approval doctrine in Oregon

1928The opinion in Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co. , 82 Or. 149 ( 181 P. 411 ), is authority for the same doctrine; and a statement in Turnidge v. Thompson , 89 Or. 637 , 653 ( 175 P. 281 ), is an approval of the doctrine." The above views are reiterated in Warner v. Synnes , 114 Or. 451 ( 230 P. 362 , 235 P. 305 , 44 A.L.R. 904 ); they are expressed to like effect by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit in Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar , 10 F.2d 335 .

1924The opinion in Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co., 82 Or. 149 ( 161 Pac. 411 ), is authority for the same doctrine; and a statement in Turnidge v. Thompson, 89 Or. 637, 653 ( 175 Pac. 281 ), is an approval of the doctrine.” This rule has become the settled law of the state.

2026Cite as 348 Or App 133 (2026) 143 The board also argues that the prior approval requirement is “the only practical way to ensure that both petitioner and the supervisor know that petitioner is abid- ing by the restriction on number of devices.” We are not persuaded that requiring prior approval from a supervising officer—whose discretion to withhold that approval is not limited by the board—is “the only practical way” to ensure petitioner’s compliance with the various restrictions to which he is subject.

2022However, the board may refuse to allow new issues to be raised if it finds that the issue could have been raised before the local government[.]” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 321 Or App 505 (2022) 511 incorrect road standard.

2017Rudell v. City of Bandon, 249 Or App 309, 320 , 275 P3d 1010 (2012); see also Sisters Forest Planning Committee v. Deschutes Cty., 198 Or App 311, 316 , 108 P3d 1175 (2005) (“[S]pecificity and clarity are desirable to ensure that the imposed conditions are properly understood not only by the entity responsible for complying with them but also by potential challengers of a permit subject to conditions.”); Tirumali v. City of Portland, 169 Or App 241, 246 , 7 P3d 761 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 674 (2001) (if an approval standard is “ambiguous,” it is not “clear and objective”).

2017Rudell v. City of Bandon, 249 Or App 309, 320 , 275 P3d 1010 (2012); see also Sisters Forest Planning Committee v. Deschutes Cty., 198 Or App 311, 316 , 108 P3d 1175 (2005) (“[S]pecificity and clarity are desirable to ensure that the imposed conditions are properly understood not only by the entity responsible for complying with them but also by potential challengers of a permit subject to conditions.”); Tirumali v. City of Portland, 169 Or App 241, 246 , 7 P3d 761 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 674 (2001) (if an approval standard is “ambiguous,” it is not “clear and objective”).

2017Rudell v. City of Bandon, 249 Or App 309, 320 , 275 P3d 1010 (2012); see also Sisters Forest Planning Committee v. Deschutes Cty., 198 Or App 311, 316 , 108 P3d 1175 (2005) (“[S]pecificity and clarity are desirable to ensure that the imposed conditions are properly understood not only by the entity responsible for complying with them but also by potential challengers of a permit subject to conditions.”); Tirumali v. City of Portland, 169 Or App 241, 246 , 7 P3d 761 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 674 (2001) (if an approval standard is “ambiguous,” it is not “clear and objective”).

2017Rudell v. City of Bandon, 249 Or App 309, 320 , 275 P3d 1010 (2012); see also Sisters Forest Planning Committee v. Deschutes Cty., 198 Or App 311, 316 , 108 P3d 1175 (2005) (“[S]pecificity and clarity are desirable to ensure that the imposed conditions are properly understood not only by the entity responsible for complying with them but also by potential challengers of a permit subject to conditions.”); Tirumali v. City of Portland, 169 Or App 241, 246 , 7 P3d 761 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 674 (2001) (if an approval standard is “ambiguous,” it is not “clear and objective”).

2012In Rogue Valley Assoc. of Realtors v. City of Ashland, 35 Or LUBA 139, 158 (1998), aff'd, 158 Or App 1 , 970 P2d 685 (1999), LUBA described the kind of approval standards that violate ORS 197.307(6) (2009): “ ‘Needed housing’ is not to be subjected to standards, conditions or procedures that involve subjective, value-laden analyses that are designed to balance or mitigate impacts of the development on (1) the property to be developed or (2) the adjoining properties or community.

