that may fairly be attributed to the state ... are subject to due process protections. [Citations.]” (Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.Sd 1102, 1112 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 805 P.2d 300 ].) The state action requirement applies to due process protections under both the federal and state Constitutions.

2009Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d *500 277, 929 P.2d 596 ].) “Only those actions that may fairly be attributed to the state ... are subject to due process protections. [Citations.]” (Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.Sd 1102, 1112 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 805 P.2d 300 ].) The state action requirement applies to due process protections under both the federal and state Constitutions.

2006(Jones v. Kmart, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 333, fn. 1 ; People v. Plesniarski (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 108, 114 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 196 ].) Thus, by saying the Bane Act applies to all persons whether or not acting under color of law, the Legislature intended to apply its provisions to private actors as well as public officials (at least to the extent the alleged constitutional violation does not have a state action requirement).

2006(Jones v. Kmart, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 333, fn. 1 ; People v. Plesniarski (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 108, 114 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 196 ].) Thus, by saying the Bane Act applies to all persons whether or not acting under color of law, the Legislature intended to apply its provisions to private actors as well as public officials (at least to the extent the alleged constitutional violation does not have a state action requirement).