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13 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lee Funderburg (074760)green2 sentences2025"Nor does the trial court have 'the obligation on its own meticulously to sift through the entire record . . . to see if some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain' a lesser charge like manslaughter." State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (quoting State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299 (1985)). 2018The clearly indicated standard requires a sua sponte instruction on a lesser-included offense "only where the facts in evidence 'clearly indicate' the appropriateness of the charge," ibid. (quoting State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002)), or where "there is 'obvious record support for such [a] charge[,]'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Savagegreen2 sentences2021The evidence "must 'jump[] off the page' to trigger a trial court's duty to sua sponte instruct a jury on that charge." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006)). "[J]ust because a charge meets the rational basis test does not mean it meets the clearly indicated standard." Id. at 145 . 2018The clearly indicated standard requires a sua sponte instruction on a lesser-included offense "only where the facts in evidence 'clearly indicate' the appropriateness of the charge," ibid. (quoting State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002)), or where "there is 'obvious record support for such [a] charge[,]'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sloanegreen1 sentence2025A-1825-22 33 This clearly indicated standard does not require trial courts to "scour the statutes to determine if there are some uncharged offenses of which the defendant may be guilty." State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 118 (1994) (quoting State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 302 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Choicegreen1 sentence2025"Nor does the trial court have 'the obligation on its own meticulously to sift through the entire record . . . to see if some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain' a lesser charge like manslaughter." State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (quoting State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brentgreen1 sentence2025A-1825-22 33 This clearly indicated standard does not require trial courts to "scour the statutes to determine if there are some uncharged offenses of which the defendant may be guilty." State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 118 (1994) (quoting State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 302 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Denofagreen2 sentences2021The evidence "must 'jump[] off the page' to trigger a trial court's duty to sua sponte instruct a jury on that charge." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006)). "[J]ust because a charge meets the rational basis test does not mean it meets the clearly indicated standard." Id. at 145 . 2021The evidence "must 'jump[] off the page' to trigger a trial court's duty to sua sponte instruct a jury on that charge." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006)). "[J]ust because a charge meets the rational basis test does not mean it meets the clearly indicated standard." Id. at 145 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Powellgreen1 sentence2018The clearly indicated standard requires a sua sponte instruction on a lesser-included offense "only where the facts in evidence 'clearly indicate' the appropriateness of the charge," ibid. (quoting State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002)), or where "there is 'obvious record support for such [a] charge[,]'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. RTgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 509, 16 A.3d 365 . 2016Id. at 509, 16 A.3d 365 . | 1 | 1 |
Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2004In Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 507 , 178 A. 2d 161, 171 (1962), the court indicated that the presumption of fact in the Dwyer case would be "... emptied of all probative force and disappears from the case upon the introduction of any proof to the contrary." Contrast the case of Spear v. Lyndale Mfg. 2004In Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 507 , 178 A. 2d 161, 171 (1962), the court indicated that the presumption of fact in the Dwyer case would be "... emptied of all probative force and disappears from the case upon the introduction of any proof to the contrary." Contrast the case of Spear v. Lyndale Mfg. | 1 | 1 |
Meier v. Frank Mashuda Co.green1 sentence1962Cf. Meier v. Frank Mashuda Company, - Ohio App. -, 168 N. E. 2d 319, 321 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Lara
green
2 sentences2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A. 2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing 2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A.2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing s | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kroger Co.
