informal competency inquiry in Texas

2021Order for Competency Evaluation “We review a complaint that the trial court erred in not conducting an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion.” Farris v. State, 506 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 424-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (applying the old bona-fide doubt standard); see also Art. 46B.004(c-1) (suggestion of incompetency is sufficient to require an informal competency inquiry and explicitly rejecting the bona-fide doubt standard).

2025Standard of Review “We review a complaint that the trial court erred in not conducting an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion.” Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim.

2025Standard of Review “We review a complaint that the trial court erred in not conducting an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion.” Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim.

2023“We review challenges to the adequacy of a trial court’s informal competency inquiry, and its findings following such an inquiry, for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at *10 (citing Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex. Crim.

2011Competency In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not performing an informal competency inquiry because appellant’s counsel, after jury selection, suggested that appellant might be incompetent to stand trial, the record does not include a psychiatric report of findings from a court-ordered psychiatric examination, a witness testified during trial that appellant “wasn’t in his right state of mind” at the time appellant was involved in an extraneous “shooting incident,” and appellant’s mother testified during trial that appellant was “bipolar and hears voices.” We rev

2020An informal competency inquiry is required when evidence is brought to the court’s attention “rais[ing] a bona-fide doubt in the judge’s mind about the defendant’s competency to stand trial.” Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim.

2009Generally, a trial court should undertake an informal competency inquiry if it receives information sufficient to raise a bonafi.de doubt about a defendant’s competence, such as evidence indicating “recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant.” Id. at 710 ; Reed v. State, 112 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Tex.Code Crim.

2025Standard of Review “We review a complaint that the trial court erred in not conducting an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion.” Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim.

2025Standard of Review “We review a complaint that the trial court erred in not conducting an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion.” Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim.

2025George v State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d).

2024George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d).

2025Ann. art. 46B.003(a)—“does not [by itself] equate to a suggestion of incompetency.” Dusenbery, 2018 WL 4025078 , at *9 (cleaned up) (citing Graves v. State, No. 02-15- 00141-CR, 2015 WL 9244767 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 17, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that a defendant’s suicide attempt absent “evidence of severe mental illness” was “not a suggestion of” incompetency)); see also Pleasant v. State, No. 01-23-00144-CR, 2024 WL 3350254 , at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication

2023“We review challenges to the adequacy of a trial court’s informal competency inquiry, and its findings following such an inquiry, for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at *10 (citing Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).

2023See Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d); Lewis v. State, 532 S.W.3d 423, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston 2016, pet. ref’d).

2009See Fuller, 253 S.W.3d at 228 ; McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 710 ; see also Tex.Code Crim.

2009See Fuller , 253 S.W.3d at 228 ; McDaniel , 98 S.W.3d at 710 ; see also Tex. Code Crim.

2014See Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); Thomas v. State, 312 S.W.3d 732, 736-37 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd).

2011App. 2008); Thomas v. State , 312 S.W.3d 732 , 736–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d).

2012Appellant may also have been referring to a family member or friend 2 We also note the dissimilarities between appellant‘s testimony and the defendant‘s testimony in Greene v. State, which the San Antonio Court of Appeals determined was so bizarre it necessitated an informal competency inquiry. 225 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).

2009Greene, 225 S.W.3d at 329 n. 3 (referring to “bona fide doubt” standard established in McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 706, 710 , which may be satisfied by “recent severe ' mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant”).

2023Rodriguez v. State, 329 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Casey v. State, 924 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Crim.

2012“A further evidentiary showing is not required to initiate the inquiry, and the court is not required to have a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant.” Id. 1 We review a complaint that the trial court erred in not conducting an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion.

2013Id. at 614 . 6 .In a situation such as this, other jurisdictions have applied this formulation of the prejudice prong, or a similar derivative.

2013Id. ; see Tex. Code Crim.

