estoppel by judgment doctrine in Oklahoma

1966In the case of Uphoff v. Meier, 184 Okl. 378 , 87 P.2d 960 , we held: “Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a fact, right, or question actually litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction may not again be litigated in subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, even though involving a different cause of action.” To the same effect see Stark v. Stark, 188 Okl. 474 , 110 P.2d 897 ; Staples v. Jenkins, 178 Okl. 186 , 62 P.2d 504 ; 50 C.J.S.

1966In the case of Uphoff v. Meier, 184 Okl. 378 , 87 P.2d 960 , we held: “Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a fact, right, or question actually litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction may not again be litigated in subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, even though involving a different cause of action.” To the same effect see Stark v. Stark, 188 Okl. 474 , 110 P.2d 897 ; Staples v. Jenkins, 178 Okl. 186 , 62 P.2d 504 ; 50 C.J.S.

1999Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. 495 , 8 How. 495 , 12 L.Ed. 1170 (1850); Hartford Accident & Indemmity Co. v. Hembree, 198 Okl. 249 , 142 P.2d 618 (1948).

1999Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. 495 , 8 How. 495 , 12 L.Ed. 1170 (1850); Hartford Accident & Indemmity Co. v. Hembree, 198 Okl. 249 , 142 P.2d 618 (1948).

1999Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. 495 , 8 How. 495 , 12 L.Ed. 1170 (1850); Hartford Accident & Indemmity Co. v. Hembree, 198 Okl. 249 , 142 P.2d 618 (1948).

1968If there is any uncertainty as to the matter formerly adjudicated the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty by the record or extrinsically is upon the party who claims the benefit of the former judgment.” As to the application of this, and other related principles of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, or verdict, see Stone v. Stone, Fla.App., 111 So.2d 486 , Blair v. Blair, 247 Mo. 61 , 152 S.W. 1 , Meyer v. Vance, Okl., 406 P.2d 996 , Lewis v. Aubrey, Okl., 404 P.2d 1005 , and other cases digested in 9 Okl.Dig., “Judgment”, 720.

1968If there is any uncertainty as to the matter formerly adjudicated the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty by the record or extrinsically is upon the party who claims the benefit of the former judgment.” As to the application of this, and other related principles of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, or verdict, see Stone v. Stone, Fla.App., 111 So.2d 486 , Blair v. Blair, 247 Mo. 61 , 152 S.W. 1 , Meyer v. Vance, Okl., 406 P.2d 996 , Lewis v. Aubrey, Okl., 404 P.2d 1005 , and other cases digested in 9 Okl.Dig., “Judgment”, 720.

1968If there is any uncertainty as to the matter formerly adjudicated the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty by the record or extrinsically is upon the party who claims the benefit of the former judgment.” As to the application of this, and other related principles of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, or verdict, see Stone v. Stone, Fla.App., 111 So.2d 486 , Blair v. Blair, 247 Mo. 61 , 152 S.W. 1 , Meyer v. Vance, Okl., 406 P.2d 996 , Lewis v. Aubrey, Okl., 404 P.2d 1005 , and other cases digested in 9 Okl.Dig., “Judgment”, 720.

1968If there is any uncertainty as to the matter formerly adjudicated the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty by the record or extrinsically is upon the party who claims the benefit of the former judgment.” As to the application of this, and other related principles of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, or verdict, see Stone v. Stone, Fla.App., 111 So.2d 486 , Blair v. Blair, 247 Mo. 61 , 152 S.W. 1 , Meyer v. Vance, Okl., 406 P.2d 996 , Lewis v. Aubrey, Okl., 404 P.2d 1005 , and other cases digested in 9 Okl.Dig., “Judgment”, 720.

1967Jur.2d, “Estoppel and Waiver”, §§ 68 et seq.) where the party seeking to invoke the rule was not an adversary, or in privity with one, in the action, or proceeding, in which the previous representation was made —as was the situation in the cases of Tyra v. Board of Police and Fire Pension Com’rs., 101 Cal.App.2d 248 , 225 P.2d 617 , and Scarano v. Central R.

1967Jur.2d, “Estoppel and Waiver”, §§ 68 et seq.) where the party seeking to invoke the rule was not an adversary, or in privity with one, in the action, or proceeding, in which the previous representation was made —as was the situation in the cases of Tyra v. Board of Police and Fire Pension Com’rs., 101 Cal.App.2d 248 , 225 P.2d 617 , and Scarano v. Central R.

