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13 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Caldwellgreen2 sentences2026See UJI- Criminal General Use Note (“[A]n elements instruction may only be altered when the alternation is adequately supported by . . . the unique circumstances of a particular case.”); see also State v. Doe, 1983-NMSC-096 , ¶ 8, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (“[I]f the jury instructions substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language, then they are sufficient.”); Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 24 (“A jury instruction is proper, and nothing more is required, if it fairly and accurately presents the law.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {19} 2024See Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 25 (“Jury instructions that substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language do not constitute fundamental error.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {9} We observe as well that although receiving stolen property and possession of a stolen vehicle are separate statutory offenses, they are in substance a general and specific version of the same crime. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Doegreen2 sentences2026See UJI- Criminal General Use Note (“[A]n elements instruction may only be altered when the alternation is adequately supported by . . . the unique circumstances of a particular case.”); see also State v. Doe, 1983-NMSC-096 , ¶ 8, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (“[I]f the jury instructions substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language, then they are sufficient.”); Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 24 (“A jury instruction is proper, and nothing more is required, if it fairly and accurately presents the law.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {19} 2026See UJI- Criminal General Use Note (“[A]n elements instruction may only be altered when the alternation is adequately supported by . . . the unique circumstances of a particular case.”); see also State v. Doe, 1983-NMSC-096 , ¶ 8, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (“[I]f the jury instructions substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language, then they are sufficient.”); Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 24 (“A jury instruction is proper, and nothing more is required, if it fairly and accurately presents the law.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {19} | 1 | 1 |
State v. Astorgagreen1 sentence2026See State v. Astorga, 2016-NMCA-015, ¶ 5 , 365 P.3d 53 (“The burden of demonstrating fundamental error is on the party alleging it, and the standard of review for reversal for fundamental error is an ‘exacting’ one.” (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cunninghamgreen1 sentence2021We exercise our discretion to apply the doctrine of fundamental error “very guardedly, and only where some fundamental right has been invaded, and never in aid of strictly legal, technical, or unsubstantial claims[.]” Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {26} First, the given jury instruction was consistent with the UJI for second-degree CSCM under thirteen years of age. | 1 | 1 |
Hennessy v. Duryeagreen2 sentences2020See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013 2020See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Senagreen2 sentences2020Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 54 ; see also id. (“[T]he Foster presumption is rebutted by evidence that each crime was completed before the other crime occurred.”); Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (“[T]he proper analytical framework is whether ‘the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.’ ” (quoting Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 29)). {23} The act of spitting in Officer Ramos’s face would plainly fall within the ambit of the “abused” alternative under the given jury instruction. 2020Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 54 ; see also id. (“[T]he Foster presumption is rebutted by evidence that each crime was completed before the other crime occurred.”); Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (“[T]he proper analytical framework is whether ‘the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.’ ” (quoting Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 29)). {23} The act of spitting in Officer Ramos’s face would plainly fall within the ambit of the “abused” alternative under the given jury instruction. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hertzog
green
2 sentences2024Hertzog, 2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 11 . 2024Hertzog, 2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 11 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Gaitan
green
2 sentences2005State v. Gaitan, 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 10 , 131 N.M. 758 , 42 P.3d 1207 ; State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶49 , 123 N.M. 778 , 945 P.2d 996 . 2005State v. Gaitan, 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 10 , 131 N.M. 758 , 42 P.3d 1207 ; State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶49 , 123 N.M. 778 , 945 P.2d 996 . | 2 | 2003–2005 |
State v. Salazar
green
2 sentences2005State v. Gaitan, 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 10 , 131 N.M. 758 , 42 P.3d 1207 ; State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶49 , 123 N.M. 778 , 945 P.2d 996 . 2005State v. Gaitan, 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 10 , 131 N.M. 758 , 42 P.3d 1207 ; State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶49 , 123 N.M. 778 , 945 P.2d 996 . | 2 | 2003–2005 |
State v. Holt
green
1 sentence2025We measure the evidence against the given jury instruction, see State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20 , 368 P.3d 409 , which, for the first element, required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant “exposed [T.L.] to cocaine . . . on or about the” day T.L. died. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Holt
green
1 sentence2025We measure the evidence against the given jury instruction, see State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20 , 368 P.3d 409 , which, for the first element, required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant “exposed [T.L.] to cocaine . . . on or about the” day T.L. died. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Benally
green
