disregard violation in New York

1872It .does not prevent the application of the rule established in 39 N. Y. 81 , because, in that case the corporation owned a large amount of real estate located outside of the territorial limits of the assessors, and beyond their jurisdiction; and there is no such distinction between the two cases as would authorize a disregard of the doctrine laid down in the case cited.

1871It does not prevent the' application ’of the ruleestablished in 39 N. Y., 81 , because in that case the corporation owned a large amount of real estate located outside of the territorial limits .of the assessors, and beyond their jurisdiction, and there is no such distinction between the two cases as would authorize a disregard of the doctrine laid down in the case cited. • It is insisted that the assessors erred in refusing to strike out the assessment for personal property, and to reduce the assessment, of the real.estate, which -the evidence before them upon the hearing showed did not excee

2004With these facts and defendant’s criminal history, we find no reason to disturb the sentence (see People v Barkley, 289 AD2d 880 [2001]; People v Langlois, 243 AD2d 775 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 855 [1998]).

2004With these facts and defendant’s criminal history, we find no reason to disturb the sentence (see People v Barkley, 289 AD2d 880 [2001]; People v Langlois, 243 AD2d 775 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 855 [1998]).

1948(See United States v. Post, 148 U. S. 124 .) There can be little question that the statute was passed for the benefit and protection of the laborer and, in such a case, a party who has “ suffered from a disregard and violation of the duty [imposed by statute] has a cause of action for his damages against the one who has disregarded his duty ”, even though the statute does not explicitly provide for such a remedy.

1948(Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N. Y. 458, 465 ; see, also, Bruce’s Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743, 751 ; D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.

1948From the duty and its violation there is implied a cause of action in favor of the one for whose benefit the duty was imposed and who has been injured by its violation.” Quoting from Cooley on Torts, Chief Judge Hiscock continued (p. 466): “ ‘ it is sufficient to say of the authorities that they recognize the rule as a general one that when the duty imposed by the statute is manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of individuals, the common law, when an individual is injured by the breach of the duty, will supply a remedy if the statute gives none.’ ” In Chotapeg, Inc., v. Bullowa (

1943Assn. v. Fried ley, 123 Ind. 143,145-146 .) Thus the rule generally accepted is that if the law on the subject is well and clearly defined, has existed and been published long enough to justify the belief that it was known to the profession, ‘ ‘ then a disregard of such rule by an attorney-at-law renders him accountable for the losses caused by such negligence or want of skill; negligence, if knowing the rule, he disregarded it; want of skill, if he was ignorant of the rule.” ( Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 496 .) On the question of the validity of the in terrorem clause I am fran

1943The following expression by Surrogate Wingate, in his opinion in Matter of Brush ( 154 Misc. 480 ) is an apt illustration: “ Whereas the indulgence of superlatives in judicial utterance is usually hazardous and frequently productive of untoward results, it may be said with safety that there are few subjects of testamentary interpretation, the principles concerning which are in a more nebulous and unsatisfactory state than in that which is here in question.

1943Assn. v. Fried ley, 123 Ind. 143,145-146 .) Thus the rule generally accepted is that if the law on the subject is well and clearly defined, has existed and been published long enough to justify the belief that it was known to the profession, ‘ ‘ then a disregard of such rule by an attorney-at-law renders him accountable for the losses caused by such negligence or want of skill; negligence, if knowing the rule, he disregarded it; want of skill, if he was ignorant of the rule.” ( Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 496 .) On the question of the validity of the in terrorem clause I am fran

1937As is pointed cut by Judge Hubbs in Matter of Rothman ( 263 N. Y. 31, at p. 33 ), the disregard of the principle, and the arbitrary appointment of one selected by the court over the wishes of the relatives of the incompetent can only lead to criticism of the court and resentment by the parties most interested in the proceeding.

1929(Guerin v. City of New York, 214 App. Div. 800 ; Civ.

1920Those facts constitute a cause of action.” (Citing Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115 , and Bern-hard v. Curtis, 75 Conn. 476 .) Whether defendant, appellant, accepted the money tendered or not the cause of action for damages, if any, survived.

1920Those facts constitute a cause of action.” (Citing Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115 , and Bern-hard v. Curtis, 75 Conn. 476 .) Whether defendant, appellant, accepted the money tendered or not the cause of action for damages, if any, survived.

1915The disregard of that rule was the basis of the reversal of the judgment of death in People v. Molineux ( 168 N. Y. 264 ).

1903In People v. Phyfe ( 136 N. Y. 554 ) it was held that purely statutory offenses cannot be established by implication, and that acts otherwise innocent and lawful do not become crimes unless there is a clear and positive expression of the legislative intent to make them such.