2025See Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 797 ; Guerra v. State, No. 11-19-00359-CR, 2022 WL 599241 , at *5–6 (Tex. App.— Eastland Feb. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (allowing criminal defendant to raise appellate challenge that the trial court should have conducted an informal competency inquiry); Johnson v. State, Nos. 2-05-205-CR, 2-05- 206-CR, 2006 WL 2578033 , at *4 & n.37 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 22, 2006, no pet.) (abatement order, not designated for publication) (holding that criminal defendant did not forfeit complaint about trial court’s not having conducted a comp

2023Rodriguez v. State, 329 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Casey v. State, 924 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Crim.

2023See, e.g., Means v. State, 955 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (concluding that “any purported error from the trial court’s failure to convene” pretrial competency “proceeding was waived”); Dickson v. State, No. 13-97-00693-CR, 1999 WL 33757418 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 13, 1999, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) (noting that trial counsel’s decision not to object to failure to hold hearing on defendant’s competency in response to motion “waived error”).

2023See Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d); Lewis v. State, 532 S.W.3d 423, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston 2016, pet. ref’d).

2021Order for Competency Evaluation “We review a complaint that the trial court erred in not conducting an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion.” Farris v. State, 506 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim.

2020An informal competency inquiry is required when evidence is brought to the court’s attention “rais[ing] a bona-fide doubt in the judge’s mind about the defendant’s competency to stand trial.” Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim.

2015See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (history of mental illness and being on psychiatric medications insufficient to warrant competency inquiry absent evidence of present inability to communicate with counsel or understand proceedings); Miles v. State, 688 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1985, pet. ref’d) (concluding once competency finding is made, some evidence of subsequent change in mental condition required to warrant new competency determination).

2015See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (history of mental illness and being on psychiatric medications insufficient to warrant competency inquiry absent evidence of present inability to communicate with counsel or understand proceedings); Miles v. State, 688 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1985, pet. ref’d) (concluding once competency finding is made, some evidence of subsequent change in mental condition required to warrant new competency determination).

2014The court of appeals found that, because Maines chose to overdose on medication, his trial could continue because he voluntarily absented himself.18 Similarly, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in Bottom v. State that Bottom’s voluntary choice in ingesting a large quantity of medication with the goal of committing suicide was a voluntary absence and his trial properly continued without his presence.19 Without needing to address Chapter 46B’s proper application, the court put it succinctly: “Because Bottom acted voluntarily and because he cannot avoid trial by intentionally disabling himself

2014The court of appeals found that, because Maines chose to overdose on medication, his trial could continue because he voluntarily absented himself.18 Similarly, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in Bottom v. State that Bottom’s voluntary choice in ingesting a large quantity of medication with the goal of committing suicide was a voluntary absence and his trial properly continued without his presence.19 Without needing to address Chapter 46B’s proper application, the court put it succinctly: “Because Bottom acted voluntarily and because he cannot avoid trial by intentionally disabling himself

2014Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Lawrence v. State, 169 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. refd).

2014See Gray v. State, 257 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d).

2013Regarding appellant’s past PTSD, “evidence of past mental impairment is only sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt about competency if the evidence indicates that the defendant is presently ‘incapable of consulting with counsel or understanding the proceedings against him.’” Iniquez v. State, 374 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.—Austin 8 2012, no pet.) (quoting Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395–96); see also Charley v. State, No. 05-08-01678-CR, 2010 WL 2510208 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jun. 23, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling defendant’s issue that the trial court sh

2009Generally, a trial court should undertake an informal competency inquiry if it receives information sufficient to raise a bonafi.de doubt about a defendant’s competence, such as evidence indicating “recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant.” Id. at 710 ; Reed v. State, 112 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Tex.Code Crim.

2009Generally, a trial court should undertake an informal competency inquiry if it receives information sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt about a defendant's competence, such as evidence indicating "recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant." Id. at 710 ; Reed v. State, 112 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd); Tex.Code Crim.

2007Id . art. 46B.004(c); McDaniel , 98 S.W.3d at 710-11 (explaining the requirements of each step in a claim of incompetence); Alcott v. State , 51 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. Crim.

2003Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. 2: See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 3: We conclude the preceding exchange at a hearing a little less than a month before trial, in fact, constituted an informal competency inquiry.

2003Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. 2: See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 3: We conclude the preceding exchange at a hearing a little less than a month before trial, in fact, constituted an informal competency inquiry.