intersection violation (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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intersection violation in Illinois

6 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1968–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Kennedy v. City of Chicagogreen
illappct · 2022 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024See Kennedy v. City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 210492, ¶ 3 ; Kata v. City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 162075-U , ¶ 6; Keating v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 112559-U , ¶ 2 “The red light camera program uses electronic monitoring devices to detect and record images of vehicles caught in an intersection in violation of a red light traffic signal.” Keating, 2013 IL App (1st) 112559-U , ¶ 2. ¶7 Following the City of Chicago’s implementation of its red-light camera program, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 94-795 (Pub.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Barrick v. Grimes green
illappct · 1999
1 sentence

2004Barrick, 308 Ill.

12004–2004
West v. Kirkham green
ill · 1992
2 sentences

1992(West, 147 Ill. 2d at 11 .) The court stated that this rationale “would effectively swallow the section’s immunity entirely,” because “the creative plaintiff, seeking to premise an action on the failure to provide a particular traffic device, could always circumvent section 3 — 104 by finding and pointing out some other traffic device that was provided.” (Emphasis in original.) (West, 147 Ill. 2d at 10 .) This rationale applies to plaintiff’s allegation that defendants were negligent in failing to reduce the speed limit on Route 83.

1992(West, 147 Ill. 2d at 11 .) The court stated that this rationale “would effectively swallow the section’s immunity entirely,” because “the creative plaintiff, seeking to premise an action on the failure to provide a particular traffic device, could always circumvent section 3 — 104 by finding and pointing out some other traffic device that was provided.” (Emphasis in original.) (West, 147 Ill. 2d at 10 .) This rationale applies to plaintiff’s allegation that defendants were negligent in failing to reduce the speed limit on Route 83.

11992–1992
First National Bank v. City of Aurora green
ill · 1978
2 sentences

1992Two of the city ordinances cited by the plaintiff as having been violated provided as follows: “ ‘No person owning or occupying any land or premises within the corporate limits of the city shall plant, construct or maintain upon said premises any hedges or board fences or other structure which will obstruct the view of any person driving along the streets of the city and approaching the intersections thereof, which is of a height greater than four (4) feet above the crown of the street, nor plant or maintain any plant, shrub, bush or other vegetation tending to obstruct such view, and which is

1992Two of the city ordinances cited by the plaintiff as having been violated provided as follows: “ ‘No person owning or occupying any land or premises within the corporate limits of the city shall plant, construct or maintain upon said premises any hedges or board fences or other structure which will obstruct the view of any person driving along the streets of the city and approaching the intersections thereof, which is of a height greater than four (4) feet above the crown of the street, nor plant or maintain any plant, shrub, bush or other vegetation tending to obstruct such view, and which is

11992–1992
Tabor v. Tazewell Service Co. neutral
illappct · 1958
2 sentences

1973While Oliva did not have the right to rely upon the assumption that Moffet would obey laws, as an excuse for Oliva’s failure to exercise due care (Tabor v. Tazewell Service Co., 18 Ill.App.2d 593 , 153 N.E.2d 98 ), it is likewise true that Oliva was not required to anticipate the negligence on the part of Moffet in running a red light (which the jury apparently believed happened).

1973While Oliva did not have the right to rely upon the assumption that Moffet would obey laws, as an excuse for Oliva’s failure to exercise due care (Tabor v. Tazewell Service Co., 18 Ill.App.2d 593 , 153 N.E.2d 98 ), it is likewise true that Oliva was not required to anticipate the negligence on the part of Moffet in running a red light (which the jury apparently believed happened).

11973–1973
Hestand v. Clark green
illappct · 1952
1 sentence

1968In giving consideration to the question of passing at an intersection in violation of the statute the Courts have held, in the following cases, a question of fact was presented (Hestand v. Clark, 345 Ill App 480, 103 NE2d 652 ; Pfile v. Owens, 331 Ill App 390, 73 NE2d 445 ; and Piper v. Dowell, Inc., 335 Ill App 337, 80 NE2d 736 ).

11968–1968
Pfile v. Owens neutral
illappct · 1947
1 sentence

1968In giving consideration to the question of passing at an intersection in violation of the statute the Courts have held, in the following cases, a question of fact was presented (Hestand v. Clark, 345 Ill App 480, 103 NE2d 652 ; Pfile v. Owens, 331 Ill App 390, 73 NE2d 445 ; and Piper v. Dowell, Inc., 335 Ill App 337, 80 NE2d 736 ).

11968–1968

Where else courts name it

LA 16 (1951–1982) NY 13 (1991–2021) CA 12 (1929–2016) GA 6 (1952–2023) IL 6 (1968–2024) NC 5 (1950–1978) MD 4 (1961–1980) TN 3 (1961–2010) ME 3 (1938–2006) PA 3 (1950–2004) ID 3 (1969–2025) OH 3 (1990–2016) FL 2 (1982–2010) NM 2 (1967–1977) WA 2 (1936–1959)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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