2012In Rogue Valley Assoc. of Realtors v. City of Ashland, 35 Or LUBA 139, 158 (1998), aff'd, 158 Or App 1 , 970 P2d 685 (1999), LUBA described the kind of approval standards that violate ORS 197.307(6) (2009): “ ‘Needed housing’ is not to be subjected to standards, conditions or procedures that involve subjective, value-laden analyses that are designed to balance or mitigate impacts of the development on (1) the property to be developed or (2) the adjoining properties or community.

1998Consequently, the city argues, its governing body’s interpretation is subject to the deferential review standard of ORS 197.829(l)(a)-(c) and Clark v. Jackson County, 313 Or 508 , 836 P2d 710 (1992), and is not reversible under that standard.

1998Consequently, the city argues, its governing body’s interpretation is subject to the deferential review standard of ORS 197.829(l)(a)-(c) and Clark v. Jackson County, 313 Or 508 , 836 P2d 710 (1992), and is not reversible under that standard.

1994Such rules shall be binding upon all members of the bar.” (Emphasis added.) Further, ORS 9.527(7) provides: “The Supreme Court may disbar, suspend or reprimand a member of the bar whenever, upon proper proceedings for that purpose, it appears to the court that: ‡ ‡ ‡ “(7) The member has violated any of the provisions of the rules of professional conduct adopted pursuant to ORS 9.490.” (Emphasis added.) ORS 3.050 provides that “[n]o person is eligible to the office of judge of the circuit court unless the person is a member of the Oregon State Bar.” In Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar, 241 Or 283, 2

1994Such rules shall be binding upon all members of the bar.” (Emphasis added.) Further, ORS 9.527(7) provides: “The Supreme Court may disbar, suspend or reprimand a member of the bar whenever, upon proper proceedings for that purpose, it appears to the court that: ‡ ‡ ‡ “(7) The member has violated any of the provisions of the rules of professional conduct adopted pursuant to ORS 9.490.” (Emphasis added.) ORS 3.050 provides that “[n]o person is eligible to the office of judge of the circuit court unless the person is a member of the Oregon State Bar.” In Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar, 241 Or 283, 2

1992Petitioner and cross-petitioners assign error to LUBA’s conclusion that the denial did not give rise to a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. 2 The county denied the application, because it concluded that the proposed dwelling did not satisfy the approval standard in its ordinance that dwellings in the zone be “necessary and accessory to a forest use.” The Supreme Court said in Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 609 , 581 P2d 50 (1978): “Where a zoning designation allows a landowner some substantial beneficial use of his property, the landowner is not

1992Petitioner and cross-petitioners assign error to LUBA’s conclusion that the denial did not give rise to a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. 2 The county denied the application, because it concluded that the proposed dwelling did not satisfy the approval standard in its ordinance that dwellings in the zone be “necessary and accessory to a forest use.” The Supreme Court said in Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 609 , 581 P2d 50 (1978): “Where a zoning designation allows a landowner some substantial beneficial use of his property, the landowner is not

1992Petitioner and cross-petitioners assign error to LUBA’s conclusion that the denial did not give rise to a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. 2 The county denied the application, because it concluded that the proposed dwelling did not satisfy the approval standard in its ordinance that dwellings in the zone be “necessary and accessory to a forest use.” The Supreme Court said in Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 609 , 581 P2d 50 (1978): “Where a zoning designation allows a landowner some substantial beneficial use of his property, the landowner is not

1992Petitioner and cross-petitioners assign error to LUBA’s conclusion that the denial did not give rise to a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. 2 The county denied the application, because it concluded that the proposed dwelling did not satisfy the approval standard in its ordinance that dwellings in the zone be “necessary and accessory to a forest use.” The Supreme Court said in Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 609 , 581 P2d 50 (1978): “Where a zoning designation allows a landowner some substantial beneficial use of his property, the landowner is not

1989In Ellis v. Springfield Women’s Clinic, 67 Or App 359, 361 , 678 P2d 268 , rev den 297 Or 228 (1984), the plaintiff excepted to an error-of-judgment instruction which stated that “ ‘if the Defendants in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, erred in such judgment, then they would not be negligent.’ ” The court noted that although it had previously approved of the instruction in Roach v. Hockey, 53 Or App 710, 715 , 634 P2d 249 , rev den 292 Or 108 (1981), it now concluded that this approval was in error.

