indicated defense in California

2013If someone dies as a result of the actions of a person who was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is involuntary manslaughter." 11 In the footnote omitted from the text above, the Turk court stated: "In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 175 , [footnote] 22 [(Breverman)], the court indicated that this standard is equivalent to the substantial evidence standard for instructing on lesser included offenses generally." (Turk, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 6 .) 23 c.

2008(See People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 795-796 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ] (Stewart).) 6 In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 175, fn. 22 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ], the court indicated that this standard is equivalent to the substantial evidence standard for instructing on lesser included offenses generally. 7 The 1981 amendment (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 6, p. 1593) added the second paragraph in section 188.

2022Citing People v. Danis (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 782 (Danis), however, the court indicated that if defense counsel “present expert witnesses regarding mental health issues, [the prosecution] is going be entitled to . . . have 31 PEOPLE v. CAMACHO Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C.

2022J. your client examined.” (See Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 786 [“even in the absence of an authorizing statute, a trial court possesses the inherent power to order a defendant who has imposed a defense of insanity or of diminished capacity to submit to an examination of a psychiatrist selected by the People”], disapproved in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096 (Verdin).) In August 2005, after defense counsel indicated that Dr. Stewart would be rendering a medical opinion on defendant’s behalf, the court stated that it would sign a “Danis order,” allowing the prosecution to co

2021(In re Roderick (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 242, 249, fn. 3 ; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3312, subd. (a)(3).) 6. because the petition should have been denied on the papers alone.

2015For example, defendant points out, the trial court sustained a number of prosecution objections to testimony or argument offered by defendant, and at times on its own motion noted that defendant was seeking to elicit inadmissible hearsay, but the court did not similarly prevent the prosecution from eliciting hearsay on its own motion; the court on occasion questioned witnesses or clarified their answers; the court admonished defense counsel when he disobeyed a ruling prohibiting the parties from questioning Harris about the reason he was no longer a student at Castlemont High School; the court

2013If someone dies as a result of the actions of a person who was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is involuntary manslaughter." 11 In the footnote omitted from the text above, the Turk court stated: "In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 175 , [footnote] 22 [(Breverman)], the court indicated that this standard is equivalent to the substantial evidence standard for instructing on lesser included offenses generally." (Turk, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 6 .) 23 c.

2008(See People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 795-796 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ] (Stewart).) 6 In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 175, fn. 22 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ], the court indicated that this standard is equivalent to the substantial evidence standard for instructing on lesser included offenses generally. 7 The 1981 amendment (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 6, p. 1593) added the second paragraph in section 188.

2008(See People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 795-796 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ] (Stewart).) 6 In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 175, fn. 22 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ], the court indicated that this standard is equivalent to the substantial evidence standard for instructing on lesser included offenses generally. 7 The 1981 amendment (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 6, p. 1593) added the second paragraph in section 188.

1997Beck seeks to “ ‘eliminate the distortion of the factfinding process that is created when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence.’ ” (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 646-647 [ 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2504-2505 , 115 L.Ed.2d 555 ].) When jury instructions were discussed before trial in this case and the court indicated that an instruction defining attempt would have to be given, defendant objected.

1997Beck seeks to “ ‘eliminate the distortion of the factfinding process that is created when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence.’ ” (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 646-647 [ 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2504-2505 , 115 L.Ed.2d 555 ].) When jury instructions were discussed before trial in this case and the court indicated that an instruction defining attempt would have to be given, defendant objected.

1997The People attempt to save the superior court’s restrictive discovery order on a ground other than those set forth by the superior court, namely that the order was an appropriate exercise of discretion under section 1054, subdivision (d) to “prevent harassment.” “The right of a criminal defendant to present a defense and witnesses on his or her behalf is a fundamental element of due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [citation]” (People v. Schroeder (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 784, 787 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 237 ]), and a judge, as well as a prosecutor, can

1997The People attempt to save the superior court’s restrictive discovery order on a ground other than those set forth by the superior court, namely that the order was an appropriate exercise of discretion under section 1054, subdivision (d) to “prevent harassment.” “The right of a criminal defendant to present a defense and witnesses on his or her behalf is a fundamental element of due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [citation]” (People v. Schroeder (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 784, 787 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 237 ]), and a judge, as well as a prosecutor, can

