approval claim in Texas

1955In Lyne v. Sanford, 82 Tex. 58 , 19 S.W. 847 , the Supreme Court held that where the application for sale set out the property to be sold for the purpose of paying debts, and the court granted such order of sale, such action was tantamount to an approval of the claim by the administrator, and by. the court; In Heard v. Vineyard, Tex.Com.App., 212 S.W. 489, 490, 492 , the court held that it was immaterial that at the date of the application and order of sale the claim had not been established, when in fact such claim was then due and payable.

1955In Lyne v. Sanford, 82 Tex. 58 , 19 S.W. 847 , the Supreme Court held that where the application for sale set out the property to be sold for the purpose of paying debts, and the court granted such order of sale, such action was tantamount to an approval of the claim by the administrator, and by. the court; In Heard v. Vineyard, Tex.Com.App., 212 S.W. 489, 490, 492 , the court held that it was immaterial that at the date of the application and order of sale the claim had not been established, when in fact such claim was then due and payable.

2015No. JC–0147 (1999) (“The salaries of employees “[T]hese statutory requirements make the approval of a claim and non-elected county officers may be changed by a budget against the county (or a payment thereof) a discretionary amendment at any time, while the salaries of elected officers act of the auditor rather than a mere ministerial act.” Id. may be changed only once a year, ‘during the regular budget “To hold [otherwise] would remove one of the safeguards hearing and adoption proceedings.’ ”).

2015Santoya and Iracheta's in this system of checks and balances and would permit increase in salary was not adopted through the budget process. a commissioners court to disburse county funds without restraint.” Id.

2010Webb County Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel Inc. , 792 S.W.2d 952 , 954 (Tex. 1990).

2002Id. “[TJhese statutory requirements make the approval of a claim against the county (or a payment thereof) a discretionary act of the auditor rather than a mere ministerial act.” Id.

2002Id. “[TJhese statutory requirements make the approval of a claim against the county (or a payment thereof) a discretionary act of the auditor rather than a mere ministerial act.” Id.

1997They are Christian v. Pace, 371 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1963, no writ), and Poole v. Rutherford, 199 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1947, writ ref d n.r.e.).

1997They are Christian v. Pace, 371 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1963, no writ), and Poole v. Rutherford, 199 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1947, writ ref d n.r.e.).

1996The approval requirement assures “that the design feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the contractor.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 , 108 S.Ct. at 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 458 .

1996The approval requirement assures “that the design feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the contractor.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 , 108 S.Ct. at 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 458 .

1985Another panel of this court affirmed the conviction of a co-defendant in Ryles v. State, 676 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.).

1972We, therefore, cannot agree with the statement in Wood to the effect that such instruction is “not ade *515 quate and sufficient to remove the harm caused” by the injection of insurance. 474 S.W.2d at 766 .

1939Gregory et al. v. Ward, 118 Tex. 526 , 18 S.W.2d 1049 .

1939Gregory et al. v. Ward, 118 Tex. 526 , 18 S.W.2d 1049 .

1929In De Cordova v. Rogers, 97 Tex. 60 , 75 S. W. 16 , the Supreme Court, in discussing what was then article 1853, being article 3219, Revised Statutes 1911, as well as what was then article 3213, speaking through Judge Gaines, said: “Now by referring back to Article 1853, it will be seen that all orders must be ‘entered on the records’ of the court, and since the claim docket is expressly made a record book of the court, it would seem that when the approval of a claim is so entered the requirement of that article is strictly complied with.

1929In De Cordova v. Rogers, 97 Tex. 60 , 75 S. W. 16 , the Supreme Court, in discussing what was then article 1853, being article 3219, Revised Statutes 1911, as well as what was then article 3213, speaking through Judge Gaines, said: “Now by referring back to Article 1853, it will be seen that all orders must be ‘entered on the records’ of the court, and since the claim docket is expressly made a record book of the court, it would seem that when the approval of a claim is so entered the requirement of that article is strictly complied with.