1967For further cases expounding on the theory of estoppel by judgment and the distinction between the latter and situations calling for the application of the rule that subsequent action is barred as res judicata, see Wilkey v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., Old., 322 P.2d 1058 , and Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Thompson, Old., 380 P. 2d 70S.

1966I recognize, as mentioned in Viersen v. Boettcher, Okl., 387 P.2d 133, 137 , that ordinarily when the owner of an interest in a parcel of real estate is not made a party to an action to foreclose a mortgage on it, his interest is not foreclosed; but this general rule may not obtain, where, as here, the interest of the non-litigant and that of one of the parties to the action, is so inseparable and indistinguishable in all respects material to the estoppel by judgment doctrine, that it may be regarded as one, and the same, and they both be said to represent the same interest.

1966I recognize, as mentioned in Viersen v. Boettcher, Okl., 387 P.2d 133, 137 , that ordinarily when the owner of an interest in a parcel of real estate is not made a party to an action to foreclose a mortgage on it, his interest is not foreclosed; but this general rule may not obtain, where, as here, the interest of the noil-litigant and that of one of the parties to the action, is so inseparable and indistinguishable in all respects material to the estoppel by judgment doctrine, that it may be regarded as one, and the same, and they both be said to represent the same interest. -This was not sho

1966In the case of Uphoff v. Meier, 184 Okl. 378 , 87 P.2d 960 , we held: “Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a fact, right, or question actually litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction may not again be litigated in subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, even though involving a different cause of action.” To the same effect see Stark v. Stark, 188 Okl. 474 , 110 P.2d 897 ; Staples v. Jenkins, 178 Okl. 186 , 62 P.2d 504 ; 50 C.J.S.

1966In the case of Uphoff v. Meier, 184 Okl. 378 , 87 P.2d 960 , we held: “Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a fact, right, or question actually litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction may not again be litigated in subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, even though involving a different cause of action.” To the same effect see Stark v. Stark, 188 Okl. 474 , 110 P.2d 897 ; Staples v. Jenkins, 178 Okl. 186 , 62 P.2d 504 ; 50 C.J.S.

1966In the case of Uphoff v. Meier, 184 Okl. 378 , 87 P.2d 960 , we held: “Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a fact, right, or question actually litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction may not again be litigated in subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, even though involving a different cause of action.” To the same effect see Stark v. Stark, 188 Okl. 474 , 110 P.2d 897 ; Staples v. Jenkins, 178 Okl. 186 , 62 P.2d 504 ; 50 C.J.S.

1966In the case of Uphoff v. Meier, 184 Okl. 378 , 87 P.2d 960 , we held: “Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a fact, right, or question actually litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction may not again be litigated in subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, even though involving a different cause of action.” To the same effect see Stark v. Stark, 188 Okl. 474 , 110 P.2d 897 ; Staples v. Jenkins, 178 Okl. 186 , 62 P.2d 504 ; 50 C.J.S.

1966It is immaterial that Sautbine owed Federal Life no duty to call its attention to the fact that it had not correctly named as a party defendant in that case, the record owner of the mineral interest here involved and that he was perfectly within his legal rights in filing a disclaimer in Cause No. 2218, supra. In this connection, notice Quirk v. Bedal, 42 Idaho 567 , 248 P. 447, 449 .

1966It is immaterial that Sautbine owed Federal Life no duty to call its attention to the fact that it had not correctly named as a party defendant in that case, the record owner of the mineral interest here involved and that he was perfectly within his legal rights in filing a disclaimer in Cause No. 2218, supra. In this connection, notice Quirk v. Bedal, 42 Idaho 567 , 248 P. 447, 449 .

1966Nor were the parties, spoken of in Dierks v. Walsh, 203 Okl. 113 , 218 P.2d 920 , as the “newly-made” defendants, shown to have been “virtually represented” by Dierlcs Lumber & Coal Co., in the action whose judgment was there urged as es-topping them.

1966Nor were the parties, spoken of in Dierks v. Walsh, 203 Okl. 113 , 218 P.2d 920 , as the “newly-made” defendants, shown to have been “virtually represented” by Dierlcs Lumber & Coal Co., in the action whose judgment was there urged as es-topping them.

1966Sautbine, Inc. In Young v. Rohrbough [ 88 Neb. 101 ], 129 N.W. 167 (Neb. 1910), the Court held that where judgment is rendered for directors holding a majority of the stock of the corporation, it is res judicata and the corporation cannot be sued on the same facts.

1966Sautbine, Inc. In Young v. Rohrbough [ 88 Neb. 101 ], 129 N.W. 167 (Neb. 1910), the Court held that where judgment is rendered for directors holding a majority of the stock of the corporation, it is res judicata and the corporation cannot be sued on the same facts.

