state action requirement in Illinois

9 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2006 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

Case	Followed	Cited
Motes v. Myersgreen ca11 · 1987 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994Motes, 810 F.2d at 1058. 1994(See Motes v. Myers (11th Cir.1987), 810 F.2d 1055, 1059 .) To recover under that statute, a plaintiff must show that the violation was committed by a defendant acting under color of State law. ( Jones v. Gutschenritter (8th Cir.1990), 909 F.2d 1208, 1211 .) This statutory color-of-State-law requirement is satisfied where the offending conduct meets the State-action requirement of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

Case	Cited	Years
Parker v. Brown green scotus · 1943 2 sentences 2005The state-action exemption to the Sherman Act was established by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 , 87 L. 1983Again, the fact that the plaintiff was precluded from presenting evidence establishing that the defendants were not entitled to immunity under the State action doctrine first enunciated in Parker v. Brown (1943), 317 U.S. 341 , 87 L.	3	1983–2005
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 2006Plaintiff, however, ignores the Lugar Court’s determination that a state statute “is subject to constitutional restraint and properly may be addressed in a §1983 action, if the second element of the state-action requirement is met as well.” (Emphasis added.) Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 , 73 L. 2006Plaintiff, however, ignores the Lugar Court’s determination that a state statute “is subject to constitutional restraint and properly may be addressed in a §1983 action, if the second element of the state-action requirement is met as well.” (Emphasis added.) Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 , 73 L.	2	2006–2006
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co. green scotus · 1978 2 sentences 2005They recognize the Supreme Court in New Motor rejected the argument as to the California Act ( New Motor, 439 U.S. at 109 , 99 S.Ct. at 412 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 376 ), finding the statute fell under the state-action exemption, but assert New Motor is distinguishable because that Court (1) failed to address the second prong of the state-action requirement and (2) noted less than 1% of the protests were resolved against the manufacturer. 2005They recognize the Supreme Court in New Motor rejected the argument as to the California Act ( New Motor, 439 U.S. at 109 , 99 S.Ct. at 412 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 376 ), finding the statute fell under the state-action exemption, but assert New Motor is distinguishable because that Court (1) failed to address the second prong of the state-action requirement and (2) noted less than 1% of the protests were resolved against the manufacturer.	1	2005–2005
Jones v. Gutschenritter green · 1990 2 sentences 1994(Jones v. Gutschenritter (8th Cir. 1990), 909 F.2d 1208 , 1211.) This statutory color-of-State-1 aw requirement is satisfied where the offending conduct meets the State-action requirement of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. 1994(See Motes v. Myers (11th Cir.1987), 810 F.2d 1055, 1059 .) To recover under that statute, a plaintiff must show that the violation was committed by a defendant acting under color of State law. ( Jones v. Gutschenritter (8th Cir.1990), 909 F.2d 1208, 1211 .) This statutory color-of-State-law requirement is satisfied where the offending conduct meets the State-action requirement of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.	1	1994–1994
Waycaster (Ronald) v. At&t Technologies, Inc neutral ca7 · 1987 1 sentence 1992Ill. 1986), 631 F. Supp. 221, 224-25 , aff’d (7th Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1091 ).	1	1992–1992
SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall green ny · 1985 2 sentences 1992(See Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers, 512 Pa. 23 , 515 A.2d 1331 ; Woodland, 423 Mich. 188 , 378 N.W. 337 ; S H A D, 66 N.Y.2d 496 , 488 N.E.2d 1211 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 .) As the New York Court of Appeals stated in SHAD, the State-action requirement performs a vital function: “Actions of the Federal Government are limited by the Federal Constitution’s reservation to State governments of all powers not expressly granted it [citations]. 1992(See Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers, 512 Pa. 23 , 515 A.2d 1331 ; Woodland, 423 Mich. 188 , 378 N.W. 337 ; S H A D, 66 N.Y.2d 496 , 488 N.E.2d 1211 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 .) As the New York Court of Appeals stated in SHAD, the State-action requirement performs a vital function: “Actions of the Federal Government are limited by the Federal Constitution’s reservation to State governments of all powers not expressly granted it [citations].	1	1992–1992