1989In Ellis v. Springfield Women’s Clinic, 67 Or App 359, 361 , 678 P2d 268 , rev den 297 Or 228 (1984), the plaintiff excepted to an error-of-judgment instruction which stated that “ ‘if the Defendants in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, erred in such judgment, then they would not be negligent.’ ” The court noted that although it had previously approved of the instruction in Roach v. Hockey, 53 Or App 710, 715 , 634 P2d 249 , rev den 292 Or 108 (1981), it now concluded that this approval was in error.

1989In Ellis v. Springfield Women’s Clinic, 67 Or App 359, 361 , 678 P2d 268 , rev den 297 Or 228 (1984), the plaintiff excepted to an error-of-judgment instruction which stated that “ ‘if the Defendants in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, erred in such judgment, then they would not be negligent.’ ” The court noted that although it had previously approved of the instruction in Roach v. Hockey, 53 Or App 710, 715 , 634 P2d 249 , rev den 292 Or 108 (1981), it now concluded that this approval was in error.

1989In Ellis v. Springfield Women’s Clinic, 67 Or App 359, 361 , 678 P2d 268 , rev den 297 Or 228 (1984), the plaintiff excepted to an error-of-judgment instruction which stated that “ ‘if the Defendants in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, erred in such judgment, then they would not be negligent.’ ” The court noted that although it had previously approved of the instruction in Roach v. Hockey, 53 Or App 710, 715 , 634 P2d 249 , rev den 292 Or 108 (1981), it now concluded that this approval was in error.

1970In Bandy , as pointed out by the specially concurring opinion of Lusk, J. (at p. 24, 342 P.2d at p. 850 ), the amount paid by the Board to the plaintiff in that case was paid as an award of compensation after determination that she was an employee, and was thus presumably "adequate to compensate her for her injury." In this case, however, the payment to plaintiff was made pursuant to O.R.S. 656.289(4), enacted in 1965, after the decision in Bandy , and which provides as follows: "Notwithstanding ORS 656.236, in any case where there is a bona fide dispute over compensability of a claim, the par

1928The opinion in Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co. , 82 Or. 149 ( 181 P. 411 ), is authority for the same doctrine; and a statement in Turnidge v. Thompson , 89 Or. 637 , 653 ( 175 P. 281 ), is an approval of the doctrine." The above views are reiterated in Warner v. Synnes , 114 Or. 451 ( 230 P. 362 , 235 P. 305 , 44 A.L.R. 904 ); they are expressed to like effect by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit in Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar , 10 F.2d 335 .

1928The opinion in Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co. , 82 Or. 149 ( 181 P. 411 ), is authority for the same doctrine; and a statement in Turnidge v. Thompson , 89 Or. 637 , 653 ( 175 P. 281 ), is an approval of the doctrine." The above views are reiterated in Warner v. Synnes , 114 Or. 451 ( 230 P. 362 , 235 P. 305 , 44 A.L.R. 904 ); they are expressed to like effect by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit in Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar , 10 F.2d 335 .

1928The opinion in Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co. , 82 Or. 149 ( 181 P. 411 ), is authority for the same doctrine; and a statement in Turnidge v. Thompson , 89 Or. 637 , 653 ( 175 P. 281 ), is an approval of the doctrine." The above views are reiterated in Warner v. Synnes , 114 Or. 451 ( 230 P. 362 , 235 P. 305 , 44 A.L.R. 904 ); they are expressed to like effect by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit in Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar , 10 F.2d 335 .