dual capacity doctrine in Pennsylvania

2011Co. of Pa., 503 Pa. 160, 167 , 469 A.2d 111, 114 (1983) (defining the dual capacity doctrine). .

2011Co. of Pa., 503 Pa. 160, 167 , 469 A.2d 111, 114 (1983) (defining the dual capacity doctrine). .

2019However, the Court also emphasized, in accordance with the majority opinion in Tatrai, that the dual capacity exception has no application where “the employee’s compensable injury occurred while he was actually engaged in the performance of his job.” Lewis, 538 A.2d at 869 ; see also Heath v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 546 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Pa. 1988); Snyder v. Pocono Medical Center, 656 A.2d 534, 537 (Pa. Super. 1995), aff’d, 690 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1997). - 17 - J-A15039-19 This Court most recently addressed the application of the dual capacity exception in Neidert.

1990Recently the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Callender v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 387 Pa. Superior Ct. 283, 285 , 564 A.2d 180, 181 (1989) 7 addressed the issue of “whether an employer, who is also a manufacturer of a product sold to the general public, may be liable under the dual capacity doctrine for a tort claim in the nature of a products liability action brought by an employee ... when the employee is injured by the product in the course of his employment.” In determining that the dual capacity doctrine was not applicable, the Superior Court analyzed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ta

1990The dual capacity doctrine exposes the employer to liability in tort by its employee "if it occupies, in addition to its capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers upon it obligations independent of those imposed upon it as employer.” Taynton v. Dersham, 358 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 , 516 A.2d 1241 (1986). 6 .

1990The dual capacity doctrine exposes the employer to liability in tort by its employee "if it occupies, in addition to its capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers upon it obligations independent of those imposed upon it as employer.” Taynton v. Dersham, 358 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 , 516 A.2d 1241 (1986). 6 .

2023See Neidert, 143 A.3d at 388 (dual capacity doctrine is exception to employer immunity).

2023See Neidert, 143 A.3d at 388 .

2019However, the Court also emphasized, in accordance with the majority opinion in Tatrai, that the dual capacity exception has no application where “the employee’s compensable injury occurred while he was actually engaged in the performance of his job.” Lewis, 538 A.2d at 869 ; see also Heath v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 546 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Pa. 1988); Snyder v. Pocono Medical Center, 656 A.2d 534, 537 (Pa. Super. 1995), aff’d, 690 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1997). - 17 - J-A15039-19 This Court most recently addressed the application of the dual capacity exception in Neidert.

2016Dist. of Phila., 517 Pa. 461 , 538 A.2d 862 , 869 (1988). 4 As noted above, in Tatrai , our Supreme Court held the dual capacity exception applied because, "the [hospital] employee, at the time of her injury in the general hospital emergency room, was in the same position as any other member of the public receiving medical treatment because the emergency room was open to the general public." Tatrai, supra at 1165 .

2019Our Supreme Court has found that the dual capacity doctrine operated as an exception to the exclusive remedy bar in only one case, Tatrai v. Presbyterian University Hospital, 439 A.2d 1162 (Pa. 1982).

1997We granted allocatur to revisit the dual capacity doctrine applied in Tatrai, 497 Pa. 247 , 439 A.2d 1162 , and further defined in Budzichowski, 503 Pa. 160 , 469 A.2d 111 .

2019However, the Court also emphasized, in accordance with the majority opinion in Tatrai, that the dual capacity exception has no application where “the employee’s compensable injury occurred while he was actually engaged in the performance of his job.” Lewis, 538 A.2d at 869 ; see also Heath v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 546 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Pa. 1988); Snyder v. Pocono Medical Center, 656 A.2d 534, 537 (Pa. Super. 1995), aff’d, 690 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1997). - 17 - J-A15039-19 This Court most recently addressed the application of the dual capacity exception in Neidert.

2005See, e.g., Snyder v. Pocono Medical Center, 547 Pa. 415 , 690 A.2d 1152 (1997) (opinion in support of affirmance) (hospital employee exposed to tuberculosis in course of her employment barred from suing her employer for negligent treatment); Heath v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 519 Pa. 274 , 546 A.2d 1120 (1988) (barring employee’s products liability claim against employer who was also manufacturer of equipment on which employee was injured); Coleman v. City of Philadelphia, 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 605 , 571 A.2d 528 (1990) (city trash collector barred from recovering from city for injuries sustained

2019Neidert, 143 A.3d at 388 ; see also Soto, 32 A.3d at 791 .