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby green mich · 1985 1 sentence 1992(See Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers, 512 Pa. 23 , 515 A.2d 1331 ; Woodland, 423 Mich. 188 , 378 N.W. 337 ; S H A D, 66 N.Y.2d 496 , 488 N.E.2d 1211 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 .) As the New York Court of Appeals stated in SHAD, the State-action requirement performs a vital function: “Actions of the Federal Government are limited by the Federal Constitution’s reservation to State governments of all powers not expressly granted it [citations].	1	1992–1992
W. Pa. Soc. Wrk. v. Conn. Gen. Life green pa · 1986 2 sentences 1992(See Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers, 512 Pa. 23 , 515 A.2d 1331 ; Woodland, 423 Mich. 188 , 378 N.W. 337 ; S H A D, 66 N.Y.2d 496 , 488 N.E.2d 1211 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 .) As the New York Court of Appeals stated in SHAD, the State-action requirement performs a vital function: “Actions of the Federal Government are limited by the Federal Constitution’s reservation to State governments of all powers not expressly granted it [citations]. 1992(See Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers, 512 Pa. 23 , 515 A.2d 1331 ; Woodland, 423 Mich. 188 , 378 N.W. 337 ; S H A D, 66 N.Y.2d 496 , 488 N.E.2d 1211 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 .) As the New York Court of Appeals stated in SHAD, the State-action requirement performs a vital function: “Actions of the Federal Government are limited by the Federal Constitution’s reservation to State governments of all powers not expressly granted it [citations].	1	1992–1992
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1992Second, the Authority argues that it is immune from liability under the State action doctrine, which protects States and municipalities from antitrust liability (see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire (1985), 471 U.S. 34, 39 , 85 L. 1992Second, the Authority argues that it is immune from liability under the State action doctrine, which protects States and municipalities from antitrust liability (see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire (1985), 471 U.S. 34, 39 , 85 L.	1	1992–1992
Wellwoods Development Co. v. City of Aurora green ilnd · 1986 2 sentences 1992Ill. 1986), 631 F. Supp. 221, 224-25 , aff’d (7th Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1091 ). 1992(Wellwoods Development Co., 631 F. Supp. at 224-25 .) The Authority also argues that it is immune from liability for refusing to extend plaintiffs’ leases or to enter into various contracts with plaintiffs under the Tort Immunity Act, specifically citing to sections 2 — 104, 2— 109 and 2 — 201 (Ill.	1	1992–1992
Weisberg v. Taylor green ill · 1951 2 sentences 1983The Illinois Supreme Court in Weisberg v. Taylor (1951), 409 Ill. 384 , 100 N.E.2d 748 , has decided the constitutionality of section 4 of article VI of the Liquor Control Act. 1983The Illinois Supreme Court in Weisberg v. Taylor (1951), 409 Ill. 384 , 100 N.E.2d 748 , has decided the constitutionality of section 4 of article VI of the Liquor Control Act.	1	1983–1983
Giglio v. United States green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 1983For example, in Giglio v. United States (1972), 405 U.S. 150 , 31 L. 1983For example, in Giglio v. United States (1972), 405 U.S. 150 , 31 L.	1	1983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 15u.s.c.1 (3) USC § 42u.s.c.1983 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 25 (1978–2026) MA 17 (1977–2020) NY 14 (1971–2025) TX 13 (1979–2026) MD 13 (1981–2015) CT 10 (1984–2020) IL 9 (1983–2006) WI 9 (1986–2026) WA 9 (1980–2023) OH 8 (1986–2020) NJ 6 (1983–2025) PA 6 (1980–2025) IA 6 (1936–2016) MO 5 (1978–2012) MI 5 (1977–2008) FL 5 (1978–2004) AZ 5 (1999–2007) NC 4 (1998–2020) NM 4 (1993–2019) TN 4 (1995–2026) IN 4 (1989–2014) AK 4 (1983–2023) NV 4 (1987–2001) UT 3 (1990–2006) DC 3 (1977–1989) ME 3 (2000–2009) DE 2 (1976–2013) ID 2 (1998–2026) NH 2 (1990–2003) MT 2 (1988–1990) AL 2 (2011–2014) GA 2 (1984–1997) AR 2 (2006–2008) RI 2 (2001–2001) CO 2 (1991–1997) MN 2 (1979–2005) SC 2 (2002–2003) LA 2 (1999–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check