1923The case of Hicks v. Oliver, 78 Tex. 233 , 14 S.W. 575 , was an action to vacate the approval of the claim upon the ground that the distributees of the estate had no actual notice of the filing of the claim, which, it was alleged, was unjust, etc. In the cases of Logan v. Gay and De Cordova v. Rogers, supra, it affirmatively appears that the approval of the county court upon the claim attacked was indorsed thereon.

1923The case of Hicks v. Oliver, 78 Tex. 233 , 14 S.W. 575 , was an action to vacate the approval of the claim upon the ground that the distributees of the estate had no actual notice of the filing of the claim, which, it was alleged, was unjust, etc. In the cases of Logan v. Gay and De Cordova v. Rogers, supra, it affirmatively appears that the approval of the county court upon the claim attacked was indorsed thereon.

1922Co. v. West, 174 S. W. 287 , writ refused, by this court, opinion by Justice Dunklin, the following language was used: “And as no exception was presented to the charge, which, in effect, affirmatively excluded a recovery on that issue [issue of discovered peril] appellees must be held to an approval of that instruction. 2 Vernon’s Sayles’ Tex. Civ.

1916The case of Nelson v. Bridge, 98 Tex. 523 , 86 S. W. 7 (cited by appellees as one of strong application to this case), in construing the mandatory language of the statute that letters testamentary shall not be issued where a will is probated after the lapse of four years from the death of the testator, is based upon the consideration of several statutes construed in pari materia, and wherein it is asserted that the Legislature, by the particular article, did not intend mandatory force, and the probate void, because other statutes showed to the contrary. [4] The assertion that the alleged appro

1916The case of Nelson v. Bridge, 98 Tex. 523 , 86 S. W. 7 (cited by appellees as one of strong application to this case), in construing the mandatory language of the statute that letters testamentary shall not be issued where a will is probated after the lapse of four years from the death of the testator, is based upon the consideration of several statutes construed in pari materia, and wherein it is asserted that the Legislature, by the particular article, did not intend mandatory force, and the probate void, because other statutes showed to the contrary. [4] The assertion that the alleged appro

1915McNeill v. Hallmark, 28 Tex. 157 ; Salter v. Hilgen, 40 Wis. 363 ; 23 Cyc. 1090 to 1094.

1915McNeill v. Hallmark, 28 Tex. 157 ; Salter v. Hilgen, 40 Wis. 363 ; 23 Cyc. 1090 to 1094. [6, 7] The approval of plaintiff’s claim as a valid debt against the dissolved city of Colorado, in connection with the order appointing the receiver, has the effect of a judgment, and precludes any question of liability of that corporation for plaintiff’s debt.

1915McNeill v. Hallmark, 28 Tex. 157 ; Salter v. Hilgen, 40 Wis. 363 ; 23 Cyc. 1090 to 1094.

1915McNeill v. Hallmark, 28 Tex. 157 ; Salter v. Hilgen, 40 Wis. 363 ; 23 Cyc. 1090 to 1094. [6, 7] The approval of plaintiff’s claim as a valid debt against the dissolved city of Colorado, in connection with the order appointing the receiver, has the effect of a judgment, and precludes any question of liability of that corporation for plaintiff’s debt.

1915Stats, art. 2061; Cleburns Street Ry. v. Barnes, 168 S. W. 991 .

1915T. & P. Ry. v. Shoemaker, 98 Tex. 451 , 84 S. W. 1049 . [11] And as no exception was presented to the charge, which, in effect, affirmatively exchided a recovery upon that issue, appel-lees must be held to an approval of that instruction. 2 Vernon’s Say les’ Tex. Civ.

1915T. & P. Ry. v. Shoemaker, 98 Tex. 451 , 84 S. W. 1049 . [11] And as no exception was presented to the charge, which, in effect, affirmatively exchided a recovery upon that issue, appel-lees must be held to an approval of that instruction. 2 Vernon’s Say les’ Tex. Civ.

1895As authority for this ruling, the court cites with approval the case of Gas Company v. San Francisco, 9 Cal., 453 , in which the opinion was by Judge Field.

1874(Eccles v. Daniels, 16 Tex., 136 .) Ho question has been made in this case as to the right of appeal from such order under the present probate law, and we think that right secured by the statute to any person interested in the estate, not excepting the administrator who has allowed a claim and afterwards sees fit to contest its approval.