1953Yet before the doctrine of estoppel by judgment may be applied to a particular issue that issue must be the same in both cases. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 719.” In Ford v. Dania Lumber & Supply Co., 150 Fla. 435 , 7 So.2d 594 , it is stated that an essential element of estoppel by judgment is identity of parties suing in the same capacity; and in Paine & Williams Co. v. Baldwin Rubber Co., 6 Cir., 113 F.2d 840 , that- court states that the facts conclusively determined by a judgment includes not only the ultimate facts but the material facts necessary in arriving at the conclusion but such facts

1953Yet before the doctrine of estoppel by judgment may be applied to a particular issue that issue must be the same in both cases. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 719.” In Ford v. Dania Lumber & Supply Co., 150 Fla. 435 , 7 So.2d 594 , it is stated that an essential element of estoppel by judgment is identity of parties suing in the same capacity; and in Paine & Williams Co. v. Baldwin Rubber Co., 6 Cir., 113 F.2d 840 , that- court states that the facts conclusively determined by a judgment includes not only the ultimate facts but the material facts necessary in arriving at the conclusion but such facts

1953Yet before the doctrine of estoppel by judgment may be applied to a particular issue that issue must be the same in both cases. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 719.” In Ford v. Dania Lumber & Supply Co., 150 Fla. 435 , 7 So.2d 594 , it is stated that an essential element of estoppel by judgment is identity of parties suing in the same capacity; and in Paine & Williams Co. v. Baldwin Rubber Co., 6 Cir., 113 F.2d 840 , that- court states that the facts conclusively determined by a judgment includes not only the ultimate facts but the material facts necessary in arriving at the conclusion but such facts

1943Hine. v. Board of Com’rs of McClain County, 188 Okla. 260 , 108 P. 2d 112 ; Factor Oil Co. v. Brydia, 184 Okla. 113 , 85 P. 2d 311 ; In re Bighorse’s Estate, 172 Okla. 498 , 45 P. 2d 727 .

1943Hine. v. Board of Com’rs of McClain County, 188 Okla. 260 , 108 P. 2d 112 ; Factor Oil Co. v. Brydia, 184 Okla. 113 , 85 P. 2d 311 ; In re Bighorse’s Estate, 172 Okla. 498 , 45 P. 2d 727 .

1943Hine. v. Board of Com’rs of McClain County, 188 Okla. 260 , 108 P. 2d 112 ; Factor Oil Co. v. Brydia, 184 Okla. 113 , 85 P. 2d 311 ; In re Bighorse’s Estate, 172 Okla. 498 , 45 P. 2d 727 .

1943Hine. v. Board of Com’rs of McClain County, 188 Okla. 260 , 108 P. 2d 112 ; Factor Oil Co. v. Brydia, 184 Okla. 113 , 85 P. 2d 311 ; In re Bighorse’s Estate, 172 Okla. 498 , 45 P. 2d 727 .

1943Hine. v. Board of Com’rs of McClain County, 188 Okla. 260 , 108 P. 2d 112 ; Factor Oil Co. v. Brydia, 184 Okla. 113 , 85 P. 2d 311 ; In re Bighorse’s Estate, 172 Okla. 498 , 45 P. 2d 727 .

1943Hine. v. Board of Com’rs of McClain County, 188 Okla. 260 , 108 P. 2d 112 ; Factor Oil Co. v. Brydia, 184 Okla. 113 , 85 P. 2d 311 ; In re Bighorse’s Estate, 172 Okla. 498 , 45 P. 2d 727 .

1942In support of this well-known rule, they cite Lee v. Franklin, 171 Okla. 70 , 42 P. 2d 257 , which in turn cites Earl v. Earl, 48 Okla. 442 , 149 P. 1179 , and other Oklahoma cases to the same effect.

1942In support of this well-known rule, they cite Lee v. Franklin, 171 Okla. 70 , 42 P. 2d 257 , which in turn cites Earl v. Earl, 48 Okla. 442 , 149 P. 1179 , and other Oklahoma cases to the same effect.

1942In support of this well-known rule, they cite Lee v. Franklin, 171 Okla. 70 , 42 P. 2d 257 , which in turn cites Earl v. Earl, 48 Okla. 442 , 149 P. 1179 , and other Oklahoma cases to the same effect.

1942In support of this well-known rule, they cite Lee v. Franklin, 171 Okla. 70 , 42 P. 2d 257 , which in turn cites Earl v. Earl, 48 Okla. 442 , 149 P. 1179 , and other Oklahoma cases to the same effect.