2015In Soto v. Nabisco, Inc., 32 A.3d 787 (Pa. Super. 2011), this Court stated that “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied the ‘dual capacity’ doctrine in only one case,” that being Tatrai v. Presbyterian Univ.

2016Generally, "the Pennsylvania Superior Court has taken an unfavorable view of the dual capacity doctrine." Van Doren v. Coe Press Equipment Corp., 592 F.Supp.2d 776 , 799 (E.D.Pa.2008) (citing Heimbach v. Heimbach [ 401 Pa.Super. 119 ], 584 A.2d 1008 (Pa.Super.1991) ; Callender, supra ).

2011Generally, “the Pennsylvania Superior Court has taken an unfavorable view of the dual capacity doctrine.” Van Doren v. Coe Press Equipment Corp., 592 F.Supp.2d 776, 799 (E.D.Pa.2008) (citing Heimbach v. Heimbach, 401 Pa.Super. 119 , 584 A.2d 1008 (1991); Callender, supra).

2019However, the Court also emphasized, in accordance with the majority opinion in Tatrai, that the dual capacity exception has no application where “the employee’s compensable injury occurred while he was actually engaged in the performance of his job.” Lewis, 538 A.2d at 869 ; see also Heath v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 546 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Pa. 1988); Snyder v. Pocono Medical Center, 656 A.2d 534, 537 (Pa. Super. 1995), aff’d, 690 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1997). - 17 - J-A15039-19 This Court most recently addressed the application of the dual capacity exception in Neidert.

1990Recently the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Callender v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 387 Pa. Superior Ct. 283, 285 , 564 A.2d 180, 181 (1989) 7 addressed the issue of “whether an employer, who is also a manufacturer of a product sold to the general public, may be liable under the dual capacity doctrine for a tort claim in the nature of a products liability action brought by an employee ... when the employee is injured by the product in the course of his employment.” In determining that the dual capacity doctrine was not applicable, the Superior Court analyzed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ta

1990Recently the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Callender v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 387 Pa. Superior Ct. 283, 285 , 564 A.2d 180, 181 (1989) 7 addressed the issue of “whether an employer, who is also a manufacturer of a product sold to the general public, may be liable under the dual capacity doctrine for a tort claim in the nature of a products liability action brought by an employee ... when the employee is injured by the product in the course of his employment.” In determining that the dual capacity doctrine was not applicable, the Superior Court analyzed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ta

1986See Weldon v. Celotex Corp., 695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.1982); Koslop v. Cabot Corp., 622 F.Supp. 222 (M.D.Pa.1985); Colombo v. Johns-Manville Corp., 601 F.Supp. 1119 (E.D.Pa.1984); Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, supra; Silvestri v. Strescon Industries, Inc., supra. But see Oyster v. Johns-Manville Corp., 568 F.Supp. 83 (E.D.Pa.1983); Kosowan v. MDC Industries, Inc., supra. Assuming, arguendo, that Tatrai did adopt the “dual capacity doctrine,” we find that it does not apply to the facts of this case.

1983The rationale behind the dual capacity theory ... is that the existence of an employment relationship between the injured party and the manufacturer of the product causing the injury is of reduced importance when viewed in the context of a products liability action____ [T]he theory reasons that since the employer is also the manufacturer of the product which allegedly caused injury and which would thus give rise to products liability were it not for the existence of the employment relationship, liability ought not to be avoided merely because of that employment relationship.” Kohr v. Raybestos

1981See Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 283 , 30 N.E.2d 596, 597 (1940) (administration of an impure drug was not a risk incidental to nurse’s employment); 6 Stevens v. County of Nassau, 56 App.Div.2d 866, 392 N.Y.

1981See Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 283 , 30 N.E.2d 596, 597 (1940) (administration of an impure drug was not a risk incidental to nurse’s employment); 6 Stevens v. County of Nassau, 56 App.Div.2d 866, 392 N.Y.