1988The court indicated its requirement of a substantial preliminary showing would work to prevent “new large-scale commitment[s] of judicial resources” and “should suffice to prevent the misuse of a veracity hearing for purposes of discovery or obstruction.” ( 438 U.S. at p. 170 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 681 ].) The high court went on to reiterate that the showing sufficient to trigger the evidentiary hearing “must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross examine.” (Id., at p. 171 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 682 ].) The court thus was concerned about preventing traversals

1988The court indicated its requirement of a substantial preliminary showing would work to prevent “new large-scale commitment[s] of judicial resources” and “should suffice to prevent the misuse of a veracity hearing for purposes of discovery or obstruction.” ( 438 U.S. at p. 170 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 681 ].) The high court went on to reiterate that the showing sufficient to trigger the evidentiary hearing “must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross examine.” (Id., at p. 171 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 682 ].) The court thus was concerned about preventing traversals

1969The Witherspoon case makes it clear, however, that constitutional guarantees are not violated when the court excuses for cause “those who [have] made unmistakably clear . . .' that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, ...” ( 391 U.S. at p. 522, fn. 21 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785 ].) We have examined the voir dire examination of each of the three jurors excused for cause in the instant case and have concluded that the indicated standard was here met.

1969The Witherspoon case makes it clear, however, that constitutional guarantees are not violated when the court excuses for cause “those who [have] made unmistakably clear . . .' that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, ...” ( 391 U.S. at p. 522, fn. 21 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785 ].) We have examined the voir dire examination of each of the three jurors excused for cause in the instant case and have concluded that the indicated standard was here met.

1967(In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 52-53 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ] ; People v. Burns (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d Supp. 839 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 921 ].) We do not reach this conclusion wholly by reference to -the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

1967(In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 52-53 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ] ; People v. Burns (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d Supp. 839 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 921 ].) We do not reach this conclusion wholly by reference to -the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

1967(See People v. Spinosa, (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 252 P.2d 409 ] ; Jackson v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [ 219 P.2d 879 ] ; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 914 [ 180 P.2d 465 ].) The enactment of section 834a clearly represents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California.

1967(See People v. Spinosa, (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 252 P.2d 409 ] ; Jackson v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [ 219 P.2d 879 ] ; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 914 [ 180 P.2d 465 ].) The enactment of section 834a clearly represents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California.

1967However, the California Supreme Court rejected such argument and, while conceding that the section was enacted to prevent abuses, stated that it still “left to the courts the determination of what specific facts in addition to a showing 1 of relevance of the information sought to the subject matter of the action’ should be required to show ‘good cause. ’ ” (Associated Brewers Distributing Co. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.2d 583, 587 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 422 P.2d 332 ].) Moreover, the court indicated that the test is whether the documents sought to be discovered are (1) relevant to the *635 subjec

1967However, the California Supreme Court rejected such argument and, while conceding that the section was enacted to prevent abuses, stated that it still “left to the courts the determination of what specific facts in addition to a showing 1 of relevance of the information sought to the subject matter of the action’ should be required to show ‘good cause. ’ ” (Associated Brewers Distributing Co. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.2d 583, 587 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 422 P.2d 332 ].) Moreover, the court indicated that the test is whether the documents sought to be discovered are (1) relevant to the *635 subjec

1967(See People v. Spinosa, (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 252 P.2d 409 ] ; Jackson v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [ 219 P.2d 879 ] ; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 914 [ 180 P.2d 465 ].) The enactment of section 834a clearly represents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California.

1967(See People v. Spinosa, (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 252 P.2d 409 ] ; Jackson v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [ 219 P.2d 879 ] ; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 914 [ 180 P.2d 465 ].) The enactment of section 834a clearly represents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California.

1967(See People v. Spinosa, (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 252 P.2d 409 ] ; Jackson v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [ 219 P.2d 879 ] ; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 914 [ 180 P.2d 465 ].) The enactment of section 834a clearly represents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California.

1967(See People v. Spinosa, (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 252 P.2d 409 ] ; Jackson v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [ 219 P.2d 879 ] ; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 914 [ 180 P.2d 465 ].) The enactment of section 834a clearly represents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California.