green
2 sentences2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A. 2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing 2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A.2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing s | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Crown Equipment Corp. v. McEuin
green
2 sentences2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A. 2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing 2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A.2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing s | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Garron
green
2 sentences2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A. 2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing 2011Indeed, in State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A. 2d 243 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (2004), where we affirmed that the clearly indicated standard requires an instruction on a lesser-included offense, we took particular note of the fact that: in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Alexander
green
1 sentence2018The clearly indicated standard requires a sua sponte instruction on a lesser-included offense "only where the facts in evidence 'clearly indicate' the appropriateness of the charge," ibid. (quoting State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002)), or where "there is 'obvious record support for such [a] charge[,]'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Aluminum Co. v. Preferred Metal Products
green
2 sentences2004Co., 35 N.J.Super. 385 , 114 A. 2d 314 (App.Div.1958) where the court indicated that the presumption at issue would disappear when met by "positive, substantial and repellent evidence." If the proof offered to refute the presumed evidential fact is equal to the supporting data of the elemental fact, then the opponent of the presumed evidential fact has failed to carry their burden of going forward, Aluminum Co. of America v. Preferred Metal Products, 37 F.R.D. 218 (D.N.J.1965). 2004Co., 35 N.J.Super. 385 , 114 A. 2d 314 (App.Div.1958) where the court indicated that the presumption at issue would disappear when met by "positive, substantial and repellent evidence." If the proof offered to refute the presumed evidential fact is equal to the supporting data of the elemental fact, then the opponent of the presumed evidential fact has failed to carry their burden of going forward, Aluminum Co. of America v. Preferred Metal Products, 37 F.R.D. 218 (D.N.J.1965). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Spear v. Lyndale Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences2004Co., 35 N.J.Super. 385 , 114 A. 2d 314 (App.Div.1958) where the court indicated that the presumption at issue would disappear when met by "positive, substantial and repellent evidence." If the proof offered to refute the presumed evidential fact is equal to the supporting data of the elemental fact, then the opponent of the presumed evidential fact has failed to carry their burden of going forward, Aluminum Co. of America v. Preferred Metal Products, 37 F.R.D. 218 (D.N.J.1965). 2004Co., 35 N.J.Super. 385 , 114 A. 2d 314 (App.Div.1958) where the court indicated that the presumption at issue would disappear when met by "positive, substantial and repellent evidence." If the proof offered to refute the presumed evidential fact is equal to the supporting data of the elemental fact, then the opponent of the presumed evidential fact has failed to carry their burden of going forward, Aluminum Co. of America v. Preferred Metal Products, 37 F.R.D. 218 (D.N.J.1965). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue & Taxation
green
1 sentence2003Ibid. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors
green
1 sentence2000Ibid. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
green
2 sentences1991In Loudermill the Court indicated that the hearing “though necessary, need not be elaborate.” 470 U.S. at 545 , 105 S.Ct. at 1495 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 506 . “[T]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Id., quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. at 786 , 28 L.Ed.2d at 119 . 1991In Loudermill the Court indicated that the hearing “though necessary, need not be elaborate.” 470 U.S. at 545 , 105 S.Ct. at 1495 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 506 . “[T]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Id., quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. at 786 , 28 L.Ed.2d at 119 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Boddie v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1991In Loudermill the Court indicated that the hearing “though necessary, need not be elaborate.” 470 U.S. at 545 , 105 S.Ct. at 1495 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 506 . “[T]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Id., quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. at 786 , 28 L.Ed.2d at 119 . 1991In Loudermill the Court indicated that the hearing “though necessary, need not be elaborate.” 470 U.S. at 545 , 105 S.Ct. at 1495 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 506 . “[T]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Id., quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. at 786 , 28 L.Ed.2d at 119 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Deatore
green
2 sentences1988Regardless of the relevance of jury-bias as a viable test in civil cases, e.g., Wright v. Bernstein, supra, or in ordinary criminal cases, e.g., State v. Deatore, supra, it cannot serve as the standard in á capital case. 1988Regardless of the relevance of jury-bias as a viable test in civil cases, e.g., Wright v. Bernstein, supra , or in ordinary criminal cases, e.g., State v. Deatore, supra , it cannot serve as the standard in a capital case. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Wright v. Bernstein
green
2 sentences1988Regardless of the relevance of jury-bias as a viable test in civil cases, e.g., Wright v. Bernstein, supra, or in ordinary criminal cases, e.g., State v. Deatore, supra, it cannot serve as the standard in á capital case. 1988Regardless of the relevance of jury-bias as a viable test in civil cases, e.g., Wright v. Bernstein, supra , or in ordinary criminal cases, e.g., State v. Deatore, supra , it cannot serve as the standard in a capital case. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Converse v. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp.
green
1 sentence1962The court indicated that this defense might be sound if the defendant’s work could not have been done without inflicting the injury; however, it then proceeded to find for the plaintiff, pointing out that the defendant could have used other dumping grounds which were available “subject only to approval of the officer in *419 charge.” 281 F., at p. 985 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Fred v. Mayor and Council, Old Tappan Borough
green
1 sentence1959(See Fred v. Mayor and Council, Old Tappan Borough, 10 N.J. 515 (1952).) In that light, there is much to commend judicial acquiescence in the construction of the statute and its administrative implementation by the New Brunswick authorities in the case before us. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.