frequency analysis (New Jersey) · Go Syfert
← New Jersey issues

frequency analysis in New Jersey

13 New Jersey opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Coopergreen
nj · 1999 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001
2 sentences

2001As we explained in Cooper II : [F]irst, we use a frequency analysis that includes both mathematical and statistical calculations to compare defendant's case to other cases with similar fact patterns or similar levels of culpability in order to ascertain the rate of death sentencing in those similar cases; second, we engage in precedent-seeking review in which we compare all relevant factors in factually similar cases to determine whether defendant's death sentence appears to be disproportionate in comparison to the sentences imposed on other defendants who committed comparable homicides. [ Id.

2001As we explained in Cooper II: [F]irst, we use a frequency analysis that includes both mathematical and statistical calculations to compare defendant’s case to other cases with similar fact patterns or similar levels of culpability in order to ascertain the rate of death sentencing in those similar eases; second, we engage in precedent-seeking review in which we compare all relevant factors in factually similar cases to determine whether defendant’s death sentence appears to be disproportionate in comparison to the sentences imposed on other defendants who committed comparable homicides. [Id. a

22
State v. Martinigreen
nj · 1994 · cited in 5 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1994–2007
2 sentences

2007If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial cases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as "strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant's death sentence." [ Ibid. (citations omitted).] After the frequency analysis is performed, we turn to precedent-seeking review, where "`we [have] examine[d] death-eligible cases similar to defendant's case to determine whether his death sentence is aberrant when compared to the sentences received by defendants in those other c

2007If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial cases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as "strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant's death sentence." [ Ibid. (citations omitted).] After the frequency analysis is performed, we turn to precedent-seeking review, where "`we [have] examine[d] death-eligible cases similar to defendant's case to determine whether his death sentence is aberrant when compared to the sentences received by defendants in those other c

15
State v. DiFriscogreen
nj · 1995 · cited in 4 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1999–2000
2 sentences

2000“Frequency analysis helps us to determine whether defendant is in a category that renders him or her more likely than other killers to receive the death penalty.” DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 171 , 662 A.2d 442 .

2000“Frequency analysis helps us to determine whether defendant is in a category that renders him or her more likely than other killers to receive the death penalty.” DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 171 , 662 A.2d 442 .

14
State v. Marshallgreen
nj · 1992 · cited in 4 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1994–1999
2 sentences

1999As outlined in Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 152-59 , 613 A.2d 1059 , and followed in our subsequent proportionality review cases, we conduct a frequency analysis using statistical methods and a precedent-seeking review consisting of case-by-case analyses of comparative culpability.

1999As outlined in Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 152-59 , 613 A.2d 1059 , and followed in our subsequent proportionality review cases, we conduct a frequency analysis using statistical methods and a precedent-seeking review consisting of case-by-case analyses of comparative culpability.

14

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Bey green
nj · 1994
2 sentences

1994As we stated in Bey IV, supra, “In the frequency analysis, we will consider only those mitigating factors that the jury found relevant to the imposition of the death penalty.” 137 N.J. at 361 , 645 A.2d 685 .

1994As we stated in Bey IV, supra, “In the frequency analysis, we will consider only those mitigating factors that the jury found relevant to the imposition of the death penalty.” 137 N.J. at 361 , 645 A.2d 685 .

31994–1999
In Re Proportionality Review Project green
nj · 1999
2 sentences

2000When we reviewed Judge Baime’s recommendations in Proportionality Review I , we agreed that the frequency analysis should consist only of the salient-factors test, and that that test should be modified to contain fewer subcategories. 161 N.J. at 87-89 , 735 A.2d 528 .

2000When we reviewed Judge Baime’s recommendations in Proportionality Review I , we agreed that the frequency analysis should consist only of the salient-factors test, and that that test should be modified to contain fewer subcategories. 161 N.J. at 87-89 , 735 A.2d 528 .

22000–2000
Tichnell v. State green
md · 1983
2 sentences

1999This Court has long recognized as a general rule that “ ‘[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive [and thus disproportionate] if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.’ ” State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 131 , 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) (Marshall II), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993) (quoting Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432 , 468 A.2d 1 , 17 n. 18 (1983)).

1999This Court has long recognized as a general rule that “ ‘[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive [and thus disproportionate] if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.’ ” State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 131 , 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) (Marshall II), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993) (quoting Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432 , 468 A.2d 1 , 17 n. 18 (1983)).

21994–1999
State v. Timmendequas green
nj · 2001
2 sentences

2007If, in similar eases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial cases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as “strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant’s death sentence.” [Ibid, (citations omitted).] After the frequency analysis is performed, we turn to precedent-seeking review, where “ ‘we [have] examine[d] death-eligible cases similar to defendant’s case to determine whether his death sentence is aberrant when compared to the sentences received by defendants in those other c

2007If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial cases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as "strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant's death sentence." [ Ibid. (citations omitted).] After the frequency analysis is performed, we turn to precedent-seeking review, where "`we [have] examine[d] death-eligible cases similar to defendant's case to determine whether his death sentence is aberrant when compared to the sentences received by defendants in those other c

12007–2007
Prihoda v. Husz green
scotus · 1996
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
Sweeney v. United States green
scotus · 1996
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
DiFrisco v. New Jersey green
scotus · 1996
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
Banda v. United States green
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
Provost v. Minnesota green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

1999This Court has long recognized as a general rule that “ ‘[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive [and thus disproportionate] if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.’ ” State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 131 , 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) (Marshall II), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993) (quoting Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432 , 468 A.2d 1 , 17 n. 18 (1983)).

1999This Court has long recognized as a general rule that "`[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive [and thus disproportionate] if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.'" State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 131 , 613 A. 2d 1059 (1992) ( Marshall II ), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1993) (quoting Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432 , 468 A. 2d 1 , 17 n. 18 (1983)).

11999–1999
Sitton v. United States green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

1999This Court has long recognized as a general rule that “ ‘[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive [and thus disproportionate] if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.’ ” State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 131 , 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) (Marshall II), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993) (quoting Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432 , 468 A.2d 1 , 17 n. 18 (1983)).

1999This Court has long recognized as a general rule that "`[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive [and thus disproportionate] if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.'" State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 131 , 613 A. 2d 1059 (1992) ( Marshall II ), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1993) (quoting Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432 , 468 A. 2d 1 , 17 n. 18 (1983)).

11999–1999
Rhodes v. United States green
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
Royster v. Vaughn green
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
LaFlamme v. White green
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
Jeffries v. Hambright green
· 1921
2 sentences

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996).

1999State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 , 116 S.Ct. 203 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66 , 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

11999–1999
State v. Jeffries green
wash · 1986
2 sentences

1992Use of the word “generally” suggested to him that the threshold frequency at which a death sentence becomes appropriate is “significantly greater than 50 percent.” Jeffries, supra, 717 P.2d at 744 .

1992Use of the word "generally" suggested to him that the threshold frequency at which a death sentence becomes appropriate is "significantly greater than 50 percent." Jeffries, supra, 717 P. 2d at 744 .

11992–1992

Where else courts name it

WI 51 (1981–2026) NJ 13 (1992–2007) CA 5 (1979–2023) UT 5 (2019–2025) TX 5 (1998–2023) CO 4 (2014–2017) NH 4 (2023–2025) AK 2 (1995–2010) FL 2 (1996–2001) CT 2 (1996–1997) PA 2 (2013–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check