Burk tort claim in Oklahoma

2011Dismissal Of DRS and Parker In Her Official Capacity 118 To dismiss Simington's petition with prejudice based on McCrady I and McCrady II, the trial court apparently concluded (1) the three theories of recovery Simington advanced all arise from the same facts, ie., his demotion by OPM, and therefore they constitute but a single Burk tort claim for wrongful discharge, and (2) he is a permanent classified employee, 10 not an at-will employee, and therefore he may not bring a common-law Burk tort claim for wrongful discharge. 11 We disagree only with the first conclusion. 119 Treating Simington's

2011Dismissal Of DRS and Parker In Her Official Capacity 118 To dismiss Simington's petition with prejudice based on McCrady I and McCrady II, the trial court apparently concluded (1) the three theories of recovery Simington advanced all arise from the same facts, ie., his demotion by OPM, and therefore they constitute but a single Burk tort claim for wrongful discharge, and (2) he is a permanent classified employee, 10 not an at-will employee, and therefore he may not bring a common-law Burk tort claim for wrongful discharge. 11 We disagree only with the first conclusion. 119 Treating Simington's

2010Id. at I 17. [ 34 At issue here is not a Burk tort claim against either of Plaintiffs employers, but instead whether Oklahoma recognizes an action for intentional interference with the employment contract brought by a discharged at-will employee against her supervisor.

2000T9 The public-policy exception applies "where an employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of an established and well-defined public policy or for performing an act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy." Burk, 1989 OK 22, 119 , 770 P.2d at 29 .

2009Declaring a violation of the Labor Act to be a misdemeanor emphasizes the compelling nature of the payday policy expressed in § 165.2, but, like § 165.7, § 165.8 neither explicitly nor implicitly articulates a work-time or lunch-break policy. 4 ¶ 14 Lastly, we turn to § 199 of Title 40 which declares that an employer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if the employer discharges, penalizes, or otherwise discriminates against an employee for filing a complaint with the Commissioner of Labor, or institutes a proceeding on or an investigation of violations of specified labor statutes, or testifies o

2009Declaring a violation of the Labor Act to be a misdemeanor emphasizes the compelling nature of the payday policy expressed in § 165.2, but, like § 165.7, § 165.8 neither explicitly nor implicitly articulates a work-time or lunch-break policy. 4 ¶ 14 Lastly, we turn to § 199 of Title 40 which declares that an employer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if the employer discharges, penalizes, or otherwise discriminates against an employee for filing a complaint with the Commissioner of Labor, or institutes a proceeding on or an investigation of violations of specified labor statutes, or testifies o

2009In McCrady v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 2005 OK 67, ¶ 13 , 122 P.3d 473 , we held that the Burk tort would not apply to a classified state employee because the employee was not an "employee-at-will" and thus not within the persons entitled to assert such a claim. [17] In Shero v. Grand Savings Bank, see note 7, supra, we held that an employer who terminated an employee for refusing to dismiss his claims against a third party client of the employer pursuant to the Open Records Act did not violate any public policy which would support a Burk tort claim. [18] Title 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et

2009In McCrady v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 2005 OK 67, ¶ 13 , 122 P.3d 473 , we held that the Burk tort would not apply to a classified state employee because the employee was not an "employee-at-will" and thus not within the persons entitled to assert such a claim. [17] In Shero v. Grand Savings Bank, see note 7, supra, we held that an employer who terminated an employee for refusing to dismiss his claims against a third party client of the employer pursuant to the Open Records Act did not violate any public policy which would support a Burk tort claim. [18] Title 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et

2022We reiterate, "The date of injury has long been the point in time in workers' compensation cases when rights of the parties become established . . . ." Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod , 2012 OK 96 295 P.3d 1107 The general rule is that the law in effect at the time of an employee's injury controls in workers' compensation matters.

2022We reiterate, "The date of injury has long been the point in time in workers' compensation cases when rights of the parties become established . . . ." Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod , 2012 OK 96 295 P.3d 1107 The general rule is that the law in effect at the time of an employee's injury controls in workers' compensation matters.

2011Cameron University, 2008 OK 2 , 16, 63 P.3d 585, 589 .

2010As stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Kruchowski v. The Weyerhaeuser Co., 2008 OK 105, ¶ 24 , 202 P.3d 144, 151-152 ; A viable Burk claim must allege (1) an actual .or constructive discharge (2) of an at-will employee (8) in significant part for a reason that violates an Oklahoma public policy goal (4) that is found in Oklahoma's constitutional, statutory, or decisional law or in a federal constitutional provision that prescribes a norm of conduct for Oklahoma and (5) no statutory remedy exists that is adequate to protect the Oklahoma policy goal.

2010As stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Kruchowski v. The Weyerhaeuser Co., 2008 OK 105, ¶ 24 , 202 P.3d 144, 151-152 ; A viable Burk claim must allege (1) an actual .or constructive discharge (2) of an at-will employee (8) in significant part for a reason that violates an Oklahoma public policy goal (4) that is found in Oklahoma's constitutional, statutory, or decisional law or in a federal constitutional provision that prescribes a norm of conduct for Oklahoma and (5) no statutory remedy exists that is adequate to protect the Oklahoma policy goal.

2009Relying on List, supra, the Court again decided that a Burk tort could not lie because the action was based upon the plaintiff's status rather than her conduct. 115 Again, looking to the "adequacy" of the remedies available to the plaintiff, Marshall determined that because the remedies provided by Federal law in Title VII 12 and Oklahoma's - anti-discrimination - statutes 13 provided "adequate" remedies, there was no reason to extend the Burk tort exception to Marshall's claim. 116 Two years after Marshall, we once again addressed the issue of whether a plain tiff alleging sexual harassment i

2009Relying on List, supra, the Court again decided that a Burk tort could not lie because the action was based upon the plaintiff's status rather than her conduct. 115 Again, looking to the "adequacy" of the remedies available to the plaintiff, Marshall determined that because the remedies provided by Federal law in Title VII 12 and Oklahoma's - anti-discrimination - statutes 13 provided "adequate" remedies, there was no reason to extend the Burk tort exception to Marshall's claim. 116 Two years after Marshall, we once again addressed the issue of whether a plain tiff alleging sexual harassment i

2009Const. art. 5, § 46, see note 5, supra. [20] Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., 2006 OK 59, ¶ 3 , 145 P.3d 1037 . [21] Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., see note 18, supra at ¶ 6. [22] Also after Saint , in Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, ¶¶ 12-13 , 176 P.3d 1204 , we held that a federal statute standing alone does not articulate Oklahoma's public policy.

2009Const. art. 5, § 46, see note 5, supra. [20] Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., 2006 OK 59, ¶ 3 , 145 P.3d 1037 . [21] Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., see note 18, supra at ¶ 6. [22] Also after Saint , in Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, ¶¶ 12-13 , 176 P.3d 1204 , we held that a federal statute standing alone does not articulate Oklahoma's public policy.

2004Id. at 546. 4 This test was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 5 In applying the test, Jantzen noted the similarity of Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety, 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).

2004Id. at 546. 4 This test was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 5 In applying the test, Jantzen noted the similarity of Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety, 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).

2004Id. at 546. 4 This test was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 5 In applying the test, Jantzen noted the similarity of Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety, 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).

1995Id. at 50 .

1995Hayes’ reliance on this duty of loyalty to his employer is also distinguishable from the situation involved in Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47 (Okla.1989), where we sanctioned a Burk tort claim where the termination was alleged to have been based upon the employee’s refusal to drive a vehicle not conforming to statutory mandates regarding safety in that the vehicle had defective brakes, headlights, and turn signals.