intersection violation in New York

2021Jorge's and plaintiff's deposition testimony establish that his vehicle was stopped at the traffic light when his vehicle's rear driver side bumper was struck by defendant Metropolitan Foods' left-turning truck and renders Metropolitan Foods' claim that the rear of Jorge's vehicle was in the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1175 irrelevant ( see Chame v Kronen , 150 AD3d 622 [1st Dept 2017]; Vespe v Kazi , 62 AD3d 408 [1st Dept 2009]).

2021Jorge's and plaintiff's deposition testimony establish that his vehicle was stopped at the traffic light when his vehicle's rear driver side bumper was struck by defendant Metropolitan Foods' left-turning truck and renders Metropolitan Foods' claim that the rear of Jorge's vehicle was in the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1175 irrelevant ( see Chame v Kronen , 150 AD3d 622 [1st Dept 2017]; Vespe v Kazi , 62 AD3d 408 [1st Dept 2009]).

2019Here, Hernandez and Julie P. Transit established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that (1) Hernandez had the right-of-way, (2) that because Desriviere failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), he was negligent as a matter of law, and (3) that Desriviere's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Williams v Hayes , 103 AD3d 713, 714-715 ; Thompson v Schmitt , 74 AD3d 789, 789-790 ; Maliza v Puerto-Rican Transp.

2019Here, Hernandez and Julie P. Transit established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that (1) Hernandez had the right-of-way, (2) that because Desriviere failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), he was negligent as a matter of law, and (3) that Desriviere's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Williams v Hayes , 103 AD3d 713, 714-715 ; Thompson v Schmitt , 74 AD3d 789, 789-790 ; Maliza v Puerto-Rican Transp.

2019Corp. , 50 AD3d at 652 ).

2011Vinci failed to stop at a red signal and proceeded through an intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2), striking the plaintiffs’ vehicle (see Monteleone v Jung Pyo Hong, 79 AD3d 988 [2010]; Ramos v Triboro Coach Corp., 31 AD3d 625 [2006]; Borges v Zukowski, 22 AD3d 439 [2005]; Casanova v New York City Tr.

2011Vinci failed to stop at a red signal and proceeded through an intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2), striking the plaintiffs’ vehicle (see Monteleone v Jung Pyo Hong, 79 AD3d 988 [2010]; Ramos v Triboro Coach Corp., 31 AD3d 625 [2006]; Borges v Zukowski, 22 AD3d 439 [2005]; Casanova v New York City Tr.

2011Vinci failed to stop at a red signal and proceeded through an intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2), striking the plaintiffs’ vehicle (see Monteleone v Jung Pyo Hong, 79 AD3d 988 [2010]; Ramos v Triboro Coach Corp., 31 AD3d 625 [2006]; Borges v Zukowski, 22 AD3d 439 [2005]; Casanova v New York City Tr.

2011Auth., 279 AD2d 495 [2001]).

2009The question of whether Abodeledhman actually stopped at the stop sign before entering the intersection, as he was required to do under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172 (a), is not dispositive, as the evidence revealed that whether or not he stopped at the stop sign, he failed to yield to the defendant Terab’s vehicle, which had the right-of-way (see Exime v Williams, 45 AD3d at 633 ).

2009Here, Terab and Gonzalez established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that Terab had the right-of-way, that because Abodeledhman failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a), he was negligent as a matter of law, and that Abodeledhman’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Klein v Crespo, 50 AD3d at 745 ; Ponticello v Wilhelm, 249 AD2d 459 [1998]).

2009Here, Terab and Gonzalez established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that Terab had the right-of-way, that because Abodeledhman failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a), he was negligent as a matter of law, and that Abodeledhman’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Klein v Crespo, 50 AD3d at 745 ; Ponticello v Wilhelm, 249 AD2d 459 [1998]).

2007Rather, the jury reasonably could have found, based upon the plaintiff Theresa Gerdvil’s varying accounts of where the defendants’ vehicle came from, and the defendant driver’s testimony that he was stopped at the time of the collision, that the accident resulted from Theresa Gerdvil’s not seeing what was there to be seen, and that the position of the defendants’ vehicle merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the accident (see Gerrity v Muthana, 7 NY3d 834, 835-836 [2006]; Peters v City of New York, 33 AD3d 779 [2006]; Ely v Pierce, 302 AD2d 489 [2003]).

2007Exime, while operating a motor vehicle, failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering an intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a), and thus that he was negligent as a matter of law (see McCain v Larosa, 41 AD3d 792, 793 [2007]; Gergis v Miccio, 39 AD3d at 468-469 ; Laino v Lucchese, 35 AD3d 672, 673 [2006]; McNamara v Fishkowitz, 18 AD3d 721, 721-722 [2005]; Meliarenne v Prisco, 9 AD3d 353, 354 [2004]).

2007Rather, the jury reasonably could have found, based upon the plaintiff Theresa Gerdvil’s varying accounts of where the defendants’ vehicle came from, and the defendant driver’s testimony that he was stopped at the time of the collision, that the accident resulted from Theresa Gerdvil’s not seeing what was there to be seen, and that the position of the defendants’ vehicle merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the accident (see Gerrity v Muthana, 7 NY3d 834, 835-836 [2006]; Peters v City of New York, 33 AD3d 779 [2006]; Ely v Pierce, 302 AD2d 489 [2003]).

2006The plaintiffs entrance into the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2) (a) constituted negligence per se (see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]) and was a proximate cause of the accident (see Lallemand v Cook, 23 AD 3d 533 [2005]; Garrett v Manaser, supra; Misa v Filancia, 2 AD3d 810 [2003]).

2006The plaintiffs entrance into the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2) (a) constituted negligence per se (see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]) and was a proximate cause of the accident (see Lallemand v Cook, 23 AD 3d 533 [2005]; Garrett v Manaser, supra; Misa v Filancia, 2 AD3d 810 [2003]).

2006The plaintiffs entrance into the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2) (a) constituted negligence per se (see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]) and was a proximate cause of the accident (see Lallemand v Cook, 23 AD 3d 533 [2005]; Garrett v Manaser, supra; Misa v Filancia, 2 AD3d 810 [2003]).

2006The plaintiffs entrance into the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2) (a) constituted negligence per se (see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]) and was a proximate cause of the accident (see Lallemand v Cook, 23 AD 3d 533 [2005]; Garrett v Manaser, supra; Misa v Filancia, 2 AD3d 810 [2003]).

2006The plaintiffs entrance into the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2) (a) constituted negligence per se (see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]) and was a proximate cause of the accident (see Lallemand v Cook, 23 AD 3d 533 [2005]; Garrett v Manaser, supra; Misa v Filancia, 2 AD3d 810 [2003]).

2006The plaintiffs entrance into the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (2) (a) constituted negligence per se (see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]) and was a proximate cause of the accident (see Lallemand v Cook, 23 AD 3d 533 [2005]; Garrett v Manaser, supra; Misa v Filancia, 2 AD3d 810 [2003]).

2005Considering the extent to which the issue of negligence was interwoven with the issue of causation in this case (see Pimpinella v McSwegan, 213 AD2d 232 [1995]), we conclude that the jury verdict finding that the defendant was negligent, but that his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident, could not have been reached “on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134 [1985]; see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493 [1978]; Delgado v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist.

2003Further, contrary to the appellant’s contention, Stanlaine demonstrated that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether she contributed to the accident by failing to yield the right-of-way at the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a) (see Brucaliere v Garlinghouse, 304 AD2d 782 [2003]; Batal v Associated Univs., 293 AD2d 558 [2002]).