1 sentence2024Moreover, although it is also reversible error if a given jury instruction would have confused or misdirected a reasonable juror, Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 , a given jury instruction is sufficient when, reading all the instructions as a whole, “they fairly and correctly state the applicable law.” State v. Rushing, 1973-NMSC-092 , ¶ 20, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 . {27} The jury instruction at issue reads, “A person who is defending against an attack need not retreat. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Rushing
green
2 sentences2024Moreover, although it is also reversible error if a given jury instruction would have confused or misdirected a reasonable juror, Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 , a given jury instruction is sufficient when, reading all the instructions as a whole, “they fairly and correctly state the applicable law.” State v. Rushing, 1973-NMSC-092 , ¶ 20, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 . {27} The jury instruction at issue reads, “A person who is defending against an attack need not retreat. 2024Moreover, although it is also reversible error if a given jury instruction would have confused or misdirected a reasonable juror, Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 , a given jury instruction is sufficient when, reading all the instructions as a whole, “they fairly and correctly state the applicable law.” State v. Rushing, 1973-NMSC-092 , ¶ 20, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 . {27} The jury instruction at issue reads, “A person who is defending against an attack need not retreat. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Astorga
green
1 sentence2021Defendant concedes that he did not preserve the issue by objecting to the language of the given instruction, therefore, we review for fundamental error. {24} We remain unpersuaded that the given jury instruction amounts to fundamental error because (1) the instruction was consistent with the applicable Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI); (2) each time that the instruction was read aloud to the jury, the word “the”—which Defendant claims created fundamental error—was omitted; and (3) to the extent that the instruction may have been erroneous, such error was technical in nature. {25} “Under the doct | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Samora
green
1 sentence2021“Under this standard, we must determine whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected . . . from instructions which, through omission or misstatement, fail to provide the juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant law.” State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 27 , 387 P.3d 230 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Samora
green
1 sentence2021“Under this standard, we must determine whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected . . . from instructions which, through omission or misstatement, fail to provide the juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant law.” State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 27 , 387 P.3d 230 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Astorga
green
1 sentence2021Defendant concedes that he did not preserve the issue by objecting to the language of the given instruction, therefore, we review for fundamental error. {24} We remain unpersuaded that the given jury instruction amounts to fundamental error because (1) the instruction was consistent with the applicable Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI); (2) each time that the instruction was read aloud to the jury, the word “the”—which Defendant claims created fundamental error—was omitted; and (3) to the extent that the instruction may have been erroneous, such error was technical in nature. {25} “Under the doct | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. McWhorter
green
1 sentence2020The State, in contrast, argues that “accident” should be construed more broadly and that the given jury instruction was adequate. {14} To determine the appropriate construction, we first consider the ordinary and plain meaning of the term “accident.” See McWhorter, 2005-NMCA-133, ¶ 5 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2020See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013 2020See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Mondragon
red
2 sentences2020See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013 2020See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Romero
green
2 sentences1993First, while conceding that the trial court is required to “instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction of any crime submitted to the jury,” SCRA 1986, 5-608(A) (Repl.Pamp.1992), the State asserts that Defendant has not preserved this issue for review because at trial he neither objected to the instruction given nor offered a correct instruction regarding fraudulent intent, SCRA 1986, 5-608(D); State v. Romero, 87 N.M. 279 , 532 P.2d 208 (Ct.App.1975); State v. Garcia, 100 N.M. 120 , 666 P.2d 1267 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192 , 668 P.2d 308 (1983). 1993First, while conceding that the trial court is required to “instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction of any crime submitted to the jury,” SCRA 1986, 5-608(A) (Repl.Pamp.1992), the State asserts that Defendant has not preserved this issue for review because at trial he neither objected to the instruction given nor offered a correct instruction regarding fraudulent intent, SCRA 1986, 5-608(D); State v. Romero, 87 N.M. 279 , 532 P.2d 208 (Ct.App.1975); State v. Garcia, 100 N.M. 120 , 666 P.2d 1267 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192 , 668 P.2d 308 (1983). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences1993First, while conceding that the trial court is required to “instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction of any crime submitted to the jury,” SCRA 1986, 5-608(A) (Repl.Pamp.1992), the State asserts that Defendant has not preserved this issue for review because at trial he neither objected to the instruction given nor offered a correct instruction regarding fraudulent intent, SCRA 1986, 5-608(D); State v. Romero, 87 N.M. 279 , 532 P.2d 208 (Ct.App.1975); State v. Garcia, 100 N.M. 120 , 666 P.2d 1267 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192 , 668 P.2d 308 (1983). 1993First, while conceding that the trial court is required to “instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction of any crime submitted to the jury,” SCRA 1986, 5-608(A) (Repl.Pamp.1992), the State asserts that Defendant has not preserved this issue for review because at trial he neither objected to the instruction given nor offered a correct instruction regarding fraudulent intent, SCRA 1986, 5-608(D); State v. Romero, 87 N.M. 279 , 532 P.2d 208 (Ct.App.1975); State v. Garcia, 100 N.M. 120 , 666 P.2d 1267 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192 , 668 P.2d 